The 156th Rifle Division was first formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in August 1939 in the Crimea, part of the Odessa Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) that would become official the following month. It was still in the Crimea when the German invasion began in June 1941, as part of 9th Rifle Corps, which was subordinated to 51st Army in August. As one of two regular rifle divisions in the peninsula it was given responsibility for defending the well-fortified Isthmus of Perekop as Axis forces arrived from Ukraine in September. After several days of heavy fighting late that month against forces of the German 11th Army the 156th was forced to retreat from its positions along the Tatar Wall, falling back to the rear defense line near Ishun with the loss of most of one regiment. In late October the second stage of the offensive began, and within days 51st Army and the reinforcing Separate Coastal Army were in full retreat, during which the 156th had its commander and most of his staff taken prisoner. In November what remained was evacuated across the Kerch Strait. As the German summer offensive began into the Caucasus steppe in early July the depleted division was ordered north to defend along the Don River, but with manpower and equipment in short supply it was unable to regain its strength and it was officially disbanded on August 10.
A new 156th was formed in the Moscow Military District in May 1943, based on a pair of rifle brigades, one of which had no combat experience. As it formed it came under command of 68th Army in the Reserve of the Supreme High Command but the Army was assigned to Western Front in July, prior to the start of the summer offensive toward Smolensk. The division left Western Front in September for a brief rebuilding as it was railed north to become part of 1st Baltic Front in October. Assigned to 4th Shock Army it was involved in the battles to expand the breakthrough south of Nevel toward Haradok and eventually on Vitebsk. The complicated and frustrating fighting for the latter place continued through the winter without decisive success, and prior to the summer offensive the 156th was transferred to 43rd Army, north and west of the German-held salient. During Operation Bagration the division was initially in second echelon and took part in mopping up encircled German forces before advancing into the so-called "Baltic Gap" in Lithuania and Latvia. It won the Order of Kutuzov for its part in the fighting southeast of Riga before advancing on Memel in October and taking part in the isolation of that port. During 1945 it was back in 4th Shock Army and was part of the force containing the former Army Group North in the Courland Peninsula. It remained in service in Latvia until June 1946 when it was disbanded.
1st Formation The 156th began forming on August 16, 1939, at Simferopol, based on a rifle regiment from the 30th Rifle Division. At the outbreak of war it was still in the Crimea, one of two rifle divisions stationed there. At this time its order of battle was as follows: 361st Rifle Regiment 417th Rifle Regiment 530th Rifle Regiment 434th Artillery RegimentCharles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 77 260th Antitank Battalion 174th Antiaircraft Battery (later 483rd Antiaircraft Battalion) 183rd Reconnaissance Battalion 265th Sapper Battalion 215th Signal Battalion 217th Medical/Sanitation Battalion 204th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 183rd Motor Transport Battalion 215th Field Bakery 137th Divisional Artillery Workshop 267th Footwear Workshop 450th Field Postal Station 238th Field Office of the State Bank Kombrig Platon Vasilevich Chernyaev came from command of the 30th Division to take over the new division on the day it began forming. A veteran of World War I and the Russian Civil War, including service in the 1st Cavalry Army, he had briefly studied at the Frunze Academy in 1930-32 and had been acting commander of the 90th Rifle Division in 1937–38. His rank would be modernized to that of major general on June 5, 1940.
Defense of Crimea At the outset of the German invasion the 156th was part of 9th Rifle Corps, which also contained the 106th Rifle and 32nd Cavalry Divisions,Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 12 for a strength of about 35,000 personnel, all under command of Lt. Gen. P. I. Batov. The Corps was tasked with defending the Crimea and preparing for amphibious operations elsewhere in the Black Sea.Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 77 On August 20 the Corps was subordinated to 51st Army.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 44 Before the Axis forces arrived General Chernyaev left the division to take up duties in Separate Coastal Army and was replaced Col. Aleksandr Ivanovich Danilin on September 1. Chernyaev would be killed by artillery fire on June 22, 1942, in the Donbas.Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, ed. & trans. D. M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, UK, 1998, p. 66 Danilin had been in command of the 85th Rifle Regiment, 29th Rifle Division, when he was arrested in July 1938 during the Great Purge. He remained under arrest until December 1939, and was reinstated in the Red Army in February 1940. Before taking command of the 156th he was serving as deputy commander of the 74th Rifle Division.
51st Army, with a strength of some 95,000, was placed under command of Col. Gen. F. I. Kuznetsov, who began preparing a defense of the Isthmus of Perekop in mid-August with most of his assigned forces, apart from 9th Corps, still en route. Roughly 30,000 civilians were drafted into building defenses alongside the Red Army troops on the Perekop and the Chonhar Peninsula. His deployment was badly affected by faulty intelligence from the STAVKA in General Staff Order No. 001033 of August 18 which stated in part:In fact, the Axis had no amphibious capability to speak of, and the German airborne force had been devastated on Crete in May, so it was odd that this information was given credence. It led Kuznetsov to deploy 40,000 troops to defend the coast against landings that were effectively impossible, while a further 25,000 were in the Crimean interior on anti-paratroop duty. Just 30,000 were left to defend the northern approaches, including Danilin's 7,000 at Perekop.Robert Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2014, pp. 43-44
The Army was not initially assigned any tanks, so Southern Front managed to scrape up ten T-34s and 56 T-37s from repair facilities to form the 5th Tank Regiment under command of Maj. S. P. Baranov, giving Kuznetsov a small mobile reserve. On August 30 the German 11th Army forced a crossing of the Dniepr River at Beryslav in the face of resistance from Southern Front's 9th Army. The attackers broke out on September 9–10, forcing a shattered 9th Army back toward Melitopol and opening the approaches to the Crimea. The 11th Army commander, Gen. E. Ritter von Schobert, directed his LIV Army Corps toward Perekop, without any clear idea of what that force would face; in fact German intelligence had not yet identified 51st Army. Schobert directed the Corps commander, Gen. E. Hansen, to form a forward detachment in an effort to take the Perekop by coup de main, just before Schobert was killed in an air crash on September 12. Gen. E. von Manstein was appointed by Hitler as his successor, but he would not arrive for five days.Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, p. 44
On the day of Schobert's death the reconnaissance battalion of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, under command of Sturmbannführer K. Meyer, made a 35 km dash from Beryslav toward Perekop, followed by the 22nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and reached the village of Preobrazhenka, 8 km north of the ancient Tatar Wall, at around 0600 hours. Meyer's force consisted of motorcycle infantry, a few armored cars, and a battery of towed Pak 36 antitank guns, but no engineers and no other heavy weapons. As it entered the village his lead company took 76mm artillery fire from the armored train Voykovets as well as small arms fire from the 2nd Battalion of the 361st Rifle Regiment entrenched at the nearby Chervonyi Chaban Sovkhoz. Meyer could see that extensive fortifications continued to the south and as he retreated he reported back to Hansen that "coup against Perekop impossible."Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, pp. 44-45
Battle of Perekop Manstein arrived at Mykolaiv on September 17 and found that Hansen had moved up his 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions toward the Perekop but had not attempted to reduce the Soviet defenses. Furthermore, XXX Army Corps had sealed off the Chonhar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit with Leibstandarte but had also made no effort to push into the Crimea. The 156th had constructed three defensive lines across the Perekop, with the main line making use of the Tatar Wall. In the forward line two battalions of the 361st Regiment held strongpoints, each with an artillery battalion of the 434th Regiment in support. Behind this advanced position was a recently dug antitank ditch some 2m deep and four lines of tanglefoot-type barbed-wire obstacles. Within the main line of resistance concrete and timber/stone bunkers had been dug for 76mm regimental guns and 45mm antitank guns, plus several dug-in tanks. The Tatar Wall itself was fronted by the old moat, now 12m deep and 33m wide; the Wall sat on 5m-high earthen berm. The surrounding countryside was barren of trees and other vegetation, completely open to Soviet observation. Most concerning for the attackers, however, was the extensive employment of antipersonnel mines, including thousands of wooden PMDs which could not be found by conventional detectors, plus improvised devices including aerial bombs and naval mines. Remote-control buried flamethrowers were also in service. Overall, the German Army had not had to penetrate such a defence to date in the war.Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, pp. 46-47
Manstein was keen to avoid a frontal assault and set 11th Army's engineers to find some way to bypass these lines. One possibility was cross the shallow Syvash as had been done by the Red Army in 1920, but due to the tidal conditions and soft bottom at this time German engineers trying to wade across quickly sank to their hips. The use of Sturmbooten was also considered, but rejected. In addition, Kuznetsov was expecting this move and had ordered Danilin to deploy two battalions of the 530th Rifle Regiment on the Litovskii Peninsula where the 1920 crossing had occurred. On the Chonhar the railroad bridge had been destroyed and obstacles placed in the water below, while the Arabat was so long, narrow and exposed that it could only be crossed if unopposed.Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, pp. 47-49