Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore guarantees freedom of religion in Singapore. Specifically, Article 15(1) states: "Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate it."
The terms profess, practise and propagate are not defined in the Constitution, but cases from Singapore and other jurisdictions may shed light on their meaning. The word profess in relation to a religion was defined in a 1964 Singapore case not involving the Constitution as meaning "to affirm, or declare one's faith in or allegiance to". A 2001 Malaysian decision suggested that the profession of religion does not encompass the renunciation of a religion or the profession of an irreligious viewpoint. As regards the word propagate, in 1977 the Supreme Court of India held that it confers on an individual the right to transmit or spread his or her religion by an exposition of its tenets, but not the right to convert another person who holds a pre-existing religious belief to one's own religion. These issues have not yet come before the Singapore courts for determination. On the other hand, in 1999 the Court of Appeal attempted to draw a line between religious practices and secular facts, taking the view that singing the National Anthem and saying the National Pledge were the latter. Thus, rules that compelled a teacher to engage in these activities in an educational institution could not be regarded as having infringed his right to practise his religion.
Freedom of religion under Article 15(1) is not absolute as it is qualified by Article 15(4) of the Constitution, which provides that the rights secured by Article 15 do not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality. These limitations upon the freedom of religion are an important aspect of Singapore's secularism. The Singapore courts have interpreted the term public order to be equivalent to the concepts of "public peace, welfare and good order" referred to in section 24(1)(a) of the , rather than taking the narrower view that public order means freedom from unlawful physical violence. There has also been academic criticism of the fact that the courts have not applied any form of balancing test to determine whether freedom of religion has been reasonably restricted. On the contrary, where national security is said to be involved, the courts have deferred to the Government as to the necessity for the restrictive legislation. The terms public health and morality in Article 15(4) have yet to be judicially interpreted.
Text of Article 15
Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. is entitled "Freedom of religion" and reads as follows:
In Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education (1999),Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education 2 S.L.R.(R.) [Singapore Law Reports (Reissue)] 529, Court of Appeal (Singapore). the Court of Appeal affirmed that the Constitution generally adopts what is known as accommodative secularism by "removing restrictions to one's choice of religious belief".Nappalli, p. 537, para. 28.
Article 15(1) is in pari materia with Article 11(1) of the Constitution of Malaysia, from which it was adopted following Singapore's independence from Malaysia in 1965., s. 6(1). The latter states: "Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to clause (4), to propagate it."Article 11(4) states: "State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam." Article 15(1) also contains similarities to Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India: "Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion."
Meaning of profess, practise and propagate
Profess The word profess in Article 15(1) is not defined in the Constitution, but the case Re Mohamed Said Nabi, deceased (1964)Re Mohamed Said Nabi, deceased M.L.J. [Malayan Law Journal] 121, High Court (Singapore). may provide guidance. The issue in the case was the meaning of the word Muslim in the Muslims Ordinance 1957Muslims Ordinance 1957 (No. 25 of 1957). which was defined as "a person who professes the religion of Islam".Mohamed Said Nabi, para. 8. The High Court held that to come within the definition, one must be shown to be an orthodox Muslim and must have outwardly manifested and practised Islam; merely having been born into that religion was insufficient. More specifically, Justice F.A. Chua referred to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and noted that the word profess means "to affirm, or declare one's faith in or allegiance to (a religion, principle, God or Saint etc.)".Mohamed Said Nabi, para. 9.
However, to determine if one has in fact "professed" a religion, a proper scrutiny of the entire circumstances is necessary. On the facts, the deceased was brought up as a Muslim, married under Muslim rites, and had held Muslim religious ceremonies in his house which he had taken part in. This was strong evidence that he professed the religion of Islam,Mohamed Said Nabi, para. 10. despite the fact that he had also engaged in the heterodox practices of drinking alcohol and eating pork. The judge held that such practices did not amount to a renunciation of the religion,Mohamed Said Nabi, para. 13. and added that someone who had been born into the religion must be held to be a member of that religion unless it is proved he has adopted some other religion.Mohamed Said Nabi, para. 12.
The Malaysian interpretation of the term profess in Article 11(1) of the Malaysian Constitution may be relevant as that provision is worded similarly to Article 15(1) of the Singapore Constitution. In Daud bin Mamat v. Majlis Agama Islam (2001),Daud bin Mamat v. Majlis Agama Islam 2 M.L.J. 390, High Court (Kota Bahru, Malaysia). it was held that the act of exiting one's religion does not fall under the meaning of professing and practising one's religion. In the judge's view, "to accept that professing no religion equated to 'a religion' or the 'right to profess and practice it' would stretch the definition in Article 11 too far".Daud bin Mamat, p. 402. On the other hand, it might be argued that the freedom to renounce one's religion or to profess not to have a religion is a corollary of the freedom to profess a religion. This issue has not yet come before the Singapore courts for determination.
Practise The Constitution is also silent on what constitutes practising a religion for the purposes of Article 15(1). The local courts have defined the word practise by indicating what types of acts are not considered religious practices. In Nappalli, the Court of Appeal held that singing of the National Anthem and reciting the National Pledge were not religious practices but rather expressions of national patriotism, which were secular acts. The Canadian case Donald v. The Board of Education for the City of Hamilton (1945)Donald v. The Board of Education for the City of Hamilton O.R. 518. was distinguished; in that case, singing the national anthem was held to constitute a religious practice because the anthem contained a prayer hymn which "unquestionably reflected some religious character".Nappalli, p. 537, para. 25.
In Nappalli, the appellant was dismissed from an educational institution for his refusal to participate in the aforementioned acts. Central to his claim was the submission that these acts were religious practices that went against his belief as a Jehovah's Witness and thus infringed his constitutional right to practice and profess his religion guaranteed by Article 15. However, the Court held that since "religion" in Singapore under the Constitution is restricted to "a citizen's faith in a personal God" and does not include "a system of belief in one's own country", the acts in question were not religious practices. Hence, the appellant's rights had not been contravened.Nappalli, p. 537, para. 26. The Court took the view that "the appellant's interpretation of the pledge and anthem ceremony as a religious ceremony was a distortion of secular fact into religious belief".Nappalli, p. 538, para. 28. If the appellant's interpretation was correct, this would result in Article 15(1) losing operative effect, for "[h]ow can the same Constitution guarantee religious freedom if, by asking citizens to pledge their allegiance to country, it is (as the appellant suggests) coercing participation in a religious ceremony? This excruciatingly absurd interpretation cannot have been what was envisaged by the authors of the Constitution."Nappalli, p. 538, para. 29.
The courts in Malaysia have taken a similar approach in defining the meaning of religious practice under Article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution. They have also consulted religious texts to determine what type of acts might constitute religious practices. In Halimatussaadiah v. Public Service Commission, Malaysia (1992),Halimatussaadiah v. Public Service Commission, Malaysia 1 M.L.J. 513, H.C. (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia). the appellant claimed she had been wrongfully dismissed from her employment due to her refusal to comply with employment conditions that prohibited any attire that covered a female public servant's face while on duty. According to the appellant, this contravened her right to religious practice on grounds that the wearing of the purdah was part of her religious practice as a Muslim. However, the court disagreed and held that the purdah was not considered a religious practice as it was not a requirement under Islam since there was no express mention of such a requirement in the Quran.
However, in the Philippines, the courts have accorded the individual autonomy to decide what constitutes religious practice. It is up to the individual to decide what constitutes religious practice so long as such acts do not offend public interest. This was the view proffered in Ebralinag v. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (1993),Ebralinag v. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 219 S.C.R.A. 256, Supreme Court (Philippines), archived from the original on 27 May 2011. in which the issue was whether the petitioners, who were Jehovah's Witnesses, ought to be expelled from schools for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the oath of allegiance as required by the Republic Act No. 1265 of 11 July 1955 and other legislation. Cruz J. held that the state could not interpret the Bible for the petitioners as "only they can read it as they see fit. Right or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter."
Propagate Singapore courts have not yet interpreted the word propagate in Article 15(1) of the Constitution.