The North Korean famine (), dubbed by the government as the Arduous March (), was a period of mass starvation together with a general economic crisis from 1994 to 1999 in North Korea. During this time there was an increase in defection from North Korea, which peaked towards the end of the famine period.
Economic mismanagement and the loss of Soviet support caused food production and imports to decline rapidly. A series of floods and droughts exacerbated the crisis. Another contributing background factor was the tightening of international sanctions. The North Korean government and its centrally planned system proved too inflexible to effectively curtail the disaster. North Korea attempted to obtain aid and commercial opportunities, but failed to receive initial attention. After repeatedly refusing international help, North Korea only sought international aid after 1995.
Estimates of the death toll vary widely. Out of a total population of approximately 22 million, somewhere between 240,000 and 3,500,000 North Koreans died from starvation or hunger-related illnesses, with the deaths peaking in 1997.Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson and Tao Wang, Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures , Institute for International Economics. A 2011 U.S. Census Bureau report estimated the number of excess deaths from 1993 to 2000 to be between 500,000 and 600,000.
Background In North Korea, the famine is referred to as the Arduous March. It was one of the most important events in the history of North Korea, because it forced the country and its people to change their lives in fundamental and unanticipated ways.
The term "Arduous March" or "March of Suffering" became the official metaphor for the famine following a state propaganda campaign in 1993. The Rodong Sinmun urged the North Korean citizenry to invoke the memory of a propaganda fable from Kim Il Sung's time as a commander of a small group of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters. The story, referred to as the Arduous March, is described as "fighting against thousands of enemies in 20 degrees below zero, braving a heavy snowfall and starvation, the red flag fluttering in front of the rank".
As part of this state campaign, uses of words such as 'famine' and 'hunger' were banned because they implied government failure. Citizens who said deaths were due to the famine could be in serious trouble with the authorities. A special group (the Simhwajo) was set up to purge the citizens responsible.
Less than 20% of North Korea's mountainous terrain is arable land. Much of the land is frost-free for only six months, and only one crop can be grown on it per year. The country has never been self-sufficient in food production, and several experts considered it unrealistic and economically imprudent for the country to aim for self-sufficiency rather than trade. Due to North Korea's terrain, farming is mainly concentrated along the flatlands of the four western coastal provinces, where there is a longer growing season, level land, substantial rainfall, and well-irrigated soil conducive to the high cultivation of crops. Along with the western coastal provinces, fertile land also runs through the eastern seaboard provinces. However, interior provinces such as Chagang and Ryanggang are too mountainous, dry, and cold to support food crop farming.
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union embarked on a campaign of radical reform known as perestroika. It began to demand that North Korea repay the Soviet Union for all of the past and current aid which it sent to North Korea – amounts which North Korea could not repay. By 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved alongside the Eastern Bloc, ending all aid and trade concessions, such as cheap oil. Without Soviet aid, the flow of imports to the North Korean agricultural sector ended, and the government proved to be too inflexible to respond. Energy imports fell by 75%. The economy went into a downward spiral, with imports and exports falling in tandem. Flooded coal mines required electricity to operate pumps, and the shortage of coal worsened the shortage of electricity. Agriculture reliant on electrically powered irrigation systems, artificial fertilizers and pesticides was hit particularly hard by the economic collapse.
Most North Koreans had experienced nutritional deprivation long before the mid-1990s. The country had reached the limits of its productive capacity, and could not respond effectively to exogenous shocks.
North Korea's state trading companies emerged as an alternative means of conducting foreign economic relations. From the mid-1980s, these state trading companies became important conduits of funding for the regime, with a percentage of all revenues going "directly into Kim Jong Il's personal accounts... [which have been] used to secure and maintain the loyalty of the senior leadership".
The country soon imposed austerity measures, dubbed the "eat two meals a day" campaign. These measures proved inadequate in stemming the economic decline. According to Professor Hazel Smith of Cranfield University:
Without help from these countries, North Korea was unable to prevent the coming famine. For a time, China filled the gap left by the Soviet Union's collapse and propped up North Korea's food supply with significant aid.Haggard & Noland, Hunger and Human Rights, supra note 70, at 14. By 1993, China was supplying North Korea with 77 percent of its fuel imports and 68 percent of its food imports. In 1993, China faced its own grain shortfalls and need for hard currency, and it sharply cut aid to North Korea.
In 1997, So Kwan-hui, the North Korean Minister for Agriculture, was accused of spying for the United States government and sabotaging North Korean agriculture on purpose, thus leading to the famine. As a result, he was publicly executed by firing squad by the North Korean government.
Causes Floods and drought The economic decline and failed policies provided the context for the famine, but the floods of the mid-1990s were the immediate cause. The floods in July and August 1995 were described as being "of biblical proportions" by independent observers. They were estimated to affect as much as 30 percent of the country.
As devastating floods ravaged the country in 1995, arable land, harvests, grain reserves, and social and economic infrastructure were destroyed. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that "between 30 July and 18 August 1995, torrential rains caused devastating floods in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In one area, in Pyongsan county in North Hwanghae province, of rain were recorded to have fallen in just seven hours, an intensity of precipitation unheard of in this area... water flow in the engorged Amnok River, which runs along the Korea/China border, was estimated at 4.8 billion tons over a 72-hour period. Flooding of this magnitude had not been recorded in at least 70 years".
The major issues created by the floods were not only the destruction of crop lands and harvests, but also the loss of emergency grain reserves, because many of them were stored underground. According to the United Nations, the floods of 1994 and 1995 destroyed around 1.5 million tons of grain reserves,UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Consolidated UN Inter Agency-Appeal", 1 July 1996-21 March 1997. and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stated that 1.2 million tons (or 12%) of grain production was lost in the 1995 flood.UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, "Status of Public Health-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, April 1997" There were further major floods in 1996 and a drought in 1997.
North Korea lost an estimated 85% of its power generation capacity due to flood damage to infrastructure such as hydropower plants, coal mines, and supply and transport facilities.David F. Von Hippel and Peter Hayes, "North Korean Energy Sector: Current Status and Scenarios for 2000 and 2005", in Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, ed. Noland, 89. UN officials reported that the power shortage from 1995 to 1997 was not due to a shortage of oil, because only two out of a total of two dozen power stations were dependent on heavy fuel oil for power generation, and these were supplied by KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization). About 70% of power generated in the DPRK came from hydropower sources, and the serious winter-spring droughts of 1996 and 1997 (and a breakdown on one of the Yalu River's large hydro turbines) created major shortages throughout the country at that time, severely cutting back railway transportation (which was almost entirely dependent on electric power), which in turn resulted in coal supply shortages to the coal-fueled power stations which supplied the remaining 20% of power in the country.Ian Davies, quoted in Beal, "Waters of Prosperity"
Failure of the public distribution system North Korea's vulnerability to the floods and famine was exacerbated by the failure of the public distribution system. The regime refused to pursue policies that would have allowed food imports and distribution without discrimination to all regions of the country. During the famine, the urban working class of the cities and towns of the eastern provinces of the country was hit particularly hard.Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.51 The distribution of food reflected basic principles of stratification of the communist system.Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.53
Foreign observers claimed food was distributed to people according to their political standing and their degree of loyalty to the state.Haggard, Stephan. Nolan, Marcus. 2007. Famine in North Korea. New York; Columbia University Press. p.54
The structure is as follows (the World Food Program considers 600 grams of cereal per day to be less than a "survival ration"): Category Amount allocated Privileged industrial worker 900 grams/day Ordinary worker 700 grams/day Retired citizen 300 grams/day 2~4-year-old 200 grams/day
However, the extended period of food shortages put a strain on the system, and it spread the amount of available food allocations thinly across the groups, affecting 62% of the population who were entirely reliant on public distribution. The system was feeding only 6% of the population by 1997. Year Changes 1987 Reduced 10% 1992 Reduced another 10% 1994 470 grams/day down 420 grams/day 1997 128 grams/day
A 2008 study found no variation in children's nutrition between counties that had experienced flooding and those that had not.
Long-term causes The famine was also a result of the culmination of a long series of government decisions that accrued slowly over decades. The attempt to follow a closed-economic model caused the regime to abandon the possibility of engaging in international markets and importing food and instead attempt to reduce demand, e.g., through the 1991 "Let's eat two meals a day" campaign. Attempts to increase exports and earn foreign exchange through the Rajin Sonbong free trade zone in 1991 were unsuccessful – it was located in the most isolated part of North Korea and lacked a clear legal foundation for international business. The North Korean government also missed the opportunity for the short-term option to borrow from abroad to finance food imports after defaulting on foreign loans in the 1970s.
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