The Battle of Tarakan took place on 11–12 January 1942, a day after the Empire of Japan declared war on the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although Tarakan was only a small marshy island off northeastern Borneo in the Netherlands East Indies (today's Indonesia), its 700 oil wells, refineries, and airfield made it a crucial objective for Japan in the Pacific War.Womack (2016), p. 111

Background

Prewar oil discovery and production Located at a remote edge in the Dutch colony of Netherlands East Indies and only 25 sq. miles in diameter, the discovery of oil at a relatively low depth below the ground (50 to 300 meters) brought great significance to Tarakan.Koninklijke Nederlands Indonesisch Leger (1949), p. 198

Pamoesian (Pamusian) on the western side of the island became the main drilling site before the war, where about 700 oil wells were established by the Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM; "Batavian Petroleum Company"). In the vicinity of the drilling sites, housing centers for BPM European employees and Chinese residents was established. Further up north, BPM also established another drilling site at Djoeata (Juwata).Koninklijke Nederlands Indonesisch Leger (1949), p. 199 To all intents and purposes, the oil wells became the source of living for the island's population.Nortier (1980), p. 303

Despite the prevalence of this massive production, before the war, most of Tarakan's hilly terrain at the center of the island, as well as the swamp coastlines in the east remained at their natural state. The road network was limited to connecting the Pamoesian and Djoeata drilling sites, the port facilities at Lingkas on the west and the airfield nearby with a 1,500 m runway.

Dutch began establishing defenses As oil production began to grow, the Dutch began to contemplate the possibility of a Japanese military aggression, and with it, the need to protect the island's facilities.

In 1923, an infantry company was established in Tarakan to serve as a covering force during the destruction of oil refineries and other production installations in the event of an unforeseen attack. Increasing international tensions compelled the company to be strengthened into a battalion-sized force.

In 1930, the Committee on the Defense of Oil Ports was established, with the purpose of analyzing the defense of major oil ports in the Dutch East Indies. Naturally, the Commission concluded that a permanent occupation of Tarakan by a larger than company-sized force was an absolute necessity.

In 1933, a so-called "Reinforcement Detachment" from Java arrived to bolster Tarakan's defense, as tensions in the Pacific were brewing up at the time. After 4 months, the detachment was sent back and it was not until 1934 before a full battalion with auxiliary weapons came to defend Tarakan.

Japan's need for resources Before the Second World War, Tarakan produced around 6 million barrels of oil annually, an amount which accounts to 16% of the total Japanese annual oil consumption. This made the island one of the key goals of Japanese military (esp. the Imperial Japanese NavyRemmelink (2015), p. 11) in their plans to occupy the Netherlands East Indies in the years leading up to the war.

Order of battle Japan

Ground forces Sakaguchi Detachment (Commander: Maj. Gen. Shizuo Sakaguchi)Right Wing Unit (Commander: Col. Kyōhei Yamamoto)Left Wing Unit (Commander Col. Ken’ichi Kanauji)Other units- 146th Infantry Regiment (minus 2nd and 3rd battalion)

- One artillery and antitank gun battery

- 2nd Kure Special Landing Force (one battalion)

- 1st Engineer Company (minus one platoon)

- Medical Unit (minus half of the unit)

- Radio Unit- 2nd Infantry Battalion (min. 6th Company)

- One artillery and antitank gun battery

- One engineer platoon

- Radio Unit - 56th Regiment Headquarters - 56th Regiment Armored Car Unit

- 1st Field Artillery Battalion

- 44th Field Anti Aircraft Artillery Battalion

Naval forces Western Attack Unit (Commander: Rear. Adm. Shoji Nishimura, based in the cruiser Naka)Remmelink (2018), p. 1264th Destroyer Flotilla (Commander: Rear. Adm. Shoji Nishimura)Air Group (Commander:

Capt. Takamasa Fujisawa) Base Force (Commander: Rear. Adm. Sueto Hirose,

based on the minelayer Itsukushima) - 2nd Destroyer Division (Harusame, Samidare, Yudachi)

- 9th Destroyer Division

(Asagumo, Minegumo, Natsugumo)

- 24th Destroyer Division

(Umikaze, Kawakaze, Yamakaze, Suzukaze)

- Transport Unit

1st Echelon: Tsuruga Maru, Liverpool Maru, Hiteru Maru, Hankow Maru, Ehime Maru, Kunikawa Maru, Kano Maru 2nd Echelon: Havana Maru, Teiryū Maru, Kuretake Maru, , Kagu Maru, Kunitsu Maru, and Rakuto Maru - Seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and

- One oiler - 2nd Base Force (P-36, P-37 and P-38)

- 11th Minesweeper Division

(W-13, W-14, W-15, W-16)

- 30th Minesweeper Division

(W-17, W-18)

- 31st Submarine-chaser Division

(CH-10, CH-11, CH-12)

Netherlands

Ground forces Tarakan Garrison (7th KNIL Infantry Battalion, Commander: Lt. Col. Simon de Waal):Nortier (1980), pp. 304-305Infantry (Commander:

Lt. Col. Simon de Waal)Artillery (Commander: M.J. Bakker)Other units - 3 Company of 177 man with 18 machine guns each (Commander: F. Treffers, A.C. Saraber and L. Bendeler)

- 1 Machine Gun Company of 18-24 Vickers Machine Gun and 6 80mm mortar (Commander: Capt. W. Everaar)

- 1 Motorized detachment of 80 man and 7 overvalwagen armored cars (Commander: 1st Lt. D.P. de Vos tot Nederveen Cappel) - Three coastal artillery batteries: 3 x 75 mm guns near Peningki under 1st Lt. J.W. Storm 4 x 120 mm guns at Karoengan under 1st Lt. J.P.A. van Adrichem 4 x 75 mm guns under Reserve 1st Lt. Van der Zijde - Two artillery (non-mobile) batteries: 3 x 75 mm guns near Lingkas under Reserve 1st Lt. J. Verdam 2 x 70 mm guns (aged) manned by KNIL personnel in the Lingkas area - Two Anti-Aircraft batteries under Reserve Lt. Nijenhuis: 4 × 40 mm guns 4 × 20 mm guns - Four AA machine gun platoons

(10 - 12 x 12.7 mm heavy machine guns)- Two engineer platoons (a platoon of 30 man and another of 40 conscripted BPM employees) under 1st. Lt. J.W. van den Belt

- Mobile Auxiliary First Aid Platoon

Aerial and Naval forces 304th Militaire Luchtvaart (ML-KNIL)Koninklijke Marine- 3 x Glenn Martin B-10 (Transferred to Samarinda II Airfield in December 1941; Tarakan Airfield deemed too small for two-engined bombers)

- 4 x Brewster Buffalo under 1st. Lt. P.A.C. Benjamins- Minelayer Hr. Ms. Prins van Oranje

(Commander: Lt. Anthonie C. van Versendaal)

- 2 x Patrol boats

- 3 x Dornier Do-24K

- A light ship of the Government Navy

Dutch plans

Early Dutch plans before 1941 called for the defense of the oil fields and installations at all costs. If deemed impossible, Dutch forces were to deny the enemy the usage of Tarakan's oil-producing machinery, before withdrawing to mainland Borneo.

One major hindrance in the defense of Tarakan was the unsuitability of its airfield to accommodate both fighters and bombers. However, the plan also called for a persistent defense of the airfield, a task that, considering the airfield's size and the Japanese military strength — in particular the overall sea and air balance; — would bring limited results.

The deployment of the Tarakan Garrison was orchestrated to prevent enemy occupation of the port complex on the western part of the island. Defense positions consisted of several "fronts" of double fence barriers:Nortier (1980), p. 307

Lingkas Front, defending the port complex North Front (NoordFront), defending access point to the airfield Support points in and around Tarakan Airfield Eastern Front (OostFront), defending the Pamoesian oil field (this front had no direct connection to the North Front; special units guard the gap between both fronts) On the East Coast, Dutch troops prepared a platoon-strength support point at the mouth of the Amal River. This unit was intended to impede the enemy landing for a brief moment, before retreating to the Eastern Front. Additional infantry cover forces were established at the Djoeata, Peningki and Karoengan batteries.

The support points, on which the front is established, were occupied with 25 troops, supported by two light and two medium machine guns each. Housed in concrete pillboxes, each support point was surrounded by a double fence, yet the scarce manpower made it impossible to occupy all support points at the same time.

The coastal batteries monitored the minefields and the entrances to the harbor. Artillery in the Lingkas Front could also be utilized to support inland battles.

Initially, the airport was only defended with 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. Abandoned before the Japanese landing, two sections of 40 mm anti-aircraft gun (minus one gun) stood at the airfield; the 20 mm guns were relocated to defend the Peningki and Karoengan batteries.

The Dutch Navy (Koninklijke Marine) laid extensive minefields at the approaches to the port. In the event of an attack, any sea lanes that were still open would be blocked by the minelayer Hr. Ms. Prins van Oranje.

Despite all of these preparations, in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, a certain defeatist atmosphere had already enveloped the defenders even well before any signs of invasion.Nortier (1980), p. 309

Japanese plans For the capture of Tarakan, the Japanese planned for a two pronged landing from the eastern side of the Island. One prong of the advance, the Right Wing Unit (under Col. Yamamoto), would land at the shores near the Amal River and destroy any Dutch troops there. Without waiting for the landing to be completed, the unit would then move westwards through the jungle and launch a sudden attack to seize the Pamoesian oilfields. Upon securing Pamoesian, Yamamoto's troops would then advance to secure the installations at the Lingkas port before the Dutch could demolish it.Remmelink (2015), p. 175

The second prong, the Left Wing Unit, would land further south at Tandjoeng Batoe (Tanjung Batu) and make their way west to capture the Peningki-Karoengan gun batteries, before moving to Lingkas, passing by the 2nd Kure Special Landing Force at the airfield, to attack and capture the Gunung Cangkol and Djoeata oil fields and the Djoeata battery up north. Once these key points of Tarakan Island were cleared, the Army would turn over guard duty to the Navy, and the force would be assembled in Tarakan and its vicinity to prepare for the capture of Balikpapan.Remmelink (2018), p. 130

Battle On 10 January 1942, after an MLD Dornier Do 24 spotted the approaching Japanese invasion fleet, Lt. Col. Simon de Waal ordered the destruction of all oil installations on the island.Womack (2016), p. 115 The engineer platoons dynamited the drilling pipes, causing an underground explosion that prevented the wells and oil below from being extracted in the near future. By 10:00 P.M., 100,000 tons worth of oil had been engulfed in flames.Koninklijke Nederlands Indonesisch Leger (1949), p. 203

At 03:00 A.M. on 11 January, Sergeant-Major C.P.E. Spangenberg, commanding the Amal River support point (with 53 troops) reported sighting landing vessels nearing the coast.Nortier (1980), pp. 311-312 At that point, the Right Wing Unit of the Japanese invasion force began to land on the eastern parts of Tarakan under the silhouette of the blazing oil fields.Remmelink (2015), p. 177

Since Dutch forces had arranged their dispositions to defend attacks from a westerly direction, they were still uncertain that the enemy forces that had been concentrating on the eastern parts of the island constituted the main attacking force. Diversionary landings and maneuvers were still being considered, even as another Japanese landing force had already been sighted at 05:00 A.M. by the defending force at Tandjoeng Batoe, further south of the Amal River.Nortier (1980), p. 312

Right Wing Unit