General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking (24 January 1862 – 9 June 1945) was a senior British Army officer who is most notable for being the commander of XI Corps for most of the First World War.
Arguments over the late release of XI Corps on the first day of the Battle of Loos in September 1915 were instrumental in forcing the resignation of Field Marshal Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force. Haking is remembered chiefly for the negligible gains and high casualties suffered by his forces (including Australian troops) at the second Attack at Fromelles, during the Battle of the Somme to the south. Although blocked from further promotion, he continued in command of XI Corps – including in Italy in the winter of 1917–1918 and in Flanders in April 1918 – until the end of the war. After the war he held two politically sensitive posts: he was the League of Nations High Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig in the early 1920s, and then General Officer Commanding (GOC) British Troops in Egypt.
Haking has enjoyed a poor reputation, especially in Australian writing. In the 21st century, at least two British historians have sought to defend his reputation, including his recent biographer Michael Senior (2012) and Gordon Corrigan (2003) who regarded him as an "intelligent and capable man" unfairly maligned in the popular mythology of the war.Corrigan 2003, pp. 201–202.
Early life and military career Haking was born on 24 January 1862 at 24 Lister Road at Kings Cross in Halifax, West Yorkshire, the son of a clergyman, the Reverend Richard Haking and his wife Mary Elizabeth. His early life and education is not known "and it is quite likely that he was taught at home either by his Oxford-educated father or by a private tutor". He entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1880 and after passing through Sandhurst "apparently without much difficulty", was commissioned with the rank of second lieutenant. Haking joined the 67th (South Hampshire) Regiment of Foot (which that year became the 2nd Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, later the Royal Hampshire Regiment) on 22 January 1881. Haking saw his first active service in Burma 1885–1887, when he was promoted to be his battalion's adjutant and was made captain in 1889. He married Rachel Violette Burford-Hancock, daughter of Sir Henry Burford-Hancock, on 28 September 1891; they had no children. The marriage took place in Beckenham, then part of Kent, when the 2nd Hampshires were based at Chatham on home service, having returned from Burma in 1888.
Haking then studied at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1896 to 1897 and his time there and the college itself "certainly made a great impression on him". It was there when he first encountered Douglas Haig, who would hugely influence Haking's later career. He was then made a deputy assistant adjutant general (DAAG) for Cork District from 1898 to 1899. He was promoted to major in March 1899. He served on the staff in the Second Boer War, initially as a DAAG. Haking later returned to the Staff College, first as a lecturer 1901–1904, then, from February 1904, as a DAAG until 1906. While at Camberley he was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel in January 1901. This was made permanent in November 1903 and he was promoted again, to brevet colonel, in June 1905. Haking was then made a substantive colonel and became the assistant adjutant general of the 4th Division, in succession to Colonel Henry Heath, in February 1906. He was then general staff officer, grade 1 (GSO 1, chief of staff) of the 3rd Division until 1908, then, after being promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general in June 1908, was brigadier general, general staff of Southern Command. He was honoured with the Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) in June 1910. Haking was given command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd Division, in September 1911.
According to Andy Simpson, in the Edwardian era, "he established a reputation as a sound tactical thinker". His book Company Training (1913) was partly inspired by Haig's 1909 Field Service Regulations. The book espoused the pre-war belief that morale and leadership were the most important factors in winning a battle. He also argued that the attacker would have the advantage over the defender, even if numerically inferior and deprecated the idea that modern weapons had made defence superior to attack. The book was reprinted during the first part of the war, at least. The book was considered "first class" and in Gordon Corrigan's view "even today ... has a freshness about it and an insight into human characteristics that would not be out of place in a modern military work".
First World War Brigade commander Still in command of the 5th Brigade in the summer of 1914, when the First World War began, Haking took it to the Western Front, with the division forming part of I Corps of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) (Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig, who knew Haking from their days at the Staff College almost twenty years before). On 23 August—the day of the Battle of Mons—in accordance with a request by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, general officer commanding (GOC) II Corps, Haig sent Haking with three battalions to make contact with II Corps on Haig's left but Haking reported that he had made no contact with the enemy.Sheffield 2005, p. 62. He helped force the Petit Morin during the Battle of the Marne. During the advance after the Marne, the brigade was at the forefront at the First Battle of the Aisne and on 14 September his was one of the few units to fight its way onto the Chemin des Dames, after the crossing of the River Aisne.
Haig recorded that the 5th Brigade made good progress on the eastern slopes of the Beaulne ridges, reaching the ridge of Tilleul de Courtacon, before having to pull back on meeting opposition. On 16 September he received a head wound that required three months' recuperation.Sheffield 2005, pp. 61, 70. The brigade's war diary records:
Division commander Haking, his wound having by now been declared "completely recovered", returned once more to the 5th Brigade on 20 November but this only lasted four weeks. On 28 December he was promoted to major general, "for distinguished conduct in the Field", and took command of the 1st Division of the BEF from Major General David Henderson.
The 1st Division took part in the Battle of Aubers Ridge (also known as the First Battle of Fromelles) in May 1915, where the three attacking divisions suffered 11,600 casualties, almost 4,000 of them being from the 1st Division and where he argued for further attacks despite the clear failure of the first attempt.Cobb 2007, p. 12. His attacking brigades lost over 50 per cent of their fighting strength in little over an hour. Haking was not blamed for what Simpson describes as the "flawed artillery plan and lack of artillery support" at Aubers Ridge. With the BEF expanding massively in size, Haking was one of the divisional commanders (he was fourth in order of seniority after Thomas Morland, Henry Horne and Hubert Gough) whom Haig recommended to the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, on 8 July 1915 as suitable for command of corps.Robbins 2005, pp. 56–57.
Battle of Loos On 1 September, Haig, commander of the First Army, recommended Haking, a "thruster", for command of XI Corps. The promotion was not confirmed until 4 September, as Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, was ill. Haking, now a temporary lieutenant-general, held this command until the end of the war.
Preparations XI Corps took part as a reserve in the Battle of Loos in September 1915. He later told the official historian, James Edmonds, that he had thought Haig wanted XI Corps to fill the gap between I Corps (Hubert Gough) and IV Corps (Henry Rawlinson) in the offensive, not act as a reserve at all.Travers 1987, p. 17. Before the battle Haking spoke to the men of 2nd Guards Brigade. One observer recorded that he "spoke very confidently, comparing the German line to the crust of a pie, behind which, once broken, he said, there is not much resistance to be expected. He ended up by saying "I don't tell you this to cheer you up. I tell it you because I really believe it".Lloyd 2006, p. 181. He assured his commanders that there would be no German resistance once their line had been broken (letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland Feilding to his wife, 16 September 1915). Although "everyone was too optimistic", Haking's promises to regimental officers that there would be "very little opposition" were "altogether misleading" and a "most regrettable travesty of the real facts" (testimony of various colonels to the official historian in the mid-1920s).Robbins 2005, p. 74.
The New Army 21st Division and 24th Division in XI Corps, were committed to battle but not the Guards Division which was held in reserve. The attacking divisions were tired and hungry after an overnight march to conceal their presence from the enemy, at 2:30 p.m. on 25 September, the first day of the battle.Lloyd 2006, pp. 88–89. Haig requested the release of the reserve early in the morning, soon after the attack began and an order was indeed telephoned from GHQ after 9:00 a.m. French also insisted on visiting army and corps headquarters later in the morning to give his final permission. It also seems to be the case that poor traffic control prevented the reserves moving up. Nick Lloyd wrote that French was partly to blame for the confusion for not having decided when the reserves were to be released. General Frederick Maurice of GHQ later blamed himself for not having gone into sufficient detail when briefing Haking as he assumed that the reserves would be passing into First Army control and Haig's staff would sort the matter out. (Traffic control during offensives improved later.)Lloyd 2006, pp. 93, 220.
Second Day GHQ released the Guards Division to the First Army at 1:45 p.m. on 26 September and it spent the day marching up to the front. Haking was ordered (at 11:30 p.m.) to submit plans for it to attack the next day. The next day Haig wanted to call off the attack but Haking felt it was too short notice. Haking also lifted the artillery barrage off the German front positions to bombard more distant targets at 3:00 p.m., an hour before the attack – Rawlinson, who visited him at 10:00 a.m., thought this a bad idea but kept his doubts to himself. Under pressure from Haig, XI Corps issued orders to the 3rd Guards Brigade that they were not to attack unless the 2nd Guards Brigade attack had succeeded but these orders were not issued until the former had already left their trenches.Lloyd 2006, pp. 191–192. XI Corps suffered another 8,000 casualties on the second day. Blame for the decision to continue the attack on the second day lies with Haig, although Haking took his men forward without any doubts.Lloyd 2006, pp. 156, 181.
Lloyd wrote that Haking "proved unequal to the task" of welding XI Corps into a fighting formation. Poor relations between staff "do not reflect well on his managerial skills". Although Haking was not responsible for the attacks on 25 and 26 September, he offered no dissent to Haig's plans and his subsequent plans shared Haig's underestimation of the enemy and "traditional" view of artillery (i.e. that it was an adjunct to the infantry attack, rather than grasping the importance of concentrated artillery fire in making such an attack possible).Lloyd 2006, pp. 215–216.
Resignation of Sir John French