The 22nd Division (; Chữ Hán: 師團22) of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was part of the II Corps that oversaw the region of the Central Highlands north of the capital Saigon. The 22nd Division was based in Ba Gi near the south central coast.
History The Division was raised initially as the 2nd Light and 4th Light Divisions in 1955. The 4th Light Division was renamed the 14th Light Division in 1956. Both were combined to become the 4th Infantry Division, which was later renamed the 22nd Division in 1959.
1965 On 8 February in Bình Định province, elements of the Vietcong (VC) Military Region 5's 2nd and 10th Regiments ambushed two companies of the 40th Infantry and an M113 armored personnel carrier troop in Nhong Pass, 5km north of Phú Mỹ, as they drove north along Highway 1 to relieve Gia Huu. After 57mm recoilless rifles had destroyed two M113s, the armored troop pulled back, then withdrew entirely when it ran out of ammunition. Airstrikes could not prevent the VC from overrunning the infantry and mauling additional troops that came in support. Four US advisers managed to escape to Phú Mỹ. The ARVN lost 280 casualties and considerable equipment. VC losses from the battle and two subsequent days of aerial bombardment reportedly numbered several hundred. The debacle, along with other actions, left the 40th Infantry Regiment combat ineffective, with just 522 men present for duty.
On 22 February, the 3rd Battalion, 42nd Infantry, ran into an enemy force armed with AK-47s and RPG-2s between Đăk Tô and the Cambodian border. Outclassed, the unit recoiled in disorder. The next day, the regimental commander, Lieutenant colonel Lai Van Chu, personally led a second battalion in a counterattack that captured some of these new weapons. In the process, the South Vietnamese identified their foe as the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 101st Regiment. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam's (MACV) strict rules required further confirmation before it would add the unit to its enemy order of battle in South Vietnam.
On 1 March, Brigadier general Nguyen Thanh Sang replaced Sub-Brigadier general Nguyen Xuan Thinh as Division commander.
On 15 April, two infantry battalions from the 41st Infantry, an armored cavalry troop, and two scout companies attacked the VC 801st Battalion near Dai Khoang village, 10km northwest of Phù Cát district. VC losses were 106 killed and three captured. ARVN losses were seven dead and 20 wounded.
On 19 April, the 41st Infantry attacked two VC companies 16km north of Qui Nhon. VC losses were 73 killed and captured 23 captured along with 16 weapons. ARVN losses were five killed and 19 wounded. Ten Americans were killed including eight killed when VC .50-caliber machine guns shot down two US Army helicopters.
On 4 May, the VC seized the coastal hamlet of Thein Nghiep in Binh Thuan province. A Regional Forces company sent to investigate halted at 09:30 when it came upon a roadblock manned by two VC companies on the Phan Thiết-Hai Long Highway, about 7km east of Phan Thiết. Binh Thuan’s province chief dispatched the understrength 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry, two Regional Forces companies and two M8 armored cars. After an airstrike hit the roadblock at 10:30, a USAF forward air controller reported that up to 500 VC were digging in on a hill overlooking the highway. After several hours of airstrikes, at 17:30, as the South Vietnamese commander launched his two M8s toward the roadblock. Meant as a distraction, they smashed through the obstacle. Then, with the assistance of a Regional Forces company, the M8s pursued the VC, killing about 30. The rout spread alarm through the rest of the VC, just as the 1st Battalion launched their assault and, by nightfall, the VC were in full flight. The allies counted 64 bodies, including a company commander, and captured seven weapons and ten prisoners, including another company commander and a political officer. They estimated that the VC had carried off another 50 dead. ARVN losses were six dead and 16 wounded.
On 3 June, the PAVN 18th Regiment ambushed the 1st Battalion, 40th Infantry, on Highway 7 between Cheo Reo and the Le Bac bridge. After the battalion retreated 1.5km, the PAVN ambushed it again. The ARVN broke and fled in disorder. The battalion's wounded senior adviser called for medical evacuation for himself and two other injured Americans. Helicopter gunships covered the evacuation, then joined fixed-wing aircraft in bombarding the area for the rest of the day. South Vietnamese losses were described as heavy.
On 7 July, the PAVN captured Đăk Tô and rebuffed an attempt by the 42nd Infantry to regain the post, killing the regiment's commander and seriously wounding his adviser. Four ARVN battalions eventually retook the town.
On 17 July, the Division and eight reserve battalions launched Operation Than Phong to reopen Highway 19 and deliver supplies to Pleiku.
1966 From 28 January to 17 February 1966, as part of Operation Double Eagle the Division operated with the US 3rd Marine Division's Task Force Delta in the coastal areas northeast of Đức Phổ. In early February 1966 as part of the complementary Operation Masher the Division's 40th Regiment blocked the southern access to the An Lão Valley while the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, 1st Cavalry Division swept the valley for VC. In early March in the final phase of the operation the Division surrounded the Cay Giap mountains, east of Bồng Sơn while the 1st Cavalry Division swept the area.
From 2–21 June 1966, in Operation Hawthorne the Division's 42nd Regiment, the ARVN 21st Ranger Battalion and the US 101st Airborne Division fought the PAVN 24th Regiment near the village of Toumorong, Kon Tum Province.
From 2–24 October 1966, in Operation Dai Bang 800 three battalions from the Division searched the Phu Cat Mountains in Bình Định province for the PAVN 12th Regiment in coordination with the 1st Cavalry Division's Operation Irving and the Republic of Korea Army (ROK) Capital Division's Operation Maeng Ho 6. In an engagement on 13 October an airborne task force from the Division killed 135 PAVN/VC and estimated that a further 85 had been killed by US helicopters.
From 31 October to 4 December 1966, in Operation Geronimo the Division's 47th Regiment, elements of the 101st Airborne Division and 4th Infantry Division and the ROK 9th Infantry Division engaged the PAVN 18B Regiment west of Tuy Hòa. PAVN losses were 150 killed and 76 captured.
1967 From 12 February 1967 to 19 January 1968, the Division participated in Operation Pershing with the US 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the ROK Capital Division in Bình Định province. Total PAVN/VC losses were 5401 killed.
From 6 April to 11 October 1967, the Division's 42nd Regiment participated in Operation Francis Marion with the US 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade against PAVN base areas in Pleiku, Darlac and the Kon Tum Provinces. Total PAVN losses were 1600 killed.
On 17 June 1967, a battalion of the PAVN 24th Regiment, reinforced with a battalion of the 40th Artillery Regiment, attacked the headquarters of the 42nd Regiment at Tân Cảnh Base Camp.
In late July 1967, the 42nd Regiment was sent into positions north of Đắk Tô as part of Operation Greeley. On 4 August, the 1/42nd encountered the PAVN on a hilltop west of Dak Seang Camp, setting off a three-day battle that drew in the ARVN 8th Airborne Battalion. The ARVN forces found 189 PAVN bodies, large quantities of ammunition and equipment, and a sophisticated regimental command post with training areas and an elaborate mock-up of the Dak Seang Camp.
In 1967, soldiers of the Division attacked and robbed inhabitants of a protected hamlet and members of the local Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) team. After the high command investigated the case, the guilty parties were beaten and placed in regimental disciplinary cages. But the chief of the MACV Revolutionary Support Directorate, General William A. Knowlton, termed the incident commonplace and demanded that the ARVN generals do more to halt such occurrences.
1968 In February 1968, Lieutenant colonel William A. Donald (USMC), a MACV CORDS evaluator, made a detailed examination of one of the Division's regiments providing area security. He described the regimental commander as "astute," with "an impressive grasp of VC/PAVN tactics and the military significance of terrain," but also as "politically motivated" and "a supreme practitioner of caution." His subordinate battalion commanders were capable, but lacked aggressiveness and imagination. There were few company or platoon-level operations, he noted, and leadership at the lower levels and on the staffs was minimal. Donald pointed out that almost all operations were planned by the regimental commander, with little assistance from his nominal staff who appeared to serve primarily as bodyguards and aides. Both the regimental and battalion commanders acted as their own intelligence officers, even operating spy networks with their personal funds and friends. He also reported that unit commanders habitually employed internal informants, enforced discipline through whippings or confining soldiers to makeshift "tiger cages" for military infractions, and used prisoners and VC suspects as laborers. The US advisers interviewed by Donald held that the entire unit was run by an inside clique of favorites, "armed with an uncanny flair for mediocrity," who, despite spending their nights at home when their troops were in the field, were decorated "with awesome regularity." Not surprisingly, Donald reported that the unit was deficient in almost all military activities, allowing the local VC to dominate the countryside, especially during the hours of darkness. He also noted that the Division commander had not visited the regiment or the battalions in several months, and no one appeared concerned over what the unit did or did not accomplish.
On 5 May 1968, at the start of the May Offensive PAVN artillery hit Kon Tum, Pleiku and Buôn Ma Thuột causing little damage. A battalion from the PAVN 32nd Regiment attacked a convoy on Highway 14 south of Kon Tum, but the ambush was quickly broken up by the arrival of the Division's 3rd Armored Cavalry Squadron. PAVN losses were 122 killed.
In mid-1968, at the instigation of II Corps commander General Lữ Mộng Lan, I Field Force, Vietnam commander General William R. Peers ordered the US 173rd Airborne Brigade to pair up with the Division in Bình Định province in what was almost a replica of Operation Fairfax. The participating US units brought substantial air, artillery, engineer, and other support to the combined endeavor from their parent units, and American and Vietnamese commanders generally collocated command posts, shared a common area of operation, and planned and carried out operations together. In the process the American officers tried to increase pressure on local enemy forces through intensive patrolling and to encourage ARVN battalion, company, and platoon-level leadership through longer, more decentralized operations. Vietnamization, as later conceived in 1969, was not an objective, and, in fact, the entire effort represented a return to the old strategy of pacification, with American combat operations now tied much closer to the overall task of local security.
1969-1971 In March 1969, as he left command of I Field Force, Peers assessed the Division as "potentially the best division in II Corps," that just sits "in the cities and towns and outlying areas for weeks on end... [with a] continual tendency to revert back to the territorial function."
In 1969, General Lê Ngọc Triển replaced General Nguyễn Văn Hiếu as Division commander.