On 19 November 1941, the Australian light cruiser and the German auxiliary cruiser engaged each other in a battle off the coast of Western Australia. Sydney, with Captain Joseph Burnett commanding, and Kormoran, under () Theodor Detmers, encountered each other approximately off Dirk Hartog Island. The single-ship action lasted half an hour, and both ships were destroyed.
From 24 November, after Sydney failed to return to port, air and sea searches were conducted. Boats and rafts carrying survivors from Kormoran were recovered at sea, while others made landfall at Quobba Station, north of Carnarvon; 318 of the 399 personnel on Kormoran survived. While debris from Sydney was found, there were no survivors from the 645-strong complement. It was the largest loss of life in the history of the Royal Australian Navy, the largest Allied warship lost with all hands during World War II, and a major blow to Australian wartime morale.Jeans, Seafaring Lore and Legend, pp. 189–191 Australian authorities learned of Sydneys fate from the surviving Kormoran personnel, who were held in prisoner of war camps until almost two years after the war with Germany had ended.
Controversy has often surrounded the battle, especially in the years before the two wrecks were located in 2008. How and why a purpose-built warship such as Sydney was defeated by a modified merchant vessel such as Kormoran was the subject of speculation, with numerous books on the subject, as well as two official reports by government inquiries, published in 1999 and 2009.
According to German accounts—which were assessed as truthful and generally accurate by Australian interrogators during the war, as well as most subsequent analyses—Sydney approached so close to Kormoran that the Australian cruiser lost the advantages of heavier armour and superior gun range. Nevertheless, several post-war publications have alleged that Sydneys loss had been the subject of an extensive cover-up, that the Germans had not followed the laws of war, that Australian survivors were massacred following the battle, or that the Empire of Japan had been secretly involved in the action (before officially declaring war in December). Currently no evidence supports any of these theories.
Background
HMAS Sydney was one of three Modified Leander class light cruisers of the RAN.Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 3 Built for the Royal Navy, the cruiser was bought by the Australian government to replace , and it was commissioned into the RAN in September 1935.Cassells, The Capital Ships, pp. 148–9 The cruiser was long and displaced .Cole, The loss of HMAS Sydney II, vol. 1, p. 18 Sydney carried eight 6-inch (152 mm) guns in four twin turrets ("A" and "B" forward, "X" and "Y" aft) as primary armament.Olson, Bitter Victory, pp. 3–4 These were supplemented by four 4-inch (102 mm) anti-aircraft guns, nine .303-inch (7.7 mm) machine guns, and eight torpedo tubes in two quadruple mountings.Olson, Bitter Victory, pp. 3–8 The cruiser also carried a single Supermarine Walrus amphibious aircraft.Olson, Bitter Victory, pp. 22–3
Initially assigned to escort and patrol duties in Australian waters, Sydney was sent to the Mediterranean in mid-1940.Cassells, The Capital Ships, p. 149Goldrick, in The Royal Australian Navy, p. 111 Sydney operated against Italian naval forces for eight months, during which she participated in multiple battles, sank two Italian warships and several merchantmen, and supported convoy operations and shore bombardments.Goldrick, in The Royal Australian Navy, pp. 112–7 The cruiser was recalled to Australia in early January 1941: the need to rest the ship and personnel, plans to spread combat experience across the RAN fleet, and a desire to reinforce the nation following German raider activity in nearby waters were all factors.Goldrick, in The Royal Australian Navy, pp. 110–1Cassells, The Capital Ships, p. 150Grove, in The Royal Australian Navy in World War II, p. 42 Sydney was assigned to Fremantle, Western Australia, and resumed escort and patrol duties.Goldrick, in The Royal Australian Navy, p. 117 Command was handed over from Captain John Collins to Captain Joseph Burnett in May 1941.Frame, HMAS Sydney, p. 26
On 11 November, Sydney departed Fremantle for Singapore with the transport .Oldham, Bitter Victory, p. 33 The vessels sailed to Sunda Strait, where the troopship was handed over on 17 November to . Sydney then turned for home and was scheduled to arrive in Fremantle late on 20 November. At the time of the battle, she had a ship's company of 645: 41 officers, 594 sailors, six Royal Australian Air Force personnel, and four civilian canteen staff.Cassells, The Capital Ships, p. 152
Kormoran During the 1930s, disparities between the conventional warship strength of the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) and other nations caused by the Treaty of Versailles led the German military to recognise that auxiliary cruisers engaged in commerce raiding would be of use during future wars and that suitable vessels should be identified.Frame, HMAS Sydney, pp. 41–7 The merchant ship (named after Styria) was one such vessel; she was taken up by the at the start of World War II. Renamed , she was the largest and newest of nine raiders, referred to as (auxiliary cruisers) or (trade disruption cruisers).Frame, HMAS Sydney, pp. 275–7Winter, H.M.A.S. Sydney, p. 13
Kormoran was commissioned in October 1940. After modification, she was long and measured .Frame, HMAS Sydney, pp. 50–1, 277 The raider was fitted with six single guns (two each in the forecastle and quarterdeck, with the fifth and sixth on the centreline) as the main armament, supplemented by two anti-tank guns, five anti-aircraft autocannons, and six torpedo tubes (a twin above-water mount on each side, and two single underwater tubes).Frame, HMAS Sydney, p. 46 The guns were concealed behind false hull plates and cargo hatch walls, which would swing clear when the order to decamouflage was given. The secondary weapons sat on hydraulic lifts hidden within the superstructure. The ship could be disguised as one of several Allied or neutral vessels.Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 97
Kormoran departed German waters in December 1940, under the command of (Frigate captain, equivalent to Commander) Theodor Detmers.Winter, H.M.A.S. Sydney, p. 183Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 402Frame, HMAS Sydney, p. 55 After operating in the Atlantic, during which time she sank seven merchant ships and captured an eighth, the raider sailed to the Indian Ocean in late April 1941.Frame, HMAS Sydney, pp. 56–68 Only three merchantmen were intercepted during the next six months, and Kormoran was diverted several times to refuel German support ships.Frame, HMAS Sydney, pp. 69–77 As the raider was carrying several hundred sea mines and was expected to deploy some of these before returning home in early 1942, Detmers planned to mine shipping routes near Cape Leeuwin and Fremantle, but he postponed this after detecting wireless signals from a warship (Australian heavy cruiser ) in the area.Winter, H.M.A.S. Sydney, pp. 123, 125 Instead, he decided to sail north and investigate Shark Bay.Frame, HMAS Sydney, pp. 77–9 At the time of the battle, the raider was disguised as the Dutch merchantman and carried 399 personnel: 36 officers, 359 sailors, and 4 Chinese sailors hired from the crew of a captured merchantman to run the ship's laundry.Cassells, The Capital Ships, p. 151Frame, HMAS Sydney, p. 47
Battle Note: All times in this section are UTC+7.
Identification On 19 November, shortly before 16:00, Kormoran was southwest of Carnarvon, Western Australia.Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942, p. 453 The raider was sailing northwards (heading 025°) at .Hore, in The Royal Australian Navy, p. 78 At 15:55, what was initially thought to be a tall ship sail was sighted off the port bow, although it was quickly determined to be the mast of a warship (HMAS Sydney). Detmers ordered Kormoran to alter course into the sun (heading 260°) at maximum achievable speed (which quickly dropped from because of problems in one of her diesel engines) while setting the ship to action stations. Sydney spotted the German ship around the same time, and she altered from her southward heading to intercept at .
As she closed the gap, the Australian cruiser requested that Kormoran identify herself.Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 178 Communications were initially attempted with a signal lamp to repeatedly send "NNJ" ("You should make your signal letters"), but those aboard the raider did not understand the uncommonly used signal and did not respond.Frame, HMAS Sydney, p. 104 Sydney continued to signal for 30 minutes, after which those aboard the cruiser used flags to send the more common "VH" signal ("You should hoist your signal letters"), while the signal lamp was used to transmit the message in plain language.Olson, Bitter Victory, pp. 178–9 After another delay, Kormoran raised "PKQI"—the call-sign for the Dutch merchant ship Straat Malakka—on the triatic stay and hoisted a Dutch merchant ensign. As Sydney was approaching from just starboard of Kormorans stern and away, the call-sign was obscured by the raider's funnel; German accounts vary as to if this was to further the illusion of a civilian ship, a ruse to lure Sydney closer, or an error on the signaller's part.Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 179Mearns, The Search for the Sydney, p. 28 Sydney signalled "Make your signal letters clear", which the signals officer aboard Kormoran did by lengthening the halyard and swinging it around to starboard. By 16:35, with Sydney away, the malfunctioning engine aboard Kormoran was repaired, but Detmers chose to keep it in reserve.Winter, H.M.A.S. Sydney, p. 130
Sydney asked Kormoran "Where bound?", to which the raider responded "Batavia".Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 180 Sydney may have then made signals asking for the raider's port of origin and cargo; the Germans who claimed this said their replies were "Fremantle" and "Piece-goods", respectively.Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 181Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939–1942, pp. 453–4 At around 17:00, Detmers instructed his wireless operators to send a false distress signal indicating that Straat Malakka was being approached by a suspicious ship. The message, transmitted at 17:03 and repeated at 17:05, contained the distress call for a merchantman under attack from a raider instead of a warship (QQQQ, as opposed to RRRR), the latitude and longitude of the transmitting ship, the time per Greenwich Mean Time (the normal practice was to transmit local time; using GMT was to let the Kriegsmarine know that the ship was actually a raider about to be lost), and the ship's name.Cole, The Loss of HMAS Sydney II, vol. 2, pp. 317–8Olson, Bitter Victory, pp. 186–9 This signal was partially received by the tugboat Uco ("QQQQ [unintelligible] 1000 GMT") and a shore station at Geraldton ("[unintelligible] 7C 11115E 1000 GMT").Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 186 The Geraldton station broadcast a message to all ships asking if there was anything to report (which was interpreted by the Germans as acknowledgement of their signal), but after no response was forthcoming, they ignored it until a report on the signal was forwarded to the Naval Board on 27 November.Olson, Bitter Victory, p. 85