The executions during the Irish Civil War took place during the guerrilla phase of the Irish Civil War (June 1922 – May 1923). This phase of the war was bitter, and both sides, the government forces of the pro-treaty Irish Free State and the anti-Treaty Irish Republican Army (IRA) insurgents, used executions and terror in what developed into a cycle of atrocities. From November 1922, the pro-treaty provisional later Free State government embarked on a policy of executing Republican prisoners in order to bring the war to an end. Many of those killed had previously been allies, and in some cases close friends (during the Irish War of Independence 1919–1921), of those who ordered their deaths in the civil war. In addition, government troops also summarily executed at least 130 prisoners in the field. The executions of prisoners left a lasting legacy of bitterness in Irish politics.
The use of execution by the Irish Free State in the Civil War was relatively harsh compared to the recent British record. In contrast with 81 official executions by the Irish Free State government, the British had executed 24 IRA volunteers during the 1919–21 conflict.
Background Michael Collins, commander of the pro-treaty National Army, had hoped for a speedy reconciliation of the warring Irish nationalist factions, demanding that anti-treaty Republicans must accept the people's verdict and then could go home without their arms stating that "We want to avoid any possible unnecessary destruction and loss of life. We do not want to mitigate their weakness by resolute action beyond what is required". With reconciliation in mind, Collins had opposed the introduction of an execution policy.Collins to Cosgrave, 29 July 1922, UCDAD, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/29 (156)
However, following the death of Collins in an ambush on 22 August 1922, the provisional government, under the leadership of W. T. Cosgrave, took the position that the Anti-Treaty IRA were conducting an unlawful rebellion against the legitimate Irish government established in law and prisoners should be treated as criminals rather than as combatants. O'Higgins in particular voiced the opinion that the use of drastic action was the only way to bring the war to an end.
Another factor contributing to the executions policy was the escalating level of violence. In the first two months of the Civil War (July–August 1922), pro-treaty forces had successfully taken all the territory held by Republicans and the war seemed all but over. After the Anti-Treaty side moved to guerrilla tactics in August–September, the pro-treaty National Army casualties mounted and they even lost control over some of the territory taken in the Irish Free State offensive. The town of Kenmare, for example, was re-taken by Anti-Treaty fighters on 9 September and held by them until 6 December.
Legal basis for the executions On 27 September 1922, three months after the outbreak of war, the pro-treaty Provisional Government put before the Dáil the Army (Emergency Powers) Resolution. This had the effect of endorsing martial law introduced by Collins on 11 July 1922, but not proclaimed at that time. Commonly, but incorrectly, referred to as the "Public Safety Bill", the Army Resolution gave parliament's formal recognition to the army's military courts and tribunals. The Army Resolution was not law, it had no legal effect, and should not be referred to as 'legislation' or 'statutory martial law'. The Army Resolution formally recognised parliament's support for measures the army was already taking and had been taking since Collins' death in August, notably the execution of prisoners under martial law powers Collins had adopted but not fully used. For this reason the "Public Safety Act", also sometimes known as the "Emergency Powers Act", is not recorded in the Irish Statute book. Introduced into the historiography after 1969, both "statutes" are alone invention of Irish historians. At least two Irish historians in their recently published histories of the civil war have devoted a chapter each to discussing the fictitious "Public Safety Act" which is widely referenced in the academic literature. No execution had any legal standing, rather the executions were justified by "military necessity" (otherwise "martial law"), in the pursuit of restoring the public order. Free State minister, Ernest Blythe, explained the non-legal status of the Army Resolution and all executions addressing the Dáil debate following the reprisal executions of four IRA leaders on 8 December 1922.
"Deputy O’Connell spoke about the difference between executions following trial by Military Courts and the [reprisal] executions this morning. From the point of view of legality, I think there is no difference. The Military Courts were not legalised by the Resolution of the Dáil. They for their operations depend upon military necessity, and the executions carried out under the sentence of those Courts are justifiable only because of military necessity. The executions carried out this morning can only be justified on grounds of military necessity. There was a formality in the case of the trials following the Military Courts. The proceedings at those Military Courts were in the nature of precautionary investigations, but the form did not give any legality to the executions that they would not have had without the form of a trial. The justification for the putting to death of the men who were put to death following trial by Military Courts was that the situation justified it, and that for the purpose of restoring the rule of law in this country it was necessary that this thing should be done".
The Army Resolution recognised the army could impose penal servitude of any duration, as well as the death penalty, for any offence including 'aiding or abetting attacks' on state forces, possession of arms and ammunition or explosive 'without the proper authority' and 'looting, destruction of public or private property or arson'.BT Murphy, The Government's Execution Policy during the Irish Civil War text of Public Safety Resolution, including penalties for specified offences, p.302-304 By imposing capital punishment on anyone found in possession of either firearms or ammunition, without a lawful reason, the army could punish Republican sympathisers for storing any arms or ammunition that could be used by Republican forces.
A motion was put to the Dáil by the Minister for Defence General Richard Mulcahy on 26 September to amend the army's Emergency Powers Order; it stated: "(IV.) The breach of any general order or regulation made by the Army authorities; and the infliction by such Military Courts or Committees of the punishment of death, or of imprisonment for any period, or of a fine of any amount either with or without imprisonment, on any person found guilty by any such Court or Committee of any of the offences aforesaid;"
This motion was amended and approved by resolution of the Dáil, after considerable debate. The Republican, or Anti-Treaty, members had refused to take their seats in the Parliament and the opposition to the measures was provided by the Labour Party, who likened the legislation to a military dictatorship. On 3 October, the Free State had offered an amnesty to any Anti-Treaty fighters who surrendered their arms and recognised the government. However, there was little response. W. T. Cosgrave, the head of the Provisional Government, told the Dáil in response, "Although I have always objected to the death penalty, there is no other way that I know of in which ordered conditions can be restored in this country, or any security obtained for our troops, or to give our troops any confidence in us as a government".
The final version, passed on 18 October 1922, stated:
"(4) The breach of any general order or regulation made by the Army Council and the infliction by such Military Courts or Committees of the punishment of death or of penal servitude for any period or of imprisonment for any period or of a fine of any amount either with or without imprisonment on any person found guilty by such Court or Committee of any of the offences aforesaid. Provided that no such sentence of death be executed except under the countersignature of two members of the Army Council".
The Order was strengthened in January 1923 to allow execution for many other categories of offence, including non-combatant Republican supporters carrying messages, assisting in escapes or using army or police uniforms; and also desertion from the National Army.The Army Council approved a wider Order, signed by General Mulcahy. The Order also permitted searches by police and government security forces without a search warrant. It was debated in the Dáil on 17 January, as required by law, and after considerable debate a motion by opposition leader Thomas Johnson of the Labour Party to negate it was defeated by a vote of 41 to 13.
The Free State government passed the Indemnity Act in August 1923. The Indemnity Act barred from prosecution actions ‘done for the purpose…of the suppression of the state of rebellion’. The later Indemnity Act was the reason for parliament passing the Army Resolution in September 1922, because the Resolution identified the Provisional Government 'has placed on the Army the responsibility for the establishment of the authority of the Government in all parts of the country...' The Army Resolution identified the pro-treaty army was fighting to defend the Provisional Government and the third Dáil both established under British law with royal assent. Some in the pro-treaty army believed, and were encouraged to believe by Collins, that they were fighting the civil war toward achieving a new IRB republic under the direction of the IRB Supreme Council. The Army Resolution clearly identified the army was fighting for parliament's sovereignty and therefore could be later indemnified by that parliament for its actions during the civil war. Two Public Safety Acts were passed in 1923.See the and the
Other social pressures Soon after the passage of the Army Resolution, several other pressures were brought to bear on Republican fighters.
On 10 October, the Catholic Hierarchy issued a pastoral letter condemning the Anti-Treaty IRA Volunteers, ending with: "All who in contravention of this teaching, participate in such crimes are guilty of grievous sins and may not be absolved in Confession nor admitted to the Holy Communion if they persist in such evil courses." In effect this meant that the Anti-Treaty fighters would be excommunicated, and if killed could not expect a church burial or to pass on to heaven. In a population that was overwhelmingly Catholic and very devout, this was an extremely powerful social pressure applied at an opportune time for the Provisional Government.
On 15 October, directives were sent to the press by Free State director of communications, Piaras Béaslaí to the effect that Free State troops were to be referred to as the "National Army", the "Irish Army", or just "troops". The Anti-Treaty side were to be called "Irregulars" and were not to be referred to as "Republicans", "IRA", "forces", or "troops", nor were the ranks of their officers allowed to be given.
From now on, the Free State, armed with updated military courts, the support of the Roman Catholic church and of much of the Press, was prepared to treat the IRA fighters as criminals rather than as combatants.
The first executions and reprisal executions The first four executions occurred a month after most Republicans had rejected the amnesty that expired in mid-October 1922. On 17 November, four Anti-Treaty IRA volunteers were shot in Dublin. These were followed by three more on 19 November.