The Battle of Krasnoi (at Krasny or Krasnoe) unfolded from 15 to 18 November 1812 marking a critical episode in Napoleon's arduous retreat from Moscow.Lieven, p. 267. Over the course of six skirmishes the Russian forces under Field Marshal Kutuzov inflicted significant blows from a prepared ambush upon the remnants of the , already severely weakened by attrition warfare.Foord, p. 343.Lieven, pp. 267–268. These confrontations, though not escalated into full-scale battles, led to substantial losses for the French due to their depleted weapons and horses.Mémoires militaires du lieutenant général comte Roguet, p. 513
Throughout the four days of combat, Napoleon attempted to rush his troops, stretched out in a march, past the parallel-positioned Russian forces along the high road. Both Kutuzov and Napoleon were in tactical control of the battle. During the skirmishes, Ozharovsky's Russian flying column initially suffered a setback, but then Eugène's and Davout's French corps were gradually pushed back and defeated, and finally Ney was repulsed; he escaped encirclement by leading his corps across the ice to the north and thus outflanking Kutuzov's army. Despite the Russian army's superiority in horse and manpower, Kutuzov hesitated to launch a full offensive, according to Mikhail Pokrovsky fearing the risks associated with facing Napoleon head-on.Smith, pp. 201–203 Instead, he hoped that hunger, cold and decay in discipline would ultimately wear down the French forces.Mémoires militaires du lieutenant général comte Roguet, pp. 512–513Bogdanovich, pp. 137–138 This strategy, however, led him in a nearly perpendicular course, placing him amidst of the separated French corps.Antoine-Henri Jomini (1838) The Art of War, p. 235
On 17 November a pivotal moment occurred when the French Imperial Guard executed an aggressive feint. This maneuver prompted Kutuzov to delay what could have been a decisive final assault, leading him to seek support from both his left and right flanks. This strategic decision allowed Napoleon to successfully withdraw Davout and his corps but it also led to his immediate retreat before the Russians could capture Krasny or block his escape route.Zamoyski, A. (2004) 1812: Napoleon's fatal march on Moscow, pp. 422, 427 Kutuzov opted not to commit his entire force against his adversary but instead chose to pursue the French relentlessly, employing both large and small detachments to continually harass and weaken the French army.Clausewitz, pp. 212, 214
If judged operationally and tactically, Napoleon suffered a tough defeat at the Battle of Krasnoi, which inflicted devastating losses upon the French forces, amplifying their already continuous losses during their perilous retreat. Despite the valiant efforts of the Imperial Guard, the confrontation left the French military in dire straits and without supplies and food, further weakening their already battered army.
The forces converge on Krasny
Napoleon retreats from Smolensk
Consisting of 100,000 combat-ready yet undersupplied troops, the Grande Armée, departed Moscow on 18 October, aiming to secure winter quarters via an alternative route to Kaluga. Following the loss at the Battle of Maloyaroslavets Kutuzov compelled Napoleon to shift northward, retracing the same ravaged path he had hoped to avoid. Smolensk, situated approximately to the west, was the nearest French supply depot. Despite fair weather, the three-week march to Smolensk, moving approximately a day, proved disastrous, subjecting the to challenges like traversing a sparsely populated area with continuous forest, abandoned villages, grappling with demoralization, disciplinary breakdowns, hunger, extensive loss of horses and crucial supplies, as well as persistent harassment from Cossacks and partisans who made it impossible to forage.The Grande Armée's implosion during the first stage of the retreat is summarized by Chandler (p. 823); Riehn (pp. 322, 335–337, 341); Cate (pp. 343–347) and Zamoyski (377–385). While sources are not definitive, it's estimated that he arrived with 37,000 infantry, and 12,000 cavalry and artillery.Georges de Chambray (1825) Histoire de l'expédition de Russie: avec un atlas et trois vignettes, Vol. 2, p. 436 The situation worsened with the advent of an early and harsh "Russian Winter", commencing on 5/7 November.Wilson, p. 253Les bulletins françois, concernant la guerre en Russie, pendant l'année, 1812, p. 98Georges de Chambray (1825) Histoire de l'expédition de Russie: avec un atlas et trois vignettes, Vol. 2, p. 381
By 8/9 November, when the French reached Smolensk, the strategic situation in Russia had turned decisively against Napoleon. Merely 40% (37,000) of the remaining was still combat-ready.Riehn, pp. 343–345. Concurrent losses on other fronts further exacerbated their dire circumstances. Encircled by encroaching Russian armies that imperiled their retreat, Napoleon recognized the untenability of his position at Smolensk. On 11 November, he ordered Berthier that the new troops should not come to Smolensk but return to Krasny or Orsha. Consequently, the new strategic goal became leading the westward into winter quarters, targeting the area of the extensive French supply depot of Minsk.Riehn, p. 349.
Having lost contact with Kutuzov over the past two weeks, Napoleon mistakenly assumed that the Russian army had suffered equally due to harsh conditions and was a couple of days behind.Riehn, pp. 349–350.Georges de Chambray (1825) Histoire de l'expédition de Russie: avec un atlas et trois vignettes, Vol. 2, p. 419 Underestimating the potential for a Kutuzov-led offensive, Napoleon made the tactical blunder of resuming his retreat. He dispatched the individual corps of the from Smolensk on four successive days, starting on Friday 13 November with the Polish Corps under Zajączek, who replaced the wounded Poniatowski. Next came the Westphalians. Napoleon left on the 14th, at five in the morning, preceded by Mortier with the Legion of the Vistula and Claparède who departed with the captures treasures and baggage wagons;Die Deutschen in Russland 1812, p. 64Napoléon Et la Grande Armée en Russie, Ou, Examen Critique de L'ouvrage de M. Le Comte Ph. de Ségur by Gaspard Baron Gourgaud (1825), p. 398 Beauharnais left on the next day, Davout on the 16th, and Ney at 2 a.m. on the 17th. This resulted in a fragmented column of disconnected corps, spanning , ill-prepared for a significant battle.Riehn, pp. 350–351, discusses the Grande Armée's order of march at this juncture and summarizes it as "an open invitation to disaster". In the intervening space between and around these French corps, nearly 40,000 disintegrated troops formed mobs of unarmed, disorganized stragglers. As the soldiers, including the sick, blind and wounded, improvised unconventional methods to withstand the cold, the scene resembled a disordered carnival procession. (Napoleon complained to the Duke of Feltre about the quality of the 180 grain-mills which were sent and distributed.)
A blizzard struck on 14 November, bringing heavy snowfall of approximately and a temperature plummet to −24 °C (−11 °F).Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini in 1812–13, p. 68 This led to further casualties among men, horses, and the abandonment of artillery.Mémoires militaires du lieutenant général comte Roguet, pp. 510–511 The intense cold enfeebled, first of all, the brain of those whose health had already suffered, especially of those who had had dysentery, but soon, while the cold increased daily, its pernicious effect was noticed in all...actions of the afflicted manifested mental paralysis and the highest degree of apathy.Achilles Rose (2003) Napoleon's Campaign in Russia Anno 1812 Medico-Historical, p. 34 Ostermann-Tolstoy, part of Miloradovich's avant-guard, shelled Napoleon and his guards, but the assault was repelled.Puybusque, L.G. de (1816) Lettres sur la guerre de Russie en 1812, p. 123 While Miloradovich desired to attack, he was not granted permission by Kutuzov. Meanwhile, Claparède and the Vistula-legion arrived at Krasny since August occupied by a small French battalion. They were expelled by Ozharovsky's flying column.Bogdanovich, p. 105
In the afternoon of 15 November, Napoleon himself arrived at Krasny accompanied by his 12,000-strong Imperial Guard.Roguet, p. 518 He planned to await the arrival of the troops of Eugène, Davout and Ney over the next several days before recommencing the retreat.
Kutuzov's southern march
During the same period, the main Russian army under Kutuzov followed the French on a parallel southern road.Parkinson, p. 208; Riehn, pp. 337–338; Cate, p. 348. This route passed through Medyn and Yelnya,Wilson, p. 265 the latter became a significant center for the partisan movement. Unlike the , the main Russian army approached Krasny in a much less weakened state,Parkinson, pp. 213–214. but still had to contend with the same, extreme weather conditions and scarcity of food. Kutuzov promoted an easy retreat for the French army and initially forbade his generals to cut off their retreat.Bogdanovich (1861) Geschichte des vaterländischen Krieges 1812, p. 119 (History of the Great Patriotic War of 1812) General Bennigsen, who disagreed, was sent back to Kaluga on the 15th.
Due to outdated intelligence reports, Kutuzov somehow believed that only one-third of the French army had passed from Smolensk to Krasny with the remainder of Napoleon's forces marching much farther to the north or still at Smolensk.THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812 IN RUSSIA by CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, p. 207 On this basis, Kutuzov accepted a plan proposed by his staff officer, quartermaster general Colonel Karl Toll, to march on Krasny to destroy what was believed to be an isolated Napoleon.Riehn, p. 351.
The Russian position at Krasny began forming on 15 November, when the 3,500-strong flying advance guard of Adam Ozharovsky took possession of the town, located in the Pale of Settlement, and destroyed magazines and stock before the French arrived.Foord, p. 334 On the same day, the 18,000 troops of Miloradovich established a strong position, across the high road about before Krasny. This movement effectively separated Eugene, Davout, and Ney from the Emperor."Campagne et captivité en Russie, extraits des mémoires inédits du géneral-major H.P. Everts, traduits par M.E. Jordens" Carnet de la Sabretache, 1901, p. 698 Recent photos by Elena Minina (2023), Smolensk On 16 November Kutuzov's 35,000-strong main force slowly approached from the south,Cate, p. 358; Riehn, pp. 351–352. and halted 5 km from the main road to Krasny. Another 20,000 Cossack irregulars, operating mostly in small bands, supplemented the main army by harassing the French at all points along the long road to Krasny. In the first skirmishes at Krasny, the French still showed stubborn resistance and desperate courage.