The 1st, 2d, and 3d Radio Battalions are United States Marine Corps Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) units whose missions are to provide tactical SIGINT, ground Electronic Warfare (EW), limited cyberspace operations, and Special Intelligence communications tasked by the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to support MEFs and their subordinate elements. Radio Battalions function primarily as intelligence-gathering and analytic organizations with capabilities connected to and integrated with theater and national SIGINT communities. Radio Battalions are responsible for establishing, operating, and maintaining Intelligence Information Architectures to accomplish this mission.
Structure and Composition
Radio Battalions are largely populated by enlisted Marines in the 2600 Occupational Career Code (OCC) Field, but also Headquarters and Support elements drawn from other career fields. Marines in the 2600 OCC Field who may be assigned to Radio Battalions include: Special Communications Signals Collection Operator/Analysts, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Intercept Operator/Analysts, Cryptologic Language Analysts, and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) Systems Engineers. Commissioned Officers assigned to Radio Battalions include Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare Officers.
Radio Battalions have traditionally consisted of a battalion headquarters, headquarters and service company, and designated operational companies. Operational components may include: Operational Control and Analysis Center (OCAC): senior SIGINT authority in a Marine Area of Operations, located within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) CE intelligence operations center OCACs typically include the following positions: OCAC Officer in Charge (OIC), Watch Officer/Watch Chief, Collection Manager, Senior Analyst, SIGINT Geospatial analysts, Digital Network Intelligence analysts, Cryptologic Linguists, SIGINT report writers, and Special Intelligence Communications Operational Command Elements (OCEs): subordinate to the OCAC; provide the Radio Battalion with extended command and control over SIGINT/EW (SIEW) teams and SIGINT operations. OCEs are task-organized based on the scope of their functions SIEW teams: primarily collection assets that perform low level analysis for Indications and Warnings purposes Capabilities include: survey, collection, and exploitation of enemy signal(s), including digital networks; geolocation of enemy units; and dissemination and utilization of intelligence at the lowest tactical echelons E.g. SIGINT Support Teams (SSTs) and Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS) teams Radio Reconnaissance Teams (RRT): specially trained and equipped SIGINT Marines who may support ground reconnaissance and surveillance elements Radio reconnaissance platoons are trained in special insert and extract means and basic reconnaissance capabilities. They are sometimes leveraged to enhance understanding of threat operations prior to the arrival of other SIGINT support unit forces Receive tactical movement direction from the ground reconnaissance commander and technical SIGINT direction from the Radio Battalion commander
All Radio Battalion operations, from the OCAC to individual teams, occur within sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs). SCIFs may be static locations, temporary tactical fixtures, or mobile facilities to support and adjust to dynamic forward deployed operations.
Oversight
Radio Battalion intelligence collection capabilities fall under the purview of DIRNSA/CHCSS (Director of the National Security Agency/Chief of the Central Security Service), controls the activities of SIGINT organizations down to the smallest tactical teams. The two sections of the United States Code relevant to Radio Battalions are Title 10 and Title 50. Title 10 furnishes the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) with the authority to "organize, train, and equip" SIGINT Marines and sets forth oversight mechanisms. Title 50 describes intelligence and its sub categories and establishes the DIRNSA as the executive agent of SIGINT for the US Government.
The tactical SIGINT capabilities of Radio Battalions are also governed by Executive Order (EO), Department of Defense Directive (DoDD), Department of Defense Instruction (DODI), Department of Defense Regulation, Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST), and Marine Corps Order (MCO).
Executive Order (EO) 12333 is a foundational authority, which, very generally and among other things, limits the collection/interception of communications to foreign persons that occur wholly outside the United States as part of NSA's role as a combat support agency. Radio Battalions, therefore, are unable to conduct domestic SIGINT collection operations and instead rely on canned scenarios and scripts to create facsimiles of potential real-world operations.
History
World War II The first iterations of Radio Battalions were Radio Intelligence Platoons activated on 14 June 1943, at Camp Elliott in Linda Vista, California. By 1945, four platoons provided cryptological support to Marine combat divisions during World War II campaigns in the Solomon Islands, Guam, Iwo Jima, Kwajalein, Peleliu, and Okinawa.
Radio Intelligence Platoons were active during the occupation of Japan in 1945 and the occupation of North China from October 1945–February 1946 during Operation Beleaguer.
In 1945, upon the conclusion of WWII and concomitant post-war occupation, the Radio Intelligence Platoons were deactivated. By fall of 1949, the platoons were re-designated as a company-size reserve unit, the 5th Signal Company, headquartered with the Fifth Marine Corps Reserve District in Washington, D. C.
Korean War In 1950, a table of organization and equipment (T/O&E) allowed for the activation of a company-sized radio unit with a specific carve-out for a cryptanalysis section. Systems of tactical intercept support established during World War II had disappeared almost entirely by the start of the Korean War.
The Korean War spurred the February 1951 activation of the reserve 5th Signal Company, which was renamed 1st Radio Company and relocated to Camp Pendleton, where it would remain for the duration of the war. 1st Radio Company was not considered combat ready, as it lacked the necessary equipment for its operations.
According to unclassified CIA studies, Marines had no tactical SIGINT support during the Korean War, the absence of which reportedly contributed to the retreat of the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir. The Korean War hastened enhancement of the Marine Corps' tactical SIGINT posture in the years following the war, including an investment in cryptologic linguists.
In July 1954, 1st Radio Company relocated to Camp Lejeune and set up its new base of operations aboard Camp Geiger in support of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.
On 15 September 1958, 1st Radio Company was re-designated 2d Radio Company at Camp Lejeune and a new 1st Radio Company was activated at Camp Smith, Hawaii to support Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC). The units were briefly re-designated as Composite Radio Companies, but reverted to Radio Companies in 1962.
Cold War From 1 July – 1 November 1958, the North Carolina-based Radio Company sent a detachment to support Marine Forces involved in the 1958 Lebanon crisis during Operation Blue Bat.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, North Carolina-based 2d Composite Radio Company provided support to ground and naval elements.
In 1964, Radio Companies were authorized to reconstitute as battalions. That July, the 2d Composite Radio Company was re-designated 2d Radio Battalion. It was deployed to the Dominican Republic between April and June 1965 as part of Operation Power Pack, the US invasion of the island during the Dominican Civil War.
On 19 April 1967, 2d Radio Battalion formed Detachment "M" to provide support to a Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRU) site in Sidi Yahia, Morocco, until the site's signal operations were discontinued on 13 July 1972.
In November 1970, 2d Radio Battalion supported Sub-Unit One, Company L, Marine Support Battalion at John Paul Jones Hill with NAVSECGRU, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. 2d Radio Battalion provided support as a permanent detachment through 16 March 2000, when Naval Security Group Activity (NSGA), Guantánamo Bay and Company L, Marine Support Battalion, held a joint decommissioning ceremony.
2d Radio Battalion provided support to the multinational peace-keeping force in Lebanon from September 1982–April 1984 and the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983.
In May 1990, civil war erupted in Liberia as rebel forces led by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia advanced on the capital Monrovia. As part of Operation Sharp Edge, the 22nd MEU positioned offshore aboard to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) if required.
On 10 June 1990, Colonel John Amos dispatched three members of the MEU's 2d Radio Battalion detachment to Monrovia by boat to augment the forward command element at the U.S. Embassy. The detachment, headed by Sergeant Kenneth M. Sharp, established intercept equipment at the embassy and monitored the unsecured radio nets of the various armed factions operating in and around Monrovia.
The Liberian combatants' lax operations security (OPSEC) made collection straightforward, as most government and rebel forces communicated in Liberian English, and incorrectly believed American personnel could not translate the dialects they used for sensitive communications. Throughout the MEU's operation, the detachment provided the Saipan with daily intelligence reports for analysis.
Vietnam War From 15 January 1962 – 31 December 1962, the Hawaii-based 1st Composite Radio Company augmented the 3rd Radio Research Unit (3rd RRU), a US Army Security Agency Unit (ASA). The 42 Marines comprising the initial detachment were sent to Pleiku in the II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ) and later to Phu Bai, falling under the broad umbrella of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV or MACV). The 1st Composite Radio Company elements deployed during this period were referred to as "Sub-Unit One". By December 1962, 1st Composite Radio Company's Detachment had been reduced from 42 officers and men to only 16.
In the spring of 1964, the unit, having been renamed 1st Radio Company, dispatched a larger force to Da Nang. This detachment, dubbed the Signal Engineering Survey Unit (SESU), was commanded by future 29th commandant of the Marine Corps, then-Major Alfred M. Gray, Jr. SESU included a 76-man infantry detachment drawn from Company G, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines.
SESU elements were dispatched to Phu Bai, to support the ASA intelligence facility; Da Nang, for liaison and logistics; and the crest and slopes of Tiger Tooth Mountain (Dong Voi Mẹp, ), a jungle-covered mountain located eight miles north of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp at Khe Sanh in northwestern Quảng Trị province. SESU Marines were transported to the mountain by helicopter, with an additional party stationed at Khe Sanh to provide supply and relief at regular intervals. In Khe Sanh, the SESU used the moniker Marine Detachment, Advisory Team One as a cover term to obscure its operations.
Major Gray prohibited Marines at Tiger Tooth Mountain from patrolling or engaging in offensive engagements to minimize the risk of their presence and capabilities being discovered. Despite these precautions, the SESU team was forced to withdraw from the mountain and relocate to Da Nang in July 1964, following repeated probes by enemy forces and indications their position had been compromised.