The Z-4 Plan was a proposed basis for negotiations to end the Croatian War of Independence with a political settlement. It was drafted by Peter W. Galbraith, Leonid Kerestedjiants and Geert-Hinrich Ahrens on behalf of a mini-Contact Group comprising United Nations envoys and diplomats from the United States, Russia and the European Union. The co-chairs of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, were closely involved in the political process surrounding the plan. The document was prepared in the final months of 1994 and early 1995 before being presented to Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and the leaders of the self-declared Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) on 30 January 1995. Tuđman was displeased with the proposal, but accepted it as a basis for further negotiations. However, the RSK authorities even refused to receive the document before UNPROFOR mandate status was resolved. According to later reactions, RSK leadership was not satisfied with the plan.
Three more attempts to revive the plan were made after Operation Flash in early May, when Croatia captured a portion of western Slavonia previously controlled by the RSK. The first initiative, that began later that month, failed because the RSK demanded that the Croatian forces pull back from western Slavonia (which Croatia declined to do). The second attempt failed simply because neither party wanted to negotiate. The final round of negotiations where the Z-4 Plan was proposed by international diplomats occurred in early August, when a major Croatian attack against the RSK seemed imminent. This time RSK leadership seemed more willing to negotiate based on Z-4 plan, but Croatia presented its own demands (including immediate replacement of the RSK with a Croatian civilian government), which were refused. On 4 August, Croatia launched Operation Storm, defeated the RSK and effectively ended the political process which led to the creation of the Z-4 Plan.
Elements of the plan made their way into two proposals on resolving the Kosovo crisis: in 1999 (during the Kosovo War) and in 2005 as a part of the Kosovo status process. Neither was accepted by the parties to that conflict.
Background
In August 1990 an insurgency known as the Log Revolution took place in Croatia, centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around the city of Knin, parts of the Lika, Kordun, and Banovina regions, and settlements in eastern Croatia with significant Serb populations. These areas were subsequently named the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and, after the RSK declared its intention to unite with Serbia, the Government of Croatia declared the RSK a breakaway state. By March 1991 the conflict escalated, resulting in the Croatian War of Independence. In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence as Yugoslavia disintegrated. A three-month moratorium on Croatia and the RSK's declarations followed, after which their decisions were implemented on 8 October.
Since the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) increasingly supported the RSK and the Croatian Police were unable to cope with the situation, the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) was formed in May 1991. The ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army (HV) in November. The establishment of the Croatian military was hampered by a September UN arms embargo. The final months of 1991 saw JNA advances and the fiercest fighting of the war, culminating in the Siege of Dubrovnik and the Battle of Vukovar. In November a ceasefire was negotiated pending a political settlement (which became known as the Vance plan), and it was implemented in early January 1992. The ceasefire collapsed in January 1993 when the HV launched Operation Maslenica, and small-scale clashes continued for more than a year. On 16 March 1994, Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin brokered negotiations between Croatia and the RSK which produced a new ceasefire on 30 March. Further negotiations produced agreements on reopening a section of the Zagreb–Belgrade motorway (crossing the RSK-held part of western Slavonia, the Adria oil pipeline and several water-supply lines) by the end of 1994.
Development
Creation The Z-4 Plan was drafted by United States ambassador to Croatia Peter W. Galbraith, Russian ambassador to Croatia Leonid Kerestedjiants and German diplomat Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, representing the European Union (EU) in a "mini-Contact Group". The Z in the plan's name stood for Zagreb (Croatia's capital), and 4 represented the involvement of the United States, Russia, the EU and the UN. The plan was the product of a process begun on 23 March 1994, with Galbraith considering himself its principal author. It was a well-developed legal document intended as the basis for negotiations and, according to Ahrens, designed to commit Croatia to an internationally agreed settlement and prevent it from turning to a military resolution of the war (while being generous to the Croatian Serbs). According to Ahrens, the plan was actually too generous to the Serbs; in essence, it created the legal foundation for a permanent Serb state in Croatia.
The heart of the plan was the Constitutional Agreement on Krajina (Part One). Part One defined Krajina as an autonomous region of Croatia, with borders based on the results of the 1991 Croatian census (which identified eleven municipalities with an absolute Serb majority). Those areas would enjoy a high level of autonomy, with most authority transferred from the central government in Zagreb to Krajina. The region would have its own president, cabinet, legislation, courts, police force, emblem, flag and currency, and the right to levy taxes and make international agreements. Part One also provided for demilitarising the autonomous area. Part Two of the plan, the Agreements Concerning Slavonia, Southern Baranja, Western Sirmium and Other Areas, related to areas where the Croatian Serbs did not form the majority in 1991 (including eastern and western Slavonia) and contained transitional provisions. Part Three of the plan spelled out safeguards on human rights, fundamental freedoms, prosecution of war crimes, a human-rights court with international judges, and provisions allowing dual Croatian and Yugoslav citizenship for Croatian Serbs. The plan envisaged that western Slavonia would be the first to be restored to Croatian control, followed by eastern Slavonia (where a transitional UN administration would be set up before the handover).
Proposed changes The first draft of the Z-4 Plan was prepared in September 1994, and further developed and amended on several occasions during the following four months. Over this period, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) co-chairs David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg requested amendments to the plan and opposed its presentation to Croatian or RSK authorities. The first set of changes requested was to include a provision that Croatia cede territory around the city of Županja (on the north bank of the Sava River) to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, allowing better communication between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb territory around Banja Luka. The request, submitted on 8 September, was turned down by the plan authors. That day, Owen requested that the plan allow Krajina to form a confederation with either Serbia or FR Yugoslavia. Owen and Stoltenberg sought to create a network of confederations between the former Yugoslav republics, but the authors of the Z-4 Plan deemed that impossible. German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, on behalf of the German EU presidency, cautioned Owen that Krajina Serbs formed only 5 percent of Croatia's population and a confederation between Kosovo and Albania would be more natural. On 6 October Russia declared its opposition to the confederation, but Owen regained the country's support for the idea four days later (shortly before it was abandoned).
The third group of requested amendments pertained to eastern Slavonia. Owen and Stoltenberg requested its status to be left unresolved, instead of gradually reverting to Croatian control over a five-year period and applying the postwar ethnic composition of the area as a formula for the ethnic mix of the local police and establishing a joint Croatian-Yugoslav company to extract crude oil in Đeletovci. The proposal was turned down, but it led to local autonomy for Serb villages in the area and reduced the transitional period to two years. The fourth group of proposed amendments, tabled by Owen, included a proposal for continued Serb armed presence in Krajina and additional authority for Krajina concerning mineral resources and international treaties. After the proposals, the text of the plan became the subject of lengthy discussions between the contact group countries, the EU and the ICFY co-chairs. The co-chairs began drafting their version of the plan; Stoltenberg stalled the plan through Norwegian diplomat (and ICFY ambassador) Kai Eide, creating a conflict between Eide and Galbraith.
First news of the plan On 1 October, Galbraith informed Croatian President Franjo Tuđman of the plan without providing any details. Similarly, Ahrens and Eide informed RSK president Milan Martić. Although early Z-4 Plan negotiations were planned without actually disclosing the plan to Croatia and the RSK, elements of the plan were leaked to Belgrade and Zagreb newspapers in mid-October. According to Florence Hartmann, in October representatives of Tuđman and those of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević met in Graz, Austria to discuss the proposed reintegration of the RSK into Croatia and their opposition to the Z-4 Plan. Tuđman disliked the plan because it envisaged a Serb state in Croatia, while Milošević saw it as a dangerous precedent that could be applied to majority non-Serb or ethnically mixed regions of rump Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo, Vojvodina and the Sandžak.
Galbraith, Eide and Kerestedjiants agreed to deliver the plan to Croatia and the RSK on 21 October, opposed by Owen and Stoltenberg. Owen also asked Vitaly Churkin to instruct his envoy to oppose the delivery. As instructed by Moscow, Kerestedjiants pulled out of the move and Galbraith accused Owen of sabotaging the Z-4 Plan.
Final version The 53-page final version of the Z-4 Plan was prepared on 18 January 1995. Entitled "Draft Agreement on the Krajina, Slavonia, Southern Baranja and Western Sirmium", it consisted of three documents and two provisional maps. The maps were considered provisional because of concerns that the inclusion of Benkovac in Krajina would be contested by Croatia; a portion of the municipality had been predominantly inhabited by Croats, and it was on the Adriatic coast. Another territorial issue was the municipality of Slunj; it was not included in Krajina, and the omission effectively cut Krajina in two. A possible solution to the problem was to split the municipality in two and award the areas east of Slunj to Krajina. In anticipation of this, planning began for a road bypassing Slunj. Despite the unresolved issues, delivery of the plan to Croatia and the RSK was scheduled for January. On 12 January, shortly before the plan's final version was drafted, Tuđman announced in a letter to the UN that Croatia would not grant an extension of the UN peacekeeping mandate beyond 31 March and United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops deployed to the RSK would have to leave.
Presentation On 30 January the Z-4 Plan was presented to Tuđman by the French ambassador to Croatia, accompanied by Galbraith, Kerestedjiants, Ahrens and Italian ambassador Alfredo Matacotta (replacing Eide). Tuđman did not hide his displeasure with the plan, receiving the draft with the knowledge that Milošević's opposition to the plan (because of his concerns for Kosovo) would not allow it to be implemented. Tuđman accepted the plan (which Croatia considered unacceptable) as a base for negotiations with the RSK, hoping that they would dismiss it.