Mission Lindsay was a World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) military expedition to Yugoslav Partisans in Slovenia, sent in May 1944. The group was led by Major Franklin Lindsay and included Lieutenant Gordon Bush, Lieutenant Schraeder - the weather officer, and Corporal James Fisher - the radio operator. It was a part of the wider, Maclean Mission, which arrived in September 1943. The mission left Brindisi airfield in an RAF Halifax bomber and together with cargo of guns, explosives, radios and medical supplies parachuted in Dolenjska, near the village of Semič on 14 May 1944.Lindsay, pp. 1-31 The fifth member, Corporal Edward Welles, was left behind in Italy in order to assemble the additional equipment that the group would ask for, once they had arrived to Slovenia. Eventually, he joined them in mid-August.Lindsay, pp. 102-103

The primary purpose of the mission was to disrupt railway transport between Northern Italy, Austria (still part of the Third Reich), Hungary and the Balkans. Reducing the movement of troops, weapons, fuel and raw materials (such as oil, bauxite, copper, zinc, lead and chrome) would damage German military ambitions and its war industry. They were to execute this via sabotage and demolition - blowing-up railroads, bridges and viaducts throughout their assigned area.Lindsay, p. 18

Background

As the Allies continued their advancement in southern Italy, it became an imperative to reduce German reinforcements and resupplies coming from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The Slovenian Alps were an ideal natural barrier to these movements, with Ljubljana Gap making a narrow strait. At the heart of it was Zidani Most, a railway junction where three key branches of the railroad met, linking Germany with Port of Trieste and the Italian front as well as Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Greece. Any disruption here was bound to harm the Third Reich's military might.Lindsay, p. 71Maclean, p. 425

Schraeder was sent to set up a weather observation station near the local airfield used by Luftwaffe. This was to provide the Allied air forces with a better picture of the weather over German-occupied Europe in order to assign next targets to their bombers. It would also enable Allied meteorologists to compare the observations with the encrypted German ones taken at the same time and location, thus help break the German military weather codes.Lindsay, p. 9

Arrival The quartet landed safely, together with their equipment and were picked up by the local Partisans, who escorted them to their headquarters. There they met Captain James Goodwin, an American head of the Allied Liaison Mission,Maclean, p. 490 and Lieutenant George Wuchinich, a Serbian-American OSS officer. They agreed with the local commanders that they would progress further north into Styria, which was officially still part of the Third Reich and get closer to the key railroads. They were accompanied by a young Partisan lieutenant, Vlado Valenčak, as an interpreter and link with the locals, and a British Lieutenant Dan Gatoni, who was searching for a Major McNeff of MI-6 who had gone to the region previously but was not heard from.Lindsay, pp. 30-57

They passed the village of Maravce, and after a short rest reached a farm near Gornji Grad on 6 June. There they met local commander, Viktor Avbelj "Rudi" and secured a parachute drop location before moving to Pohorje, into safer, higher and less populated mountainous area. Here they found Major McNeff, as well as Vuchko Vuchkovic who was sent by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the previous winter and had not been heard from since. In the meantime, Lieutenant Bush went on a separate expedition further south to try and damage the mainline railway link between Zagreb and Ljubljana.Lindsay, pp.58-64

Blowing up the railroads and first reviews Upon reaching the regional HQ, the team joined local Partisan commanders in poring over the maps and choosing the most suitable targets for their operation. They chose the key dual-track line that linked Austria with Italy, as well as its single-track western branch. If they were successful that would leave only one, single-track connection to Treviso, the line that was already full to capacity. The targets were: a 350-foot stone viaduct near Mislinje, a 700-foot tunnel at Lipoglav and two bridges, one at Zbelovo, the other at Tremerje. They also received a "four bombers" worth of drop of explosives and tools.Lindsay, pp. 75-79

Partisans wanted their own demolitions unit, consisting of former miners experienced in handling explosives, to lay down the charges. Mislinje viaduct was patrolled by the German troops, who had 1,700 men in the 6 miles radius - most of whom could reach it within 30 minutes. This night they were surprised not to have encountered guards on the viaduct. They dug up holes next to the three of the seven massive stone columns that held it up. They buried 650kg explosives into them, and used further 200kg at the arched top of the nearby tunnel, wired it up and detonated it.Lindsay, pp. 79-82

As soon as the explosion was heard, the Partisans opened fire onto the nearby garrison to prevent the Germans from counter-attack. Once the dust had settled, they noticed that the three columns were damaged but remained standing. Still under German cross-fire, they were able to reload the remaining 250kg of explosives and detonate it an hour later. This finally toppled them and the railway was no longer usable or easily repairable.Lindsay, pp. 82-83

The other three targets were even more challenging. They were heavily guarded, and required the removal of the German troops prior to the intervention. The bridge at Zbelovo remained standing as the 150kg charge did not explode but merely burned out. The one at Tremerje was also standing as the brigade was "too weak and poorly armed to overcome the garrison". Finally, with the tunnel at Lipoglav, the Partisans were more successful and were able to execute two smaller explosions, one at each end and put it out of use for a few weeks.Lindsay, pp. 83-86

It soon became obvious that the actions were not as effective as they should have been and that a huge risk and loses in being in position to lay down the explosives, were not followed by a good demolition work. In its report, the local Partisans reported

Despite this, the Partisans were able to completely block the railroad for five weeks at the height of the summer 1944 war. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Bush returned and confirmed that his group had managed to block the southern mainline for a week by "filling deep cuts with rock blown down by explosive charges from either side".Lindsay, p. 87

First liberated area The following weeks were spent on the move, actively escaping German expeditions and encirclements, which made it difficult to organise further air-drops. Eventually they ended up in Upper Savinja Valley and by 3 July managed to get a drop from a single aircraft at Mozirska. Corporal Welles finally arrived in mid-August, together with a British SOE officer - Major Roberts who was a part of Lieutenant Colonel Peter Wilkinson'sWilliams, p. 235 group intended for infiltration into Austria.Lindsay, pp. 100-103

In time, Lindsay got an opportunity to understand the Partisan movement and meet some of its key political and military leaders, including Mile Kilibarda, Jože Borštnar, Alojz Kolman Marok, Dragomir Benčič Brkin and Franc Primožič. They were mainly part of the 14th Division, which was now strengthening the Partisan presence in Styria. Once, he asked Aleš Bebler, a prominent local leader, how they gained the confidence and support of the local population. His response was that it took at least six months to "prepare the people politically before any armed units could be sent".

Encouraged by their successes, the division commanders decided to attack German garrisons in Luče, Ljubno and Gornji Grad on 30 July. In order to prevent German reinforcements, they blockaded and mined roads, bridges and the local railroad, and launched a diversionary attack on the Litija garrison, some twenty miles south. The attacks were successful and had created the very first liberated territory inside the Third Reich itself. On 13 August, they attacked and destroyed the German garrison at Rimske Toplice and cut-off an important railroad.Lindsay, pp. 132-136

On 19 August, the mission received instructions from Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, which was in fact Marshall Tito's order to be forwarded to the local Partisan commanders, concerning Operation Ratweek – a co-ordinated all-out attack on the rail and road communications across the Balkan. The order was sent via SOE channels in order to prevent it from being intercepted by the Germans. The objective was to ensure that the 24 remaining German divisions south of Slovenia are unable to withdraw towards Germany and aid the resistance to Soviet and Anglo-American troops attacking from the East, South and West of the Third Reich.Lindsay, pp. 136-137Maclean, pp. 470-497Williams, p. 221

The mission agreed the key local targets with the Partisans for the operation scheduled to start on 1 September. These included a bridge and rock cuts on the main Vienna line, and five kilometres of track they would remove and destroy. They were still very short of explosives, with Lindsay constantly reminding the supplier - "Unless you get explosives to Fourteenth Div their action will be minor. They plan to attack again tunnel and bridge but can't do it with bare hands".Lindsay, p. 139 In the end, the explosive had been delayed and the operation was limited - some tracks were cut, retaining walls destroyed and three smaller bridges were blown. After the June's intervention - tunnels and bridges were much better guarded. Finally, Lindsay arranged for the Allied air-attacks to destroy key bridges at Maribor and Zidani Most.Lindsay, pp. 139-141Maclean, pp. 489-490

On 11 and 12 September, the Partisans launched a successful attack on Mozirje and two other nearby garrisons expanding the liberated the whole valley. In late October, large German troops entered the valley, and torched the houses and stole the livestock. Upon their retreat, those that Partisans were able to capture were sent to their barracks stripped of their clothing and boots.Lindsay, pp. 142-145

Attempt to expand into Austria Being well inside the Reich's territory the mission was an excellent launch pad for penetrating into Austria and Hungary. It was with this in mind that Lt Col Peter Wilkinson and Major Alfgar Hesketh-Prichard procured Tito's approval for the new destination.Williams, p. 234 In May 1944, Lt Col Charles Villiers was dropped to the area and together with others, worked with the local Koroska Odred to make contact with the Austrians.Williams, p. 235 Additionally, Captain Charles Fisher arrived with twelve men in September the same year in order to strengthen the link, together with the senior local Partisan commander Franc Leskošek Luka. After many attempts, no Allies-friendly group in Austria could be identified or contacted and the attempt failed.Lindsay, pp. 149-177Williams, p. 236

Strained relationship