Liwa Fatemiyoun (; ), also known as Lashkar-e-Fatemiyoun (; ), Fatemiyoun Brigade, or Fatemiyoun Division, is a primarily Shia Afghan militia. It formed in 2013 to fight in Syria during the Syrian civil war on the side of the Syrian government prior to the collapse of the Assad regime. The group's officially designated purpose was the defence of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali, and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS). It is funded, trained, and equipped by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and fights under the command of Iranian officers. Both the Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Iranian government downplay their relationship with one another, despite clear coordination and the brigade's operation under the auspices of the IRGC. Liwa Fatemiyoun is also closely associated with Hezbollah Afghanistan. It is primarily made-up of Afghan/Hazara migrants living in Iran.
By late 2017, the unit was presumed to have numbered between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters. According to Zohair Mojahed, a cultural official in the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the group suffered 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded up to the end of 2017 while fighting in Syria. A minimum of 925 deaths among the brigade's troops were documented based on monitoring of open source coverage of funeral services, but these burials do not take into account the bodies abandoned on the ground, executed prisoners, the missing, etc. It was reported in 2019 that as many as 50,000 Afghans in total had fought in Liwa Fatemiyoun, up until then.
History Background
The main core of Liwa Fatemiyoun was constituted of former fighters of Shia Afghan militia groups like the Muhammad Army (Sepah-e-Muhammad), Tehran Eight, Hezbollah Afghanistan and Hezb-e-Wahadat which were active during the Soviet–Afghan War, Afghan Civil War (1992–1996), Afghan Civil War (1989–1992), and fought against the Taliban during the Afghan Civil War (1996-2001), until their collapse after the U.S Invasion of Afghanistan from which point onward some of them became part of the Afghan Army and fought against the Taliban insurgency during the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) while others fled to Iran. Along with those, the initial core of fighters also consisted of former fighters of the Abuzar Brigade, a Shia militia which voluntarily fought in the Iran–Iraq War on the side of Iran. During the Iran–Iraq War, fighters of the Abuzar Brigade were stationed in the mountainous areas of Northwestern Iran, as they had experience in mountain and irregular warfare from their war with the Soviets.
Iran is known to have established branches of Hezbollah in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with several pro-Iranian groups operating in both countries during the Soviet–Afghanistan War.
Operations of Liwa Fatemiyoun
Reports of pro-government Afghan fighters in Syria dated back to October 2012.
When the Syrian civil war had started, Fatemiyoun's founding commander, Ali Reza Tavassoli, known by his Nnom de guerre as Abu Hamed, and senior cleric Mohammad Baqir Alaoui Alawi requested to the Iranian government for Hamed's contingent of 22 to 25 fighters, who were based around the city of Mashhad, be allowed to go to Syria to defend the shrine of Sayyeda Zainab. The request was quickly approved in Tehran under the name of the 'Fatemiyoun'.
They originally fought in the Iraqi Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade before eventually becoming a distinct brigade in 2013. According to news sources affiliated with the IRGC, the group was founded on 12 May 2013.
The group's officially designated purpose, according to the Iranian government and affiliated news sources, is the defense of the shrine of Zaynab bint Ali (the granddaughter of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad), and to fight "takfiri terrorists" in Syria, which would come to include the Islamic State (IS) and the Al-Nusra Front.
At some point before 2014, Liwa Fatemiyoun was "incorporated" with Hezbollah Afghanistan, a minor political party in Afghanistan.
In terms of numbers, the first group of 22 Afghan volunteers reportedly arrived in Syria at the end of 2012. A second group of 15 followed, then a third group of 22. This first contingent would have fought alongside the Shia Iraqi Master of Martyrs battalion (Kata'ib Sayyid ush-Shuhada), and then deployed to Iraq in parallel with Syria, and also with Lebanese Hezbollah. The fifth contingent already included around 100 recruits. Liwa Fatemiyoun grew from the size of a brigade (called Liwa in Arabic) to that of a division (called Lashkar in Farsi/Persian) in 2015, which implied a strength of at least 10,000 fighters, but not all of whom were deployed in Syria. The range of 4,000 to 8,000 men due with regular rotation of personnel between Iran and Syria seemed more plausible. According to this account, the Afghans generally operated in units of 450 men (roughly the equivalent of a battalion), which seems plausible given what was seen among other actors on the Syrian regime side. This unit format also allowed them to be deployed to several locations in Syria simultaneously.
During the successful Battle of Al-Malihah in 2014, 50 Afghans had been killed in action during the fighting.
The Liwa Fatemiyoun became involved in multiple operations throughout Syria, including in Darra, Aleppo, and Palmyra. In March 2016, they fought in the recapture of Palmyra from the Islamic State. During the Aleppo offensive (July–August 2016), a commander of the Fatemiyoun brigade was killed. In 2017, the unit helped countering a major rebel offensive in northern Hama Governorate, and later aided a pro-government offensive in the Syrian Desert that aimed at reaching the Iraqi border. In course of the latter campaign, Mohammad Hosseini (also known as "Salman") was killed as he stepped on an anti-personnel mine. Hosseini had served as the intelligence chief of Liwa Fatemiyoun's Hazrat-e-Fatemeh Zahra Brigade. Following the successful conclusion of this offensive, the Liwa Fatemiyoun took part in the campaign to capture all of central Syria from the IS. Anwar Yawri, another commander of Liwa Fatemiyoun, was killed during these operations. The unit later took part in the Eastern Syria campaign (September–December 2017), and helped to break the Islamic State's siege on Deir ez-Zor.
Many of the group's commanders were veterans of previous Afghan conflicts, including: Sayyed Hakim, Hossein Fadaei Abdarchaya, Reza Khavari, and Seyyed Ibrahim. Hakim, killed in Syria in 2016, and was the last veteran of the Abuzar Brigade. After Ali Reza Tavassoli and his deputy Reza Bakhshi were killed in action in early 2015, much of Liwa Fatemiyoun's command structure was taken over by the IRGC's Quds Force. As of July 2018, at least 18 Quds Force officers have died in Syria alongside Liwa Fatemiyoun.
Liwa Fatemiyoun continued to suffer losses in Syria. On 6 December 2018, a fighter was buried in Iran. On 13 December 2018, a deceased Afghan was also buried in Tehran province. On 27 December 2018, an Afghan killed in Syria was buried in Mashhad. In January 2019, five Fatemiyoun fighters were also buried in Mashhad, Iran.
While more conventional operations against the Islamic State had been over for over year by 2019, Liwa Fatemiyoun remained deployed both in eastern Syria near the Iraqi border, still occasionally fighting ISIS around Deir ez-Zor, Mayadin and al-Boukamal, and also in the western Syria within the province of Hama, likely around the last rebel/jihadist enclave. It is to be recalled that Liwa Fatemiyoun was engaged on the Hama front during and after the rebel/jihadist offensive of March 2017. It had therefore remained there. It is likely that Fatemiyoun also continued to use its historic base camp south of Aleppo, and may have had other installations elsewhere, notably in Damascus. The deployment pattern, with at least three units (Deir Ezzor – Hama – Damascus) corresponds fairly closely to that seen in recent years. Liwa Fatemiyoun therefore had remained a tool in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards for their projection into Syria, until 2024.
Throughout their operations in Syria, Liwa Fatemiyoun had sustained numerous casualties. In October 2014, three fighters were captured by the rebel Islamic Front. Their fates are unknown. On 7 May 2015, Iran commemorated 49 fighters of the group who were killed. During the Aleppo offensive (November–December 2016), 31 Fatemiyoun fighters had been killed and many more had been wounded.Russia Defence Forum According to Spiegel Online, 700 members of the group were believed to have been killed in combat around Daraa and Aleppo as of June 2015.
The pro-Israel Washington Institute had estimated at least 255 casualties between 19 January 2012, and 8 March 2016. While precise casualty figures are difficult to determine, the brigade is thought to have lost 925 fighters in Syria as of May 2020 based on monitoring of open source coverage of funeral services, but these burials do not take into account the bodies abandoned on the ground, executed prisoners, the missing, etc. These numbers likely increased as the Iranian government continued to identify the remains of Fatemiyoun members, sometimes as long as 5 years after their death, and returned their bodies to Iran. According to Zohair Mojahed, a cultural official in the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the group suffered 2,000 killed and 8,000 wounded up to the end of 2017 while fighting in Syria.
Mostafa Sadrzadeh, known by the alias "Seyyed Ebrahim", an Iranian military commander who had led the Ammar Battalion of the Fatemiyoun Division, and who was also among the first commanders of the Nakhsa group, was killed in the outskirts of Aleppo in autumn of 2015 during Operation Moharram.
On 21 November 2017, Iran declared victory over IS, and subsequently started to downsize Liwa Fatemiyoun. The first troops to be demobilized were the youngest and oldest, as well as those who had exhibited problematic behaviour such as indiscipline. The demobilized fighters were sent back to Iran to return to their families and civilian life.
In the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, Liwa Fatemiyoun reportedly began to produce masks and gloves in Iran and Syria, intending to distribute them to poor Syrians. Western observers suspected that this was supposed to boost the group's image and help it in recruiting new members. By late 2020, Liwa Fatemiyoun was still operating in eastern Syria, though only about 500 to 1,500 fighters strong. By the time the Assad regime fell, this number had risen to 5,000 to 10,000.Experts differ on what role Liwa Fatemiyoun was fulfilling as of 2020, as the Syrian government had become relatively secure. Researcher Phillip Smyth argued that Liwa Fatemiyoun was supposed to act as Iran's "phantom force" of trained foreign soldiers, ready to be used for possible future interventions.
Accordingly, Symth and ex-Herat Province governor Abdul Qayoum Rahim claimed in 2020 that Liwa Fatemiyoun had begun deployment to other localities around the Middle East without providing firm evidence.
Symth and Rahim also claimed that the constant fighting had turned Liwa Fatemiyoun into an elite force, as most of its less capable fighters had been killed or demobilized, leaving only the most experienced and radical ones. Other security analysts argued that there was no evidence for further mass foreign deployments, and that Liwa Fatemiyoun was overall diminishing in numbers and suffering from low morale, as the Iranian government had proven to be slow in granting promised benefits to its fighters.