In American football and Canadian football, a quarterback kneel, also called taking a knee, genuflect offense, kneel-down offense, or victory formation, occurs when the quarterback touches a knee to the ground immediately after receiving the snap, thus downing himself and ending the play. It is primarily used to run the clock down, either at the end of the first half (regardless of which team is ahead) or the game itself, to preserve a lead or ensure a game goes into overtime if the game is tied and in the fourth quarter. Although it generally results in a loss of some yardage and uses up a down, it minimizes the risk of a fumble, which would give the other team a chance at recovering the ball.

The play is meant to keep the defense from seriously challenging for possession of the ball. The rules penalize rough play after the ball is dead, which in this play usually occurs a fraction of a second after the snap. Especially when the outcome of the game is all but certain, defenses will often give little resistance to the play as a matter of sportsmanship as well as to reduce the risk of injuries, penalties, and possible supplemental discipline (referees and leagues have in recent years given increasingly severe penalties for unnecessary roughness inflicted on quarterbacks, as well as headshots in general). The quarterback is generally not touched.

The formation offers maximum protection against a fumble; should the center-quarterback exchange result in a fumble, a running back is lined up on either side of the quarterback, both to recover any fumble and protect the vulnerable kneeling player from being injured by defensive players who get through the line. Also, a player known as the "safety valve" is lined up directly behind the quarterback, often much farther than a typical tailback would line up. This player's responsibility is to tackle any defensive player who may recover a fumble and attempt to advance it. Because of this essentially "defensive" responsibility, the tailback in this formation may actually be a free safety or other defensive player who is adept at making tackles in the open field.

Even though the play itself takes very little time, the rules of American football dictate that it does not stop the game clock (as with any play where the ball carrier is tackled in bounds). With the 40-second play clock in the NFL and NCAA, along with the two-minute warning in the NFL (and the NCAA since 2024 as the two-minute "timeout"), a team can run off over two minutes with three straight kneel-downs if the defensive team has no more timeouts. The winning team can storm the field if up to 40 seconds remains in the game (25 in XFL or 35 in UFL). In such situations, even before the game is technically over (i.e. the game clock will still be running), it is common for opposing coaches, team staff and players (including those not on the field for the final play) to shake hands with each other, and for media and other accredited persons to come onto the field as well to commence interviews. In the XFL, as many as three straight "victory formations" from 75 seconds (or in UFL, 1:45) left in regulation can be performed.

The offense must be aware of the current down, as well as the distance between the line of scrimmage and their own endzone. From first down, a kneel can occur three times, taking first, second, and third down, respectively. A kneel on fourth down, however, would result in a turnover on downs and give the defense the ball back, possibly setting them up for a game-winning drive depending on how much time is left. Thus, it is common to see a team aim to get a first down before they can start kneeling, as they may not have enough downs to kneel out the remaining time in the game. Each kneel also loses the offense about 1 or 2 yards, which is typically insignificant, but if the offense is very close to its own endzone, it risks a safety if they kneel down in their own endzone, as well as loss of the ball to the defense.

The kneeldown is often called a "victory formation", as it is most often run by a winning team late in the game in order to preserve a victory. In the case of a close game, the winning team would be trying to avoid a turnover which might be the result of a more complex play. In the case of a more lopsided contest where the winning team's overall point differential has no prospect of affecting their playoff qualification prospects, the play can be run as a matter of sportsmanship (the winning team forgoing the opportunity to run up the score) and to avoid injuries and/or penalties. In terms of statistics, a kneel by the quarterback is typically recorded as a rushing attempt for −1 or −2 yards.

Other sports also use the term "victory formation" for a play designed only to run down the clock with little chance of injury, such as a jammer in roller derby skating behind or only lightly challenging the pack while the final seconds of the bout tick down.

Strategy The quarterback kneel is mainly used when the team in the lead has possession of the ball with less than two minutes on the game clock. The two minute warning automatically stops the clock in an NFL game; thus, regardless of the circumstances, the team with possession after the two minute warning must run a play in order to re-start the clock. Therefore, with the 40-second play clock in the NFL and NCAA, two minutes (120 seconds) is in theory the maximum amount of time that can be run off on three consecutive quarterback kneels; this assumes it is first down and the defense has no timeouts remaining. A team cannot run more than three consecutive quarterback kneels, as doing so on fourth down turns the ball over to the opponent and guarantees them at least one opportunity to score. The decision to run the quarterback kneel depends on the amount of time remaining in the game, the down, and the number of timeouts the defense has remaining. For example, if there is one minute remaining on the game clock on first down, and the defense has one timeout left, the offense may use two successive quarterback kneels to completely run out the clock, and if the defense uses its timeout, the offense can simply execute a third kneel to run out the clock. However, if there is one minute remaining on the game clock on third down, then regardless of how many timeouts the defense has, quarterback kneels will not completely run out the clock and the offense should try to make a first down. The XFL allows this to happen if up to 75 seconds remain; that league utilizes a 25-second play clock.

Even if a series of quarterback kneels may not completely bleed the game clock, a team that is ahead with under two minutes remaining may still be advised to call the kneeldowns in such a situation if it minimizes their opponent's chances of coming back to tie or win the game. For example, on September 22, 2018, the Oregon Ducks led the Stanford Cardinal by three points and had possession of the football on second down and three at Stanford's 43-yard line with 58 seconds of game time remaining and one timeout left for Stanford. Mario Cristobal, the then-head coach of the Oregon Ducks, called a running play rather than a quarterback kneel, but Oregon fumbled the ball back to Stanford, who subsequently tied the game on the ensuing drive and won the game in overtime. Had Cristobal ordered a couple of kneeldowns, Stanford would have, in all likelihood, regained possession of the football on a punt with around ten seconds remaining and no timeouts left at their disposal. Because Stanford would have had an extremely small chance at tying or winning the game in the alternative scenario, Cristobal was heavily criticized after his team's loss for calling a play that exposed his team to the risk of a turnover rather than kneeling and minimizing the chances of a Stanford comeback. Ironically, five years later, on October 7, 2023, Cristobal was again heavily criticized for electing not to kneel. In this situation, Cristobal's Miami Hurricanes led the Georgia Tech Yellow Jackets by three points, and Miami had possession of the ball on third down with 34 seconds remaining in the game and Georgia Tech having used up all of their timeouts. Instead of calling a quarterback kneel to drain the rest of the clock and end the game, Cristobal called a running play, which resulted in a Miami fumble that was recovered by Georgia Tech. Georgia Tech subsequently used the remaining game time on the ensuing drive to score a game-winning touchdown. The criticism towards Cristobal was much more intense following the Georgia Tech-Miami game because kneeling would have ensured a victory for Cristobal's Hurricanes, whereas kneeling would not have guaranteed a victory for Cristobal's Ducks in the Stanford-Oregon game.

The quarterback kneel is also often used at the end of the first half by a team which feels they have little chance of scoring before halftime due to poor field position, and wish to minimize the chances for a disastrous turnover. It is also sometimes run at the end of the second half of a tie game by a team content with sending the game into overtime. Less commonly, the play is sometimes run at the end of the game by a losing team which is hopelessly behind and wishes to hasten the end of the game without threatening player health on needless garbage time drives. Rarely, in blowout situations in high school or small college sports, the decision to kneel is made mutually by both coaches if a deficit is too large to realistically overcome.

A team that is in field-goal range and either tied or trailing by three or fewer points can also use one or more kneeldowns in order to run time off the clock before attempting a game-winning or tying field goal. A quarterback in this situation may also run several yards to his left or right before kneeling down in order to center the spot for a field goal attempt or realign the ball closer to a particular set of hash marks if the team's kicker has a preference for where they kick. Ideally, the clock should run out during the field goal attempt, disallowing the next kickoff and an attempt for the next team to score. Atlanta Falcons head coach Arthur Smith has been known to call quarterback kneels in these situations so as to set up kicker Younghoe Koo for game-winning field goal attempts and prevent Atlanta's opponents from having the chance to answer back offensively. The strategy has been successful for Smith's Falcons on four different occasions (victories against Miami and New Orleans in 2021, Arizona in 2022, and Houston in 2023).

A quarterback kneel used to be purposefully initiated on a point after touchdown try at the end of the game after a game-winning or defensive touchdown was scored at the end of regulation; NFL rules required the try to be executed between the offense and defense, even if the offense intends to decline the unnecessary points to avoid further insulting or annoying their opponent. This occurred prominently in the "Minneapolis Miracle" during the 2017 playoffs, in which eight New Orleans Saints players on offense and defense had to return to the field from the locker room to 'oppose' the try against the victorious Minnesota Vikings after referees insisted they complete the try. Quarterback Case Keenum merely knelt down with the ball before tossing it in the air and celebrating the Vikings victory, with the Saints making no effort to oppose. The rule was changed for the 2018 season to omit the try if it would have no impact on the outcome of the game. If the try has to be attempted because the defense has the opportunity to run it back for 2 points to win or tie the game, the quarterback will usually kneel to prevent the defense from doing so.