The 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) was a brigade-sized formation which commanded Australian and New Zealand Army units deployed to South Vietnam between 1966 and 1972. 1 ATF was based in a rubber plantation at Nui Dat, north of Bà Rịa in Phuoc Tuy Province and consisted of two and later three infantry battalions, with armour, aviation, engineers and artillery support. While the task force was primarily responsible for securing Phuoc Tuy Province, its units, and the Task Force Headquarters itself, occasionally deployed outside its Tactical Area of Responsibility.

Significant battles conducted by the Task Force were Battle of Long Tan in 1966, Battle of Suoi Chau Pha in 1967, and Operation Coburg and the Battle of Coral–Balmoral in 1968. Other significant actions included Battle of Hat Dich in late-December 1968 and early 1969, Battle of Binh Ba in June 1969, and Battle of Long Khanh in June 1971.

A number of 1 ATF operations resulted in major defeats for the enemy including Operation Marsden in 1969 whereupon enormous caches of weapons and supplies and the main hospital servicing the local Communist forces were discovered and destroyed; and Operation Townsville in April 1970 whereupon Australian and New Zealand platoons captured the operational signals codes and one-time cipher pads used by the VC headquarters. As a result, senior U.S commanders including General Creighton Abrams, Commander MACV were alleged to have referred to it as "the biggest intelligence coup of the war." 1 ATF was withdrawn in late 1971.

History

Formation In March 1966 the Australian government decided to increase its commitment to the Vietnam War, announcing that the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), which had been serving as the third infantry battalion of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in Biên Hòa since June 1965, would be replaced at the end of its tour by a two-battalion brigade—the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF)—with armour, aviation, engineers and artillery support; in total 4,500 men. Additional Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) elements would also be deployed and with all three services total Australian strength in Vietnam was planned to rise to 6,300. Meanwhile, 1 RAR's attachment to US forces had highlighted the differences between Australian and American operational methods. Whereas the Americans relied on massed firepower and mobility in big-unit search and destroy operations as part of a war of attrition which often resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, the Australians—although not eschewing conventional operations—emphasised deliberate patrolling using dispersed companies supported by artillery, armored personnel carriers and helicopters to separate the Vietcong (VC) from the population in the villages, while slowly extending government control. Consequently, 1 ATF which would be allocated its own Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in Phuoc Tuy Province, thereby allowing the Australians to pursue operations more independently using their own methods.

The southernmost province in III Corps, Phuoc Tuy had been selected by the Australians because it was an area of significant VC activity, was located away from the Cambodian border, could be resupplied and, if necessary, evacuated by sea, and enabled them to concentrate their efforts in a single area to achieve greater national recognition. Rather than being attached to a US division, negotiations between senior Australian and US commanders—including Lieutenant General John Wilton and General William Westmoreland—ensured 1 ATF would be an independent command under the operational control of US II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFV), a corps-level headquarters in Bien Hoa which reported directly to Commander US MACV. This would allow the force greater freedom of action and the chance to demonstrate the Australian Army's evolving concept for counterinsurgency warfare, developed in part from its operations during the Malayan Emergency. The task force would be commanded by Brigadier David Jackson, an experienced infantry officer who had served in the Middle East and New Guinea during the Second World War, and later in the Korean War and commanded the AATTV and Australian Army Force Vietnam prior to taking up the appointment. With the new force given less than two months to deploy, hasty preparations began in Australia to ready it. Meanwhile, the headquarters of the 1st Brigade was subsequently used to raise 1 ATF.

Following US and Australian negotiations, the New Zealand government was given the choice of continuing the attachment of the 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade based at Biên Hòa or joining 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy. As with 1 RAR, the New Zealand battery had served under US command since June 1965 and was New Zealand's only military contribution to operations in Vietnam at that time. The decision was subsequently made to integrate the New Zealand battery into 1 ATF in June 1966, and from 1967 New Zealand infantry and NZSAS.

Operations

1 ATF was tasked with dominating its TAOR and conducting operations throughout Phuoc Tuy as required, as well as deploying anywhere in III Corps and neighbouring Bình Thủy in IV Corps on order. Its principal objective was to secure Route 15 for military movement to ensure allied control of the port at Vung Tau, while politically it sought to extend government authority in Phuoc Tuy. The task force would be based in a rubber plantation at Nui Dat, north of Ba Ria, while a logistics and support base would be established in Vũng Tàu with a direct link forward via road. Situated on Route 2, Wilton had selected Nui Dat because its central position offered short lines of communication, it was close but not adjacent to the main population centres, and would allow 1 ATF to disrupt VC activity in the area. Astride a major communist transit and resupply route, it was close to a VC base area yet near enough to Ba Ria to afford security to the provincial capital and facilitate liaison with the local authorities. Australian doctrine emphasised establishing a base and spreading influence outwards to separate the guerrillas from the population. By lodging at Nui Dat they aimed to form a permanent presence between the VC and the inhabitants. 1 ATF would then focus on destroying VC forces in the province, while security of the towns and villages remained a South Vietnamese responsibility.

Initially, 1 ATF consisted of two infantry battalions—the 5th and 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. Other units included the 1st APC Squadron operating M113 armoured personnel carriers, 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery which consisted of one New Zealand and two Australian batteries equipped with eighteen 105 mm L5 Pack Howitzers, 3rd SAS Squadron, engineers from the 1st Field Squadron and 21st Engineer Support Troop, 103rd Signals Squadron, 161st Reconnaissance Flight operating Cessna 180s and Bell H-13 Sioux light observation helicopters, and an intelligence detachment. Support arrangements were provided by the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG) established amid the sand dunes at Vung Tau south, while eight UH-1B Iroquois helicopters from No. 9 Squadron RAAF also supported 1 ATF from Vung Tau. Although 1 ATF was ostensibly independent, US forces provided considerable support including medium and heavy artillery, close air support, helicopter gunships, medium and heavy lift helicopters and additional utility helicopters. Six 155 mm M109 self-propelled howitzers from A Battery, US 2/35th Artillery Battalion were also permanently attached at Nui Dat. The largest Australian formation deployed since the Second World War, although many of 1 ATF's officers and non-commissioned officers had seen extensive operational service, the task force had been hastily assembled and included many untried National Servicemen. Few of its senior personnel had direct experience of counter-insurgency operations, and even less a first-hand understanding of the situation in Vietnam, while it had been unable to train together before departure. Despite these shortfalls 1 ATF had been required to rapidly deploy and commence operations in a complex environment.

The task force began arriving at Vung Tau between April and June 1966. From 17 May to 15 June, US and Australian forces secured the area around Nui Dat during Operation Hardihood, deploying two battalions of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade and an element of 1 RAR. 5 RAR deployed from Vung Tau the same day and was tasked with clearing any VC found in an area east and north-east of Nui Dat. 1 ATF occupied Nui Dat from 5 June, with Jackson flying-in with his tactical headquarters to take command. The plan to operate independently resulted in significant self-protection requirements and 1 ATF's initial priorities were to establish a base and ensure its own security. Meanwhile, Wilton's decision to occupy Nui Dat rather than co-locate 1 ATF with its logistic support at Vung Tau allowed the task force to have a greater impact, but resulted in additional manpower demands to secure the base. Indeed, the security requirements of an understrength brigade in an area of strong VC activity utilised up to half the force, limiting its freedom of action. As part of the occupation all inhabitants within a 4,000-metre radius had been removed and resettled nearby. A protective security zone was then established, the limit of which was designated Line Alpha, and a free-fire zone declared. Although unusual for allied installations in Vietnam, many of which were located near populated areas, the Australians hoped to deny the VC observation of Nui Dat and afford greater security to patrols entering and exiting the area.

At the Battle of Long Tan on 18 August 1966, D Company 6 RAR with considerable artillery support held off and defeated a VC force of at least regimental strength. 18 Australians were killed and 24 wounded, while 245 VC dead were later recovered from the battlefield. A decisive Australian victory, Long Tan proved a major local setback for the VC, indefinitely forestalling an imminent movement against Nui Dat. Although there were other large-scale encounters in later years, 1 ATF was not fundamentally challenged again. The battle established the task force's dominance over the province, and allowed it to pursue operations to restore government authority. Regardless, during February 1967 the Australians suffered their heaviest casualties in the war to that point, losing 16 men killed and 55 wounded in a single week, the bulk during Operation Bribie. 5 RAR and 6 RAR completed their tours in mid-1967 and were replaced by 7 RAR and 2 RAR. The first New Zealand infantry, Victor Company RNZIR, arrived in May 1967 from Malaysia and served with the outgoing 6 RAR before and then with the newly arrived 2 RAR.

What would ultimately prove to be a tactical blunder by 1 ATF Command and account for the majority of Australian and New Zealand casualties throughout the war, was the laying of a minefield over a 10 km area from Dat Do to the coast. By June 1967, close to 23,000 "jumping jack" mines had been laid by the Australian engineers within a 100-metre-wide strip of cleared ground between a double row of fences. Security of the minefield proved to be ineffective and the VC thereafter simply uplifted the mines and re-used them against the Australians and New Zealanders.

Meanwhile, with the war continuing to escalate following further American troop increases, 1 ATF was heavily reinforced. A third infantry battalion, 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, arrived in December 1967. The New Zealand contribution also increased with a second infantry company added also in December 1967. Whisky Company RNZIR was initially attached to 3 RAR and then came under operational control of 2 RAR, as with Victor Company.