Censorship in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is mandated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is one of the strictest censorship regimes in the world. The government censors content mainly for political reasons, such as curtailing political opposition, and censors events unfavorable to the CCP, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, pro-democracy movements in China, the persecution of Uyghurs in China, human rights in Tibet, Falun Gong, pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The government has censorship over all media capable of reaching a wide audience. This includes television, print media, radio, film, theater, text messaging, instant messaging, video games, literature, and the Internet. The Chinese government asserts that it has the legal right to control the Internet's content within its territory and that its censorship rules do not infringe on its citizens' right to freedom of speech. Government officials have access to a less censored system of classified reports.
, the World Press Freedom Index ranks China 178th out of 180 countries in regard to press freedom and calls it the "world's largest prison for journalists". Freedom House ranks the Chinese press as "not free", previously stating that "state control over the news media in China is achieved through a complex combination of party monitoring of news content, legal restrictions on journalists, and financial incentives for self-censorship".
Other views suggest that Chinese businesses such as Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba, some of the world's largest internet enterprises, have benefited from the way China blocked international rivals from the domestic market.
Background Historical
Late Qing era In late imperial China, newspapers catered primarily to literate elites deeply influenced by Confucian culture, which emphasized tradition, rejected foreign ideas, and undervalued economics. These cultural elites dominated Chinese discourses about censorship, and they heavily disfavored entertainment culture such as theatrical performance and traditional storytelling. Academic Zhang Tianxing writes that these elites saw no contradiction between promoting culture they deemed more enlightened and censoring culture which they deemed unreformed. Censorship of theatrical performances became increasingly systematic after 1900, as that form of censorship was enforced by newly developing professionalized police forces in urban areas.
The Qing emperors banned the characters for expressing ethnic slurs against the Manchus and other non-Han ethnic groups.
Republic of China (1912–1949)
Contemporary According to Reporters Without Borders, diversity of views and privately owned media were eliminated in 1949 when the CCP took control of China, bringing editorial freedom to a complete end. The official Chinese news media serves as the CCP's "mouth and tongue" as well as its "eyes and ears."
The People's Republic of China started reform and opening up in 1978, which transformed China's economic structure from a planned economy to a market economy. To stimulate the economy, the Chinese government relaxed its control over the media, which promoted media commercialization, profits, and growth. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were a turning point for Chinese censorship, especially after they were forcibly suppressed on 4 June 1989 following a declaration of martial law and People's Liberation Army troops being deployed, and the Chinese government was condemned internationally. Following the protests and subsequent massacre, news censorship was strengthened because government officials considered that free media had promoted the "turmoil" and represented a potential threat to the regime. After 1995, the Chinese government expanded internet access because it thought that a developed internet would have a positive effect on economic growth; it simultaneously adopted strategic censorship to control information.
The CCP Propaganda Department is the main official institution responsible for censorship work. Other departments, for example, the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (formerly known as the Ministry of Culture until 2018), assist with censorship work. The leadership of Hu Jintao saw a further expansion of censorship. In 2013, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping upgraded the Internet censorship department and established the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), an independent network regulation agency. Since Xi became the CCP general secretary, censorship has been "significantly stepped up".
According to a 2013 Harvard University study published in the American Political Science Review, censorship in China primarily aims to stifle collective action and social mobilization, rather than solely suppressing criticism of the government or the CCP. The study found that while criticism of specific policies or leaders is often tolerated, online posts and discussions that suggest potential for collective action, even in the absence of explicit criticism, are frequently censored. This approach suggests the government's primary concern is the prevention of organized dissent and social unrest, even if it permits certain forms of individual dissatisfaction.
The Chinese government censors the domestic internet community and foreign websites differently. For the domestic internet community, the propaganda department governs what type of content should be banned or deleted on the internet, and social media and websites conduct self-censorship which automatically filters all sensitive content. Censors review the posts on social media, and users must register with their real names. For foreign websites, the "Great Firewall" prevents Chinese citizens from accessing particular websites with sensitive content by blocking the IP addresses of these websites. Meanwhile, some foreign websites are not blocked, but the government extends the loading time for these websites. By 2020, an estimated 12 million to 20 million Chinese internet users were using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to bypass the internet blockade. In accordance with "Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of International Networking of Computer Information in the People's Republic of China," the Chinese government penalizes Internet users who use VPN to bypass Internet censorship and visit blocked websites within mainland China. In principle, it is forbidden for Internet users to use a VPN. The maximum fine is RMB 15,000 (about US$2,217). In practice, access to VPNs is limited for most mobile internet users, as all apps provided in app stores require pre-approval from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology since 2023. Since 2019, public security bureaus have fined individuals in Guangdong and other regions of China for using VPNs, with the highest fine being RMB 1,000 (about US$148). In 2026, a person in Hubei was fined RMB 200 (about US$30) for using a VPN on his Honor (formerly a subsidiary of Huawei) mobile phone to browse international TikTok (a Chinese-made mobile app that is blocked in both mainland China and Hong Kong) and X.
Legal basis
Although the 1982 state constitution formally guarantees freedom of speech, the Chinese government maintains that "freedom of speech is not the same as free speech". According to the People's Liberation Army Daily, when exercising their right to freedom of speech, citizens "must not disrupt social order, violate the Constitution and laws, or harm the interests of the state, society, or collectives, or the legitimate freedoms and rights of other citizens".
Wu Weiguang of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences notes that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forms the basis of China's political framework, meaning that the goal of freedom of speech in China is to "support and maintain the legitimacy and authority of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, as well as to promote, interpret and build the guiding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party". In China, speech, particularly political speech, is required to bear the legal responsibility of maintaining and improving the political foundation based on the CCP. Wu notes that the United States' freedom of speech is based on the premise that "there are no incorrect opinions or views", while China divides political speech into "correct and incorrect". Additionally, speech that infringes on the private rights of others and damages market order is restricted in China; Wu argues this is more similar to the Western approach. Wu says that academic speech in China is very different from the West, as in China "one cannot use freedom of academic speech as a basis to publish statements that damage the authority and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party". Finally, he adds that the CCP, as the political foundation of Chinese society, has strict requirements regarding social morality and ethics, meaning that China implements stricter controls in that regard compared to the US, which has a permissive attitude towards speech that violates social ethics.
Goals
Most broadly, the purpose of the censorship apparatus is to maintain the stability of the status quo system of governance under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This includes political censorship as well as censorship of content deemed obscene and harmful to public morality, although the latter justification can be used as a means to censor political topics as well. The more specific reasoning and logic of censorship is not publicized by the state, however; scholars outside of China generally tend to take two overarching views of its purpose: first, censorship primarily targets unauthorized criticisms of the party-state; and/or second, censorship primarily targets expression of sentiment that is conducive to organization of collective action (whether or not it is critical of the party-state).
In 2013, Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts published research based on large-scale sampling of posts on a variety of Chinese social media, arguing that the primary motive for censorship is to quash potential for collective action, and not prevent criticism of the government per se. Through regular, automated sampling of extant posts, the authors were able to analyze which were deleted over time. While drawing only from Internet-based sources, King et al. argued their data demonstrated that "despite widespread censorship of social media, we find that when the Chinese people write scathing criticisms of their government and its leaders, the probability that their post will be censored does not increase. Instead, we find that the purpose of the censorship program is to reduce the probability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective movements are in evidence or expected."
Further experiments conducted by King et al. (2014) demonstrated and recreated mechanisms of censorship of social media. The authors created social media accounts to publish text online, tracking what was and was not deleted, and additionally obtained social media censorship software used by private corporations to comply with government regulations. King et el. again argued their work offered "rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real-world events with collective action potential are censored."