Spanish military conspiracy of 1936

The Spanish military conspiracy of 1936 was a plot developed within the Spanish army from March to July of 1936. It commenced shortly after the Popular Front government assumed power. Initially, it was barely more than an informal group of Madrid-based generals, who agreed to monitor political developments, and be ready to intervene in case of a breakdown of state structures and a forthcoming proletarian revolution. Over time, conspirators assumed that military action was inevitable, and started to prepare for a coup. Its political objectives were not clear, but its most important one was toppling the Popular Front government, leading to major rectifications of the republican regime towards some sort of corporative state. The conspiracy network grew to hundreds of officers in most Spanish garrisons. The person who agreed to lead the future coup was the exiled general José Sanjurjo. His representative in Spain was initially general Ángel Rodríguez del Barrio, but since late May, this role was assumed by general Emilio Mola, who emerged as the de facto leader of the conspiracy. Some right-wing politicians were given vague information, but they were neither told any details nor admitted to the decision-making process. The government was aware of the plot unfolding, but since there was only circumstantial evidence in hand, they opted not to launch a pre-emptive strike, and to instead wait for the plotters to come out. The conspiracy climaxed in a coup, which began on July 17, 1936, and which effectively commenced the Spanish Civil War.

Background

Throughout most of the 19th century the army acted as an arbiter in political conflicts, with a decisive role in coups, risings and civil wars. The beginning of the Restoration regime, established in the mid-1870s, commenced a period of stabilization, with the military driven out of politics. However, since the early 20th century, the system was decreasingly capable of dealing with new challenges, and the voice of the army was beginning to be heard again.see the chapter The Pretorian Tradition in Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, Madison 1987, , pp. 13-18, Stanley G. Payne, El camino al 18 de julio, Barcelona 2023, , pp. 269-271 The 1923 coup of general Miguel Primo de Rivera was praetorian in character; the 6-year-long military dictatorship successfully tackled key immediate problems, but it failed to re-define the regime. Primo acknowledged defeat and stepped down in 1930, but no new solution within the format of liberal democracy has been found and the monarchy collapsed in 1931.see the chapter An Authoritarian Alternative, Payne 1987, pp. 19-33

The military greeted the advent of the Republic with little enthusiasm, but no particular hostility. The officer corps was generally monarchist rather than republican and conservative rather than progressive, but following last years of Primo dictatorship, which had compromised and discredited the army, most military men preferred to stay clear of politics.Stanley G. Payne, Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936, Madison 1993, , p. 96, Payne 2023, p. 272 It was only when the new regime started to target the army for serious reform that voices of dissent started to be heard. A series of reforms, introduced since 1931, were aimed at scaling down the overgrown officer corps, structural reform, and bringing the armed forces firmly under the civilian control.Payne 1993, pp. 96-97, Payne 2023, pp. 272-273 This proved to make way for the growth of corporative disenchantment and for loose conspiracy by a minor fraction of the officer corps, which produced the politically vague 1932 coup known as Sanjurjada, defeated easily in about 24 hours.

In 1933-1935 the army did not play a protagonist role in politics,"los miltiares, por lo general, tenian poco afan de protagonismo politico", Payne 2023, p. 272 except that in October 1934 it was engaged in defending the constitutional republican regime against a localized revolution staged by Anarchist, Socialist and Catalanist groupings;the army "habia aplicado la ley y habia salvado la Constitucion", Payne 2023, p. 273 combat involved much bloodshed and massive repression followed. It was mostly individual military men – usually retired or without assignment – that took part in anti-Republican plots engineered by some right-wing political movements, especially the Carlists.Julio Aróstegui, Combatientes Requetés en la Guerra Civil española, 1936–1939, Madrid, , pp. 71-89 A semi-official structure, Unión Militar Española, emerged in the early 1930s and grouped a minoritarian, yet significant group of officers, especially at junior and mid-rank positions; it was flavored by right-wing sympathies but initially it did not assume a clearly anti-Republican format, and it remained as sort of a corporative organization."el color politico de la UME era anti izquierdista, pero mas alla de esto, su unico programa era la defensa de los intereses militares", Payne 2023, p. 279, also Payne 1987, p. 83

General elections of February 1936 produced the triumph of Popular Front, the alliance partially composed of parties which organized the 1934 revolution and the one which placed amnesty to the revolutionaries as the key point of its program. On election night, triumphant celebrations in many cities turned into riots and produced numerous assaults on town halls and prison.Manuel Álvarez Tardío, Roberto Villa García, 1936. Fraude y violencia en las elecciones del Frente Popular, Barcelona 2017, , pp. 276-292 A few highly-positioned officers suggested that the government introduce state of war, which some scholars consider the first, unsuccessful attempt of a military coup.see e.g. "la declaración del estado de guerra no perseguía otra cosa que el golpe contra el ejercicio de la democracia", José Luis Martín Ramos, El Frente Popular. Victoria y derrota de la democracia en España, Barcelona 2015, , p. 151 The new Popular Front government embarked on radical left-wing policy and declared amnesty; suspicious about the army, it replaced most of the command layer with trusted officers.Payne 2023, p. 275 Politically-motivated street violence kept growing, soon to approach breakdown of public order.detailed analysis in Fernando del Del Rey, Manuel Alvarez Tardió, Fuego cruzado. La primavera de 1936, Barcelona 2024, . See e.g. graphs showing episodes of violence and fatalities by month, p. 276 In early March legal action was launched against some officers who had fought the 1934 revolution,General Lopes Ochoa was detained on March 10, Payne 2023, p. 274 while radical parties demanded that all state functionaries involved in repressing the 1934 rebels be subject to juridical proceedings.Payne 2023, pp. 273-274

Development

Generals' Junta (early March – late April)

On March 8Some Madrid-based generals were meeting regularly since late 1935, yet this was barely more than loose talk, Thomas 2012, p. 156. For a historiographic vision which presents the March meeting as merely the crowning of a long conspiracy, developing from 1931 or perhaps even earlier, see Angel Viñas 2019, ¿Quien quiso la guerra civil?, Barcelona 2019, a group of generals – later to be named Junta de Generales by some historiansSee e.g. José Rodríguez Labandeira, La Crisis de la República y el Golpe de los Generales 1933-1939, Madrid 2024, p. 113 - met in Madrid and formed the first nucleus of the conspiracy. According to the official ministerial list, the most senior officer was 1) Rodriguez del Barrio, followed by 2) Villegas, 3) Saliquet, 4) González Carrasco, 5) Franco, 6) Fanjul (division generals), 7) Orgaz, and 8) Mola (brigadiers).These are the names which usually appear in various accounts. Some authors provide also other names, like Ponte, Kindelan or Varela, Alía Miranda 2011, p. 75 Some generals (especially Goded, after del Barrio, the second highest-ranking conspirator and by some historians considered "el principal inspirador de la conspiración militar")Payne 2023, p. 279 were absent, though aware and supportive. Among those present only Franco and Mola commanded troops (or rather were appointed to command, yet to assume their new duties); the remaining ones held administrative roles or remained at ministerial disposal. Fernando del Rey, Manuel Alvarez Tardió, Fuego cruzado. La primavera de 1936, Barcelona 2024, , p. 501 The generals did not initially plan to stage a coup; instead, they agreed to watch political developments closely and get ready for intervention in case of total breakdown of public order, dissolution of Guardia Civil, release of all conscripts, or armed rising on part of the Left. They also agreed that the leading role should be entrusted to general Sanjurjo, at the time on exile in Portugal, with del Barrio acting as his representative. del Rey, Alvarez Tardió 2024, p. 501 Soon afterwards Franco left for Canary Islands and Mola for Navarre, while other participants remained in Madrid. Unión Militar Española structures were taken advantage of as communication channels, especially that colonel Galarza, the co-founder of UME, also took part in the meeting.

Some time in mid-March, Sanjurjo, who was in touch with conspirators by means of emissaries and encrypted postal correspondence, accepted the leadership role, del Rey, Alvarez Tardió 2024, pp. 501-502 with del Barrio as the one "quien me gusta más" and Varela as "la mejor cabeza y el único intelligente". del Rey, Alvarez Tardió 2024, p. 503 Development of the conspiracy network is unclear; it was mostly a Madrid-based enterprise and sketchy plans, in place by late March, were also centered on Madrid. del Rey, Alvarez Tardió 2024, p. 504 At the time the plotters did not consider the situation in Spain detrimental enough to warrant a coup and preferred to simply wait in standby. This irritated Sanjurjo, who from his Portuguese exile pushed for immediate action; he developed doubts about what he considered an indecisive stand of the Madrid conspirators and as a measure of encouragement pledged to move to Spain the same moment the coup is declared. del Rey, Alvarez Tardió 2024, pp. 504-505 A review, performed by the plotters and dated early April, listed Morocco, Valladolid, Burgos, Pamplona, Vitoria and Zaragoza garrisons as firmly adhering to conspiracy, with Madrid unclear and Barcelona highly doubtful; dated April 5, 504, Fernando del Rey, Los papeles de un conspirador. Documentos para la historia de las tramas golpistas de 1936, [in:] Dimensioni e problema della ricerca storica 2 (2018), p. 138 first personal suggestions, later largely to be changed, were offered. González Carrasco was appointed to lead the coup in Barcelona, Villegas in Zaragoza, and Fanjul in Burgos, del Rey, Alvarez Tardió 2024, p. 139