The Pentagon Papers, officially titled Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force, is a United States Department of Defense history of the United States' political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1968. Released by Daniel Ellsberg, who had worked on the study, it was made public on the front page of The New York Times starting on June 13, 1971. When U.S. Attorney General John N. Mitchell sought an injunction to stop the Times from publishing further material, Ellsberg forwarded a copy he made to The Washington Post, which started publishing them on June 18, 1971. A 1996 article in The New York Times said that the Pentagon Papers had demonstrated, among other things, that Lyndon B. Johnson's administration had "systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress".
The Pentagon Papers revealed that the U.S. had secretly enlarged the scope of its actions in the Vietnam War with coastal raids on North Vietnam and Marine Corps attacks, none of which were reported in the mainstream media. For his disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg was initially charged with conspiracy, espionage, and theft of government property; these charges were later dismissed, after prosecutors investigating the Watergate scandal discovered that staff members in the Nixon White House had ordered the so-called White House Plumbers to engage in unlawful efforts to discredit Ellsberg.
In June 2011, the documents forming the Pentagon Papers were declassified and publicly released.
Contents
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara created the Vietnam Study Task Force on June 17, 1967, for the purpose of writing an "encyclopedic history of the Vietnam War". McNamara claimed that he wanted to leave a written record for historians, to prevent policy errors in future administrations, although Leslie H. Gelb, then director of Policy Planning at the Pentagon, has said that the notion that they were commissioned as a "cautionary tale" is a motive that McNamara only used in retrospect. McNamara told others, such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that he only asked for a collection of documents rather than the studies he received. Motives aside, McNamara did not inform either Rusk or President Lyndon Johnson about the study. One report claimed that McNamara had planned to give the work to his friend, Robert F. Kennedy, who was seeking the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968. McNamara later denied this, though he admitted that he ought to have informed Johnson and Rusk.
Instead of using existing Defense Department historians, McNamara assigned his close aide and Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton to collect the papers. Many of them were based on papers from Richard Helms, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. McNamara wanted the study done in three months. McNaughton died in a plane crash one month after work began in June 1967, but the project continued under the direction of Defense Department official Les Gelb.
Thirty-six analysts—half of them active-duty military officers, the rest academicians and civilian federal employees—worked on the study. They worked to produce 47 volumes answering a list of 100 questions that McNamara (via his secretaries) had sent them, which included questions such as "How confident can we be about body counts of the enemy? Were programs to pacify the Vietnamese countryside working? What was the basis of President Johnson's credibility gap? Was Ho Chi Minh an Asian Tito? Did the U.S. violate the Geneva Accords on Indochina? Can we win this war?" Some of the analysts included Daniel Ellsberg, Morton Halperin, Paul Warnke, future generals Paul F. Gorman and John Galvin, historian Melvin Gurtov, economists Hans Heymann and Richard Moorstein, and future top diplomat Richard Holbrooke, who drafted a volume.
The analysts largely used existing files in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To keep the study secret from others, including National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, they conducted no interviews or consultations with the armed forces, with the White House, or with other federal agencies.
McNamara left the Defense Department in February 1968, and his successor Clark Clifford received the finished study on January 15, 1969, five days before Richard Nixon's inauguration, although Clifford claimed he never read it. Gelb said in 1991 that he presented the study to McNamara in early 1969, when the latter was president of the World Bank, but McNamara did not read it then, and as late as 2018 Gelb did not know if McNamara ever read the study later in his life.
The study consisted of 3,000 pages of historical analysis and 4,000 pages of original government documents in 47 volumes, and was classified as "Top Secret – Sensitive". ("Sensitive" is not an official security designation; it meant that access to the study should be controlled.) The task force made 15 copies; the think tank RAND Corporation received two of the copies from Gelb, Morton Halperin and Paul Warnke, with access granted if at least two of the three approved.
Organization and content of the documents
The 47 volumes of the papers were organized as follows:
I. Vietnam and the U.S., 1940–1950 (1 Vol.) A. U.S. Policy, 1940–50 B. The Character and Power of the Viet Minh C. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito?
II. U.S. Involvement in the Franco–Viet Minh War, 1950–1954 (1 Vol.) A. U.S., France and Vietnamese Nationalism B. Toward a Negotiated Settlement
III. The Geneva Accords (1 Vol.) A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver B. Role and Obligations of State of Vietnam C. Viet Minh Position and Sino–Soviet Strategy D. The Intent of the Geneva Accords
IV. Evolution of the War (26 Vols.) A. U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 1954–1960 (5 Vols.) 1. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison 2. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950–54 3. U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954–56 4. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954–59 5. Origins of the Insurgency
B. Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961–1963 (5 Vols.) 1. The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961 2. Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961–63 3. The Advisory Build-up, 1961–67 4. Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1962–64 5. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May–Nov. 1963
C. Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964–1968 (16 Vols.) 1. U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, November 1963–April 1965: NSAM 273 – NSAM 288 – Honolulu 2. Military Pressures Against NVN (3 Vols.) a. February–June 1964 b. July–October 1964 c. November–December 1964 3. Rolling Thunder Program Begins: January–June 1965 4. Marine Combat Units Go to DaNang, March 1965 5. Phase I in the Build-Up of U.S. Forces: March–July 1965 6. U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments: 1965–1967 (3 Vols.) a. Volume I: Phase II, Program 3, Program 4 b. Volume II: Program 5 c. Volume III: Program 6 7. Air War in the North: 1965–1968 (2 Vols) a. Volume I b. Volume II 8. Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1965–1967 9. U.S.–GVN Relations (2 Vols.) a. Volume 1: December 1963 – June 1965 b. Volume 2: July 1965 – December 1967 10. Statistical Survey of the War, North and South: 1965–1967
V. Justification of the War (11 Vols.) A. Public Statements (2 Vols.) Volume I: A – The Truman Administration B – The Eisenhower Administration C – The Kennedy Administration Volume II: D – The Johnson Administration B. Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 1. The Roosevelt Administration 2. The Truman Administration: (2 Vols.) a. Volume I: 1945–1949 b. Volume II: 1950–1952 3. The Eisenhower Administration: (4 Vols.) a. Volume I: 1953 b. Volume II: 1954–Geneva c. Volume III: Geneva Accords – 15 March 1956 d. Volume IV: 1956 French Withdrawal – 1960 4. The Kennedy Administration (2 Vols.) Book I Book II
VI. Settlement of the Conflict (6 Vols.) A. Negotiations, 1965–67: The Public Record B. Negotiations, 1965–67: Announced Position Statements C. Histories of Contacts (4 Vols.) 1. 1965–1966 2. Polish Track 3. Moscow–London Track 4. 1967–1968
Actual objective of the Vietnam War: Containment of China
Although President Johnson stated that the aim of the Vietnam War was to secure an "independent, non-Communist South Vietnam", a January 1965 memorandum by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton stated that an underlying justification was "not to help friend, but to contain China".
On November 3, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara sent a memorandum to Johnson, in which he explained the "major policy decisions with respect to our course of action in Vietnam". The memorandum begins by disclosing the rationale behind the bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965:
McNamara accused China of harboring imperial aspirations like those of the German Empire, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union. According to McNamara, the Chinese were conspiring to "organize all of Asia" against the United States:
To encircle the Chinese, the United States aimed to establish "three fronts" as part of a "long-run effort to contain China":
However, McNamara believed that the containment of China would sacrifice a large amount of time, money and American lives.
Internal affairs of Vietnam Years before the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred on August 2, 1964, the U.S. government was indirectly involved in Vietnam's affairs by sending advisers or (military personnel) to train the South Vietnamese soldiers: Under President Harry S. Truman, the U.S. government aided France and its associated State of Vietnam against the communist-led Viet Minh from 1950 during the First Indochina War. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. government played a "direct role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva settlement" in 1954 by supporting the fledgling South under the State of Vietnam (later becoming the Republic of Vietnam) and covertly undermining the communist country of the North. Under President John F. Kennedy, the U.S. government transformed its policy towards Vietnam from a limited "gamble" to a broad "commitment". Under President Johnson, the U.S. government began waging covert military operations against communist North Vietnam in defense of South Vietnam.
Role of the United States in the rise of President Diem
In a section of the Pentagon Papers titled "Kennedy Commitments and Programs", American commitment to South Vietnam was attributed to the "creation" of the country by the United States to prevent the spread of communism during the global Cold War. As acknowledged by the papers:
In a sub-section titled "Special American Commitment to Vietnam", the papers emphasized once again the role played by the United States:
More specifically, the United States sent US$28.4 million worth of equipment and supplies to help the Diem regime strengthen its army. In addition, 32,000 men from South Vietnam's Civil Guard were trained by the United States at a cost of US$12.7 million. It was hoped that Diem's regime, after receiving a significant amount of U.S. assistance, would be able to withstand the Viet Cong.
The papers identified General Edward Lansdale, who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as a "key figure" in the establishment of Diem as the president of South Vietnam, and the backing of Diem's regime thereafter. As written by Lansdale in a 1961 memorandum: "We (the U.S.) must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong executive can replace him legally."
Role of the United States in the overthrow of Diem's regime
According to the Pentagon Papers, the U.S. government played a key role in the 1963 South Vietnamese coup, in which Diem was assassinated. While maintaining "clandestine contact" with Vietnamese generals planning a coup, the U.S. cut off its aid to President Diem and openly supported a successor government in what the authors called an "essentially leaderless Vietnam":