is a Japanese foreign policy doctrine, based on a 1977 speech by Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, stating that Japan would never become a military power. On the contrary, the policy proposes to enhance relations with Southeast Asian countries in wide-ranging fields, as well as to increase cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member countries. The Fukuda Doctrine serves as the foundation of Japanese diplomacy toward the rest of Asia.
Historical background
Takeo Fukuda Takeo Fukuda was an expert in economics. He took on the role of an ‘economic prime minister’ under Miki's administration from 1974 to 1976. During this time, he established the Ministerial Conference on Economic Measures, enabling cross-ministry and agency talks on finance, wage and labor issues. Fukuda subsequently became the 67th prime minister of Japan, lasting for only one term from 1976 to 1978. However, he was not forced out of office before he had gotten two major diplomatic reforms executed. Under the Fukuda cabinet, Japan conducted an omnidirectional peace diplomacy, and signed Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. He pushed forward Japan's pacifistic position while making an effort to strengthen relations with Asian countries.
Phases of Japan’s Southeast Asian Policy prior to the Fukuda Doctrine After the Second World War, Japan's policies towards Southeast Asia, can be divided into two distinct phases - a period of reparations (1952-1964) and a period of regional economic development (1965-1975). The historic events and the features of those periods have contributed to the development of Fukuda Doctrine and the subsequent policies towards the region.
Period of Reparations (1952-1964) The first period in the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, can be characterized by Shigeru Yoshida’s “Economic Diplomacy”, officially promulgated in 1957. The so-called “Yoshida Doctrine” put high priority on development and aimed at peaceful expansion of Japan's economic power in foreign markets, in order to rebuild the economy and raise the living standards of the Japanese population. As a part of this policy, Japan sought to improve ties with the Southeast Asian region. Reparations settlements between Japan and Southeast Asian countries played a significant role in such environment as they served as a tool which provided a ground for rebuilding of the relations, severed by Japanese aggression during the war. During this period, Japan paid reparations to Burma, Philippines, Indonesia, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Other than reparations in the strict sense, Japan also provided “quasi-reparations” in the form of grants and aid to Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore. This way, reparation payments paved the way for Japan's economic involvement in Southeast Asia, allowing it to pursue economic interest in the region.
Another aspect of this period, again motivated by the goal of expanding Japan's economy, is the policy of a triangular relationship with the US and Southeast Asia. This strategy, coordinated with US Cold War policies, aimed at bringing together Japanese know-how, US capital and Southeast Asian raw materials, in order to secure strategic resources and sustain the economic growth.
Period of Regional Economic Development (1965-1975) The second phase of Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia is characterized with the active involvement of Japan in the region's development. This was partly due to the increasing pressure from the international community that Japan share a burden on the international arena as a “developed” country. On the other hand, this shift towards participation in the region was motivated by the new US policy on the development of Southeast Asia that aimed to protect South Vietnam from communist expansion. These changes contributed to the extensive Japanese engagement towards Southeast Asia, manifested through huge investments of capital and the involvement in development plans and projects. During this period Japan assisted the establishment of Asian Development Bank; the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia etc. In spite of the increased involvement, however, the essence of the Japanese policy didn't change significantly, as it remained focused on the triangular relationship it was fostering.
During the early 1970s Japan was at the turning point for its post-war process, after Okinawa's reversion, and the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. However it had no clear vision for its future diplomatic policies. Meanwhile, the international society continued viewing Japan as solely pursuing its own economic interests. With the end of the Vietnam war in 1975 and the US withdrawal from the region, Japan was expected to take on international responsibility in Southeast Asia. As a result, Japan became determined that as the second-biggest economic power at the time, it should make international contribution to the region, setting the starting point of the vision of the Fukuda doctrine.
Japan-ASEAN relations prior to the Fukuda Doctrine (1967-1977) Japan initially viewed ASEAN as economically strategic, but remained insouciant to the association until the early 1970s. ASEAN was established at a time when the Japanese government was prioritizing the reversion of Okinawa from the United States over an active role in the ASEAN region. When Japan was rid of the Okinawa problem, attitude towards ASEAN had already turned negative. ASEAN's adoption of a neutralization policy in 1971 was deleterious to Japan's foreign policy on supporting an organization that incorporated neutralization.
Towards 1975, however, the Tokyo government had no choice but to abandon its foreign policy on minimal involvement with organization embodying neutralization, and to establish negotiations with ASEAN countries. The growing fear of Japan's economic domination amongst Southeast Asian nations resulted in collective actions by ASEAN against Japan, exemplified by acute anti-Japanese demonstrations.
Changes in Southeast Asian security environment following the new realities of 1975 engendered a major shift in Japan's approach to foreign policy in the region. Prior to 1975, conflict between East and West defined the security of ASEAN in purely military terms, which also meant the insignificant role of Japan in the view of ASEAN nations. After the liberation of Vietnam and the fall of Kampuchea government to the communists, combined with the declining presence of American forces in Southeast Asia, ASEAN nations began to perceive their own security in terms of raising the standard of living of their people. The recognition that military power alone could not secure ASEAN interests gave way to a new priority of economic well-being. This change in priority led to a redefinition of security from that of a military perspective to one that was economic, wherein Japan could play a decisive role in contributing to ASEAN economic development and political stability.
Core Elements of the Doctrine
Source:
Japan Rejects the Role of a Military Power "First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power”
Fukuda stated that even though Japan had the capability to rearm and to produce nuclear weapons, it steered clear of resurrecting its military past. Fukuda used article 9 of the 1946 constitution to reassert Japan's pacifist stance post-war. For the ASEAN nations and Southeast Asia as a whole, this statement served as a psychological reassurance to the memories of Japanese aggression in the second world war.
Japan Increases Mutual Confidence and Trust "Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia will do its best for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on “heart-to-heart” understanding with these countries”
The Prime Minister called for mutual confidence and trust between Japan and ASEAN by emphasizing the words “heart to heart” in his definition of a development of relation between Japan and ASEAN.
Japan as an Equal Partner of ASEAN: Mutual Dependence "Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries, and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience"
Fukuda declared Japan as “an equal partner” who would “walk hand-in-hand with ASEAN.” The word “equal” implied the fear of Japanese economic dominance (“economic animal”) amongst ASEAN members – by being “an equal partner,” Japan would no longer seek dominance in the Asian scene nor would it regard other Asian nations as inferior to itself.
Goals of the Doctrine
Role of Securing Stable Coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina Japan's efforts to providing itself a political role in ASEAN and Indochina was dubbed a neo-realist approach, made possible by a declining United States presence and commitments in Southeast Asia. This approach, manifested by the rejection of military force and emphasis on economic power, demonstrated Japan's belief in the use of soft power. It was for this very reason that Japan was so keen on encouraging the development of multilateralism in Southeast Asia.
This approach to foreign policy in a sense was intended to establish a ‘political coordination’ between Japan and ASEAN as a regional actor. Fukuda had warned, in the area of trade, it was not in Japan's interest to form an exclusivist economic bloc with ASEAN. The Prime Minister's warning in effect functioned as a switch to a ‘political role’ in ASEAN and Indochina from its conventional practice of providing economic assistance. Moreover, by forging close diplomatic ties, what Sueo Sudo calls a ‘special relationship,’ with the organization through the use of FDI, ODA and other financial aids, Japan would try to establish a greater role for itself in the development of ASEAN region. Fukuda further implied Japan's responsibility in the region and its larger role as a world leader by acting as an informant on current developments in international issues that could directly affect member nations.
Provide an Alternative to the Soviet Union and PRC
The sudden American withdrawal from Indochina left Southeast Asia vulnerable to pressure from the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (PRC), both of which were not in the interest of Japan.
The Soviet Union and China, aware of an opportunity presented in Southeast Asia following the decline of U.S. hegemony in the region, grappled for influence. China, in particular, was concerned with the “Soviet hegemony” in the internal communist movement and took concrete measures to prevent further Soviet influence. The 1978 Asia visit to Malaysia and Singapore by Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping reflected PRC's attempt to win over the ASEAN governments as an ally capable of supporting PRC's interest in the region. On the other hand, the Soviet Union developed a thought-control system in which it would try to coax Southeast Asian nations into thinking of Chinese diplomacy as a form of new imperialism. The Soviet deputy foreign minister visit to ASEAN states to discuss on friendship treaties and economic aids stands as a strong proof for its determination in Southeast Asia during the 1970s. Japan, imbibing all the happenings and changes in the power balance in Southeast Asia, feared for its position, security, and economy which, until the early 1970s, had been under the United States wing. As the last resort to curb further communist influence, Japan decided to offer itself as an alternative power base of Asia. Argued by Haddad, this goal is perhaps the true “thrust of the Fukuda doctrine.”