Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 was a scheduled passenger flight from Baltimore, Maryland, to Chicago, Illinois, continuing on to Salt Lake City, Utah, and then to Las Vegas, Nevada. On December 8, 2005, the Boeing 737-7H4 operating the flight slid off the runway at Midway International Airport in Chicago while landing in a snowstorm and crashed into automobile traffic, killing a six-year-old boy.

The aircraft involved was repaired and returned to service, and remains with Southwest to the present day as N286WN.

Background Aircraft

The aircraft involved was a one-year-old Boeing 737-7H4, with serial number 32471, originally registered as It was built by Boeing Commercial Airplanes in 2004 and had logged 5273 airframe hours in 2901 takeoff and landing cycles. It was powered by two CFM International CFM56-7B24 turbofan engines. After repairs had been made, Southwest Airlines re-registered the aircraft to in September 2006.

Crew In command was 59-year-old Captain Bruce Sutherland, who had been a U.S. Air Force pilot from 1969 to 1995. He joined Southwest Airlines in August 1995 and had logged 15,000 flight hours, including 4,500 hours on the Boeing 737. The first officer was 34-year-old Steven Oliver, who had been working for the airline since February 2003, having previously served as a captain for Mesaba Airlines from 1997 to 2003. The first officer had 8,500 flight hours (with 4,000 of them as a captain), with 2,000 of them on the Boeing 737. Neither pilot had been involved in any accident or incident before Flight 1248.

Captain Sutherland was the pilot flying (PF) and First Officer Oliver was the pilot monitoring (PM).

Accident On Thursday, December 8, 2005, Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 was scheduled to arrive at Chicago Midway International Airport from Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, and then continue to Salt Lake City International Airport, then to Las Vegas McCarran International Airport. The plane circled over a small area in northwest Indiana several times before attempting to land in a snowstorm that had reduced visibility to less than .

At around 7:15 p.m. CST, the pilot attempted a landing with nearly of snow on the ground in the area. Airport officials stated that the runway was clear of snow before the landing. The latest reported weather had the wind from between east and east-southeast (090°) at .

A southeasterly wind would normally favor landing into the wind on Runway 13 Center. The runway visual range was reported at , below the landing minimums for the instrument landing system approach to Runway 13C. The only available runway with lower minimums was the opposite direction on 31C, which the crew selected, with the aircraft's groundspeed consequentially boosted by the tailwind.

The Boeing 737 skidded during landing and, according to witnesses, the nosegear collapsed. The aircraft came to rest on Central Avenue just south of the 55th Street intersection at the northwestern corner of the airport. The intersection was full of traffic, and the airplane hit at least three cars, killing six-year-old Joshua Woods, critically injuring five occupants of one car (two adults and three children), and seriously injuring four occupants of a second car. All were quickly taken to area hospitals. Three passengers from the aircraft were taken to hospitals with minor injuries. A total of 12 people were taken to hospitals after the accident. One other car that was hit was parked and unoccupied.

CVR transcript Transcript of Southwest flight 1248's CVR (Times are expressed in CST) * = Unintelligible word; () = Questionable text; (()) = Commentary; — = Break in continuity; Shading = Radio communication; ## = Expletive TimeSourceContent19:10:54CaptainBefore landing checklist19:10:54MDW Tower (to G3FK)If unable just let me know and go to the end19:10:56First OfficerSpeedbreak19:10:56G3FK (to MDW Tower)Yea, we can make a left on Alpha.19:10:57CaptainArmed green light 19:10:58First OfficerLanding gear19:10:59CaptainDown three green19:10:59First OfficerFlaps 19:11:00CaptainForty green light19:11:01First OfficerBefore landing checks complete 19:11:03CaptainThank you19:11:04First OfficerNo landing clearance yet19:11:05CaptainNope19:11:16CaptainI got (a) A three just disregard the ah.. approach warning if we get one19:11:20First Officergot it19:11:31CaptainKay'19:11:34First OfficerComin' over 'HOBEL' at seventeen19:11:37CaptainAlright and a thousand feet one thirty six, sink is a[n] nine hundred 19:11:42First OfficerYou can see the ground already 19:11:43Captain(yea) * (good)19:11:44First Officer(one)19:11:46CaptainNo peaking 19:11:47First Officer We're almost up to a thousand feet.19:11:50First OfficerNow we're at a thousand19:11:51CaptainAlright yea you're right thousand feet. One thirty two sink is ah eight-fifty 19:11:53First OfficerI always 19:11:57 ((Sound of autopilot disconnect warning))19:12:00CaptainWe're all counting on you.19:12:01First OfficerUhmhmm19:12:02 ((Sound of laughter))19:12:07 ((Sound of two clicks))19:12:16CaptainNever auto-braked here huh?19:12:18First OfficerYeah, hang on tight ((Sound of laughter))19:12:21CaptainYeah19:12:25First Officerfive hundred.19:12:26Captain 1248 (to MDW Tower)landing clearance for Southwest twelve-forty-eight19:12:28MDW Tower (to SWA1248)Southwest twelve-forty-eight, runway three-one center cleared to land wind zero-nine-zero at nine brakin' action is fair to poor19:12:35First OfficerFour hundred 19:12:36CaptainAlright19:12:37First OfficerFive green lights, cleared to land.19:12:42First OfficerApproaching minimums 19:12:42CaptainGoing outside the landing sir19:12:45First OfficerAlright19:12:46 ((Sound of thump))19:12:47CaptainMight help19:12:49First Officer##, a touch high on the glideslope19:12:50 ((Sound of two thumps))19:12:56First OfficerOne hundred 19:13:01First OfficerFifty, thirty, ten19:13:02 ((Sound of click))19:13:07 ((Sound of click and squeak))19:13:07 ((Sound of aircraft touchdown))19:13:08CaptainOh baby, I guess it comes on.19:13:11CaptainCome on baby19:13:13First OfficerAbout two thousand feet to go.19:13:14CaptainFeel it19:13:13First OfficerAbout two thousand feet to go.19:13:15First OfficerYou jumping on the--19:13:16CaptainSon of a ###19:13:17First OfficerJump on the brakes are ya?19:13:18CaptainAh huh19:13:19First OfficerI'm ahnna19:13:21First OfficerWhaddya19:13:22Captain###!19:13:23 ((Sound of double clunk))19:13:23CaptainGet back there19:13:25CaptainWe ain't goin' man19:13:27First OfficerWe're ###19:13:28CaptainWe are ###19:13:30CaptainAlight, keep it straight19:13:31 ((Sound of increased engine noise))19:13:35First Officer###19:13:14Captain### hang on19:13:35First OfficerHang on19:13:36 ((Sound of first impact))19:13:37First Officer###!19:13:39 ((Sound of Final impact))19:13:39First OfficerOh ###19:13:42First Officer(Sound of groan)19:13:43Captain(Sound of grunt) ### me.19:13:46First Officer###19:13:47Captain###19:13:47MDW Tower (to SWA1248)What was that? Southwest twelve-forty-eight are you cleared three-one center?19:13:48 ((Sound of Stick shaker))19:13:49 ((Sound of chime))19:13:51 ((Sound of clunk))19:13:51First officer 1248 (to MDW Tower)Southwest twelve-forty-eight went over the end19:13:53MDW Tower (to SWA1248)Say again19:13:54First officer 1248 (to MDW Tower)we went off the end of the runway.19:13:54CaptainShut down19:13:58First Officer###19:14:00CaptainShuttin' down((End of recording))

Investigation The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the accident. Chicago Fire Department commissioner Cortez Trotter said that the aircraft would not be removed from the intersection until the NTSB gave clearance to do so following its on-site investigation. The nose of the aircraft was hoisted onto a flatbed tractor-trailer on Saturday, December 10, and the 737 was towed to a hangar for continued inspection.

The Boeing 737-7H4 was equipped with the latest anti-skid and braking technology. The report noted that Southwest had only very recently begun using the autobrake systems, and that pilot training on proper use of autobrakes had been inadequate.

The NTSB preliminary report determined that the aircraft touched down in the touchdown zone of the runway with of its length remaining; under the prevailing conditions of weather, wind, speed, and weight, the aircraft needed of runway to stop safely. It was found that the tailwind was eight knots and exceeded the limit of five knots.

A preliminary NTSB advisory said: The flying pilot (Captain) stated that he could not get the reverse thrust levers out of the stowed position. The first officer, after several seconds, noticed that the thrust reversers were not deployed, and activated the reversers without a problem. Flight data recorder information reveals that the thrust reversers were not deployed until 18 seconds after touchdown, at which point there was only about of usable runway remaining.

Alternately, the crew could have held in the air, waiting for the weather to improve, or they could have diverted to another airport such as Chicago O'Hare International, which had substantially longer runways just 10 minutes away. Each of these options would have entailed considerable additional expense for Southwest, as well as missed connections and significant inconvenience for the flight's passengers. The NTSB identified the psychological pressure to complete their assigned task as one of the factors contributing to the crew's decision to land at Midway despite unfavorable conditions. Cockpit voice-recorder transcripts indicate that the pilots had been concerned about the weather and, before landing, jokingly alluded to the movie Airplane!, saying, "I picked a bad day to stop sniffin' glue."

The NTSB discovered that the air traffic controller had told the pilots that the braking action for the first half of the runway was good, and poor for the second half. However, investigators found that the controller had not furnished the pilots with all of the available required braking action reports because he did not take the type of aircraft from each report into account. One of these planes was a small plane that reported poor braking conditions. It was found that braking-action reports varied significantly based on aircraft type, changing weather conditions, personnel experience, the type of equipment used, and the time of report, and therefore should not be used as conclusive information on runway conditions.

The pilots stated that, based on the calculations that the crew had entered into the on-board performance computer (OPC), they believed that they could land and stop safely. However, investigators determined that the OPC had based its stopping margins on two assumptions: that the tailwind would be slower than it turned out to be and that the thrust reversers would be deployed when landing. It was found that the pilots had been unaware of these assumptions and that Southwest had not provided sufficient recurrent training on them. Therefore, the pilots did not use the critical braking-action term "poor" when assessing the landing performance.

Southwest Airlines had a policy that required pilots to consider more critical braking-action assessments when they receive mixed braking-action reports. However, the accident pilots were unaware of the policy and therefore did not consider it while assessing landing conditions. The NTSB also found that three other company pilots had landed before the accident with the same mixed braking-action reports. When interviewed, company pilots revealed that they too either did not adhere to the mixed braking policy or were not aware of it. Southwest also had not routinely trained its pilots on following or understanding the mixed braking-action report policy, and it was not referenced in the company manuals.