State-building as a specific term in social sciences and humanities, refers to political and historical processes of creation, institutional consolidation, stabilization and sustainable development of states, from the earliest emergence of statehood up to the modern times. Within historical and political sciences, there are several theoretical approaches to complex questions related to the role of various contributing factors (geopolitical, economic, social, cultural, ethnic, religious, internal, external) in state-building processes.
Since the end of the 20th century, state-building has developed into becoming an integral part and even a specific approach to peacebuilding by the international community. Observers across the political and academic spectra have come to see the state-building approach as the preferred strategy to peacebuilding in a number of high-profile conflicts, including the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and war-related conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The general argument in the academic literature on state-building is that without security, other tasks of state-building are not possible. Consequently, when state-building as an approach to peacebuilding is employed in conflict and post-conflict societies, the first priority is to create a safe environment in order to make wider political and economic development possible. So far, the results of using the state-building approach to peacebuilding have been mixed, and in many places, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, the initial high expectations set by the international community have not been met. The literature on state-building has always been very clear that building states has historically been a violent process and the outcomes in the above-mentioned cases and many others confirm the destabilizing and often violent nature of state-building.
Definition State-building has been conceptualized in different ways.
A historical approach focuses on state-building processes, from the earliest emergence of statehood up to modern times. Historical science views state-building as a complex phenomenon, influenced by various contributing factors (geopolitical, economic, social, cultural, ethnic, religious) and analyzes those factors and their mutual relations from the perspective of a particular historical situation, that is characteristic of every state-building process.
A second approach conceptualizes state-building as an activity undertaken by external actors (foreign countries) attempting to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state.
A third approach conceptualizes state-building as development.
Application of state-building theories
The predatory theory When studying the development of European states, Charles Tilly identified that European countries engaged in four activities:
War making – eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals State making – eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside their own territory Protection – eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients Extraction – acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities. Adjudication – authoritative settlement of disputes among members of the population Distribution – intervention in the allocation of goods among the members of the population Production – control of the creation and transformation of goods and services produced by the population
For Tilly, these activities are interdependent and rely on the state's ability to monopolize violence. Before the consolidation of European states, kings relied on their lords’ troops to emerge victorious from war, setting the final boundaries of their territories after years of campaigns. Still, these lords and their private armies could become potential threats to the king's power during peacetime. Originally, structures were created to facilitate extraction from the king's subordinates in exchange for protection (from their enemies and from the state), covering the expenses of war campaigns. However, extraction also economically strengthened the states, allowing them to expand their hold over the use of violence.
Out of these four activities, war making was the main stimulus to increasing the level of taxation, thus increasing the capacity of the state to extract resources otherwise known as fiscal capacity.Peter B. Evans, D. R.; Skocpol, T., War Making and State Making as Organized Crime Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press: 1985. The increased capacity of the state to extract taxes from its citizens while facing external threats prompted Jeffrey Herbst to propose allowing failed states to dissolve or engage in war to re-create the process endured by European countries. The process of extraction in exchange for protection was further argued by economic historian Frederic Lane. Lane argued that "governments are in the business of selling protection... whether people want it or not".Tilly, Charles: War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. 1985. http://www.jesusradicals.com/uploads/2/6/3/8/26388433/warmaking.pdf Furthermore, Lane argued that a monopoly was best equipped to produce and control violence. This, he argued, was due to the fact that competition within a monopoly raised costs, and that producing violence renders larger economies of scale. Although the logic was consistent with the predatory theory of the state in early modern Europe, Herbst's point of view was criticized by several scholars including Richard Joseph who were concerned that the application of the predatory theory was an excessive approach to Darwinism. Many have disregarded the limited view of this theory and have instead extended it to include strong external threats of any kind. External threats to the state produce stronger institutional capacities to extract resources from the state.
More recent research has shown the importance not just of war but also of war outcomes, with state building consolidating in victorious but not defeated states.Luis L. Schenoni, "Bringing War Back In: Victory, Defeat, and the State in Nineteenth Century Latin America" Cambdridge University Press, New York: 2024. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009442145
Limited access orders In their paper, Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast offer an alternative framework - limited access orders - for understanding the predatory role of the state. In limited access orders, entry is restricted in both economic and political systems to produce rents that benefit the ruling elites. In open access orders, entry is open to all. The logic of the open access state is based on impersonality. Both systems are interdependent and are only stable when both have similar access frameworks, either limited or open. Transitioning from a limited access order to an open access order involves difficult, radical changes based on three "doorstep conditions": 1) rule of law for elites, 2) perpetual life for organizations, and 3) political control of the military. Once all three initial conditions are satisfied, more incremental changes can be made to move the state further in the direction of an open access order.
External lending According to Didac Queralt, cheap access to credit in the 19th century inhibited state building, as the access to external loans made it unnecessary for rulers to undertake domestic political reforms to enhance internal resource extraction.
Social changes and social order In his study on countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Joel Migdal presented the necessary and sufficient conditions for establishing a strong state. He considered "massive societal dislocation" that weakens old social control and institutions as the necessary condition. Such cases include the Black Death and the Hundred Years' War in Europe, the expansion of world economy into Asia, Africa and Latin America in the 19th century, the combination of war and revolution in China, Korea and Vietnam and mass migration in Taiwan and Israel in the 20th century. Furthermore, he listed the sufficient conditions as follows: World historical timing when exogenous political forces were in favor of concentrated social control; Existence of military threat from outside or other groups in the country; A group of skillful and independent people to build an independent bureaucracy; Skillful top leadership that would take advantage of the above conditions.
Differentiating nation-building, military intervention and regime change
Some commentators have used the term nation-building interchangeably with state-building (e.g., RAND report on America's role in nation-building). However, in both major schools of theory, the state is the focus of thinking rather than the "nation" – the latter conventionally referring to the population itself, as united by identity history, culture and language. The issues debated related to the structures of the state (and its relationship to society) and as a result, state-building is the more broadly accepted term. In political science, nation-building usually has a quite distinct meaning, defined as the process of encouraging a sense of national identity within a given group of people, a definition that relates more to socialisation than state capacity (see the ODI, OECD, and DFID reports cited above).
Similarly, state-building (nation-building) has at times been conflated with military invasions that aim at regime change. This derives in part from the military invasions by Germany and Japan in World War II and resulting states and became especially prevalent following the October 2001 United States invasion of Afghanistan and March 2003 invasion of Iraq. The conflation of these two concepts has been highly controversial and has been used by opposing ideological and political forces to attempt to justify or reject as an illegal military occupation the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, regime change by outside intervention should be differentiated from state-building.
There have been some examples of military interventions by international or multilateral actors with a focus on building state capacity, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995), East Timor, and Sierra Leone. Such interventions are alternatively described as "neotrusteeship" or "neoimperialism". Under this framework, strong states take over part of all of the governance of territories with underdeveloped existing governing structures, often with the backing of international legal authority. Unlike the classic imperialism of the 19th and early 20th centuries, this type of intervention is aimed at (re)building local state structures and turning over governance to them as quickly as possible. Such efforts vary in the scope of their objectives, however, with some believing that sweeping change can be accomplished through the sufficient and intelligent application of personnel, money, and time, while others believe that any such plans will founder on the inherent unpredictability of interventions and that lengthy, sustained interventions often prevent local leaders from taking responsibility and strengthen insurgent forces.