The 25th Division Tổ quốc ghi ơn () of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)—the army of the nation state of South Vietnam that existed from 1955 to 1975—was part of the III Corps that oversaw the region of the country surrounding the capital, Saigon. It was based at Củ Chi Base Camp to the northwest of the city.
History The Division was activated in July 1961.
1964 In mid-1964 COMUSMACV General William Westmoreland identified the need for further troops to implement pacification operations in III Corps. Westmoreland suggested transferring one of the divisions in the sparsely populated Central Highlands, either the 22nd or 23rd. Defense Minister Trần Thiện Khiêm offered the Division instead. Khiêm believed local leaders in Quảng Ngãi province could raise enough paramilitary soldiers to counteract the loss of the Division. Westmoreland was skeptical, as were II Corps adviser Colonel Charles Balthis and some Vietnamese officers, who warned that many Division soldiers, a large percentage of whom were from Quảng Ngãi, would desert if transferred away from their home area. As a counter, Westmoreland suggested sending the 1st Division to III Corps, keeping the Division in the critical province of Quảng Ngãi, but transferring control over both it and the province to I Corps. Khiem was adamant, however, and in September, the division began moving to III Corps' Hậu Nghĩa province, leaving behind one of its regiments in Quảng Ngãi. The Joint General Staff (JGS) then assigned one of the independent regiments already stationed in III Corps to the Division to build the organization back up to its full complement. Westmoreland came to rue the decision. As predicted, desertions grew and morale sank because of the move. In Westmoreland's opinion, it took about three years for the Division to regain its efficiency. Equally damaging, efforts to backfill the hole created in Quảng Ngãi by the Division’s transfer floundered, thereby contributing to the serious losses in population control that were already underway in that province.
In August–October the Division participated in Operation Hop Tac, a pacification operation around Saigon.
On 20 August the Division launched Operation Quyet Thang 505 to clear Binh Dinh province's An Lao valley. For 11 days, four battalions and four Regional Forces companies backed by mechanized and artillery units prowled the valley, with the VC largely evading contact. The ARVN killed 55 VC, captured eight prisoners and six firearms for the loss of six dead and 14 wounded.
On 6 October over 800 VC in two battalions and a local force company attacked Luong Hoa, 24km southwest of Saigon at night. The Division responded by sending the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry, and the 30th Ranger Battalion. They chose to approach the hamlet using the most obvious, and therefore the most likely ambushed, route. The 1/46th walked into an L-shaped ambush and the rangers broke and left the field. The VC attacked the 1/46th four times before starting to withdraw at 11:00 pursued by helicopter gunships and A-1s. ARVN losses were 31 dead, 53 wounded and 15 missing. US losses were five killed in a downed helicopter, and one wounded. The VC left 26 bodies and MACV estimated the allies had inflicted another 100 casualties.
On 4 November the VC launched coordinated attacks in Hau Nghia and Long An provinces. Most of the actions were diversionary to the true targets, which were three platoon bases protecting pacification operations along Highway 4 in Long An. The VC overran these in 30 minutes, but the 3rd Battalion, 50th Infantry, to whom the posts belonged, reacted quickly and drove off the VC. ARVN losses were ten dead and 14 wounded. The ARVN found 31 VC dead.
On 28 December two battalions of the 49th Infantry and three platoons of artillery attacked the VC 506th Battalion. VC losses were 25 killed, three wounded and 20 suspects captured. The ARVN had eight casualties.
1965 In 1965 the Division was under the command of Colonel Phan Trọng Chinh, a friend of both Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) commander Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and I Corps commander General Nguyễn Chánh Thi. The Division guarded Highway 4, the major rice supply route to the Mekong Delta, and protected the roads and towns of Tây Ninh, Hậu Nghĩa and Long An Provinces (with a total of fourteen districts). Strong VC forces operated in both Hậu Nghĩa and Long An, close to the capital, but the Division, although reinforced by four Ranger battalions, appeared unable to come to grips with the local VC, or otherwise interfere with their activities. American advisers at MACV and in the field were puzzled and angry, blaming Chinh's lack of aggressiveness. Unbeknownst to the Americans, however, Kỳ had instructed Chinh to orient the bulk of his unit south as an anti-coup force, perhaps as a counter to the neighboring 5th Division commanded by General Phạm Quốc Thuần, a close friend of General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Kỳ had given him strict orders not to commit any more than one battalion of each regiment to combat at any one time. Chinh thus had his hands full providing static security for those provinces under his authority and keeping an eye on the political situation in Saigon. Some of his most critical military operations consisted of merely opening the main roads from time to time so that produce could be brought into the capital and supplies and other goods taken out to the towns and military bases within his jurisdiction. Defeating the VC was not his first priority. The Corps senior US adviser had requested Chinh's immediate relief, but Westmoreland chose not to press the matter, hoping that combined operations with American forces "will be able to develop the unit." Several months later he noted that the recent arrival of US combat troops in the area was "already causing some increase in the morale of the Division" but the unit was still "the weakest division in the ARVN," barely "hanging on by its teeth in Hậu Nghĩa Province." Westmoreland was well aware that Chinh's close ties with members of the current ruling junta made his replacement difficult.
On 21 January the Division launched Operation An Dan 70 to hit the VC 506th Battalion in one of its sanctuaries along the Hậu Nghĩa–Long An province border. The 52nd Ranger Battalion engaged VC entrenched along a canal bank and became pinned down. The 2nd Battalion, 49th Infantry was landed by helicopter, but also came under heavy fire and further landings were impossible. The 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry was then transported by boat to link up with the 2/49th. Meanwhile the Rangers attempted to disengage and fell back to form a perimeter along the Vaico Oriental River, followed by the VC who clung so close as to make support by aircraft and artillery difficult. Vessels of the 22nd River Assault Group then arrived to cover the Rangers as they scrambled aboard the boats. VC losses were 73 killed and it was estimated that air and artillery fire had killed 130 more. ARVN losses were 33 dead and 52 wounded.
On 25 June more than 1,000 VC used human wave tactics to assault the ARVN 3rd Battalion, 49th Infantry, based 5km from Đức Hòa district. To retard an allied response, the VC simultaneously bombarded three nearby posts, including the Division headquarters. The 3rd Battalion resisted until eventually forced to retreat. ARVN losses were 44 dead, 40 wounded, and three missing. The VC lost 34 killed and three prisoners, with MACV estimating they had carried off another 108 casualties.
1966 In 1966 US advisers regarded the Division and the 5th Division as the two worst units in the ARVN. Both divisions guarded the approaches to Saigon, but the brunt of the fighting had been assumed by US combat units, the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions and three separate brigades. Under their protection, the two divisions performed static security missions, but rather than using this respite to regroup and retrain their forces, or to hunt down the local VC, the Vietnamese commanders had let their units degenerate through inactivity, and US advisers now rated them lower than even the neighboring Regional Forces (RF)/Popular Forces (PF). JGS commander General Cao Văn Viên stated that it was "not only the worst ARVN division, but possibly the worst division in any army." In early May Westmoreland ordered the US 1st and 25th Divisions to "start working more closely with elements of these two [South Vietnamese] divisions on operations in order to improve their morale, efficiency and effectiveness." He suggested a "buddy" effort, matching the US 25th and the Division; the US 1st and the ARVN 5th Divisions. In mid-May 1966 US 25th Division commander, Major general Frederick C. Weyand, started a series of combined operations with the Division and RF/PF forces in Hậu Nghĩa province; tasked his subordinate brigade commanders to assist the three infantry regiments of the Division in constructing housing for military dependents; and sponsored a propaganda program entitled "The Brotherhood of the 25th Division," which he dedicated to the "fight for freedom against the communists."
Chinh was regarded by MACV as one of the worst division commanders, however, his continued friendship with Kỳ allowed him to ignore American advice with impunity, and the presence of strong US ground forces within his division tactical area made the performance of his own unit less critical to Saigon. In late 1966 a simmering dispute between Chinh and his senior US adviser Colonel Cecil F. Hunnicutt became public and Chinh went on to lecture his subordinates on the need to avoid being subverted by American wealth and power, as well as on the importance of keeping their self-respect and their loyalty to their own superiors.
1967 From 19 to 21 June the 46th Regiment participated in Operation Concordia with the US Mobile Riverine Force against the VC 5th Nha Be Battalion in Cần Giuộc District of the Mekong Delta.
In 1967 MACV assessed that the three ARVN divisions surrounding Saigon, the 5th, 18th and the Division had shown no improvement, and US advisers considered their commanders, Generals Thuần (5th Division), Đỗ Kế Giai (18th Division) and Chinh, flatly incompetent. The senior Junta generals had repeatedly agreed on the need to replace them, but, for political reasons, had taken no action. When Robert Komer, head of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) tried to enlist the aid of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to relieve Chinh, Westmoreland upbraided him for bypassing the US military chain of command. Referring to the affair with Colonel Hunnicutt in 1966, Westmoreland blamed the American press for Chinh's long tenure, asserting that critical news stories about Chinh had made it impossible for Kỳ to act without appearing to be an American puppet. In December 1967, perhaps to appease Westmoreland, JGS Chairman Viên decided to "remove" Chinh by promoting him to the post of III Corps deputy commander. His American advisers had given Chinh some credit for his interest in the civil matters of his Division tactical area and seemed pleased by his new appointment." According to Komer, Chinh was always "a better pacificer than a Division Commander," and the new post would hopefully keep him out of mischief. Thieu was equally pleased to be able to replace Chinh, an old rival, with a supporter, General Nguyen Xuan Thinh. Westmoreland, noting that Thinh had been relieved as commander of the 22nd Division in 1965 because of his poor performance, was not enthusiastic about the choice, but he could only hope that he would do better than his predecessor.
1968