The mass media in Turkey includes a wide variety of domestic and foreign periodicals.Turkey country profile. Library of Congress Federal Research Division (January 2006). This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. 90% of the media ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few pro-government media groups. Inevitably censorship in Turkey is an issue, and in the 21st century many journalists have been arrested and writers prosecuted. On Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index the country ranking has fallen from around 100 in 2005 to 159 in 2025.
In reaction to the failed coup d'état on 15 July 2016, over 150 media organisations, including newspapers, television and radio channels, news agencies, magazines and publishing houses, have been closed down by the government of Turkey, and 160 journalists have been jailed."Turkish court orders release of journalists during their trial". Reuters. 9 March 2018.
By circulation, the most popular daily newspapers are Sabah, Sözcü, Hürriyet, Posta, and Milliyet. The broadcast media have a very high penetration as satellite dishes and cable systems are widely available. The "Radio and Television Supreme Council" (RTÜK) is the government body overseeing the broadcast media. Aside from Turkish, the state television network offers some programs in Arabic and Kurdish.
Turkish consumers are the second-most media illiterate when compared to countries in Europe, leaving them especially vulnerable to fake news, according to a 2018 study. A combination of low education levels, low reading scores, low media freedom and low societal trust went into making the score, which saw Turkey being placed second lowest only to North Macedonia. Conspiracy theories are a prevalent phenomenon in Turkish media. According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018, Turkey was the country where people complained the most about completely made-up stories.
According to polling in 2024 by the Pew Research Center, 33% of adult Turks believe that media in Turkey have somewhat good or very good influence on the country, which is a decline from 57% who said so in 2017, while 63% stated that they had a very bad or somewhat bad influence on the country. People with a favorable view of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan viewed the media more positively with 47% saying that it had a good influence on the country, compared to 23% of people who viewed Erdoğan unfavorably.
Legislative framework
The Constitution of Turkey, at art. 28, states that the press is free and shall not be censored. Yet, Constitutional guarantees are undermined by restrictive provisions in the Criminal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, and anti-terrorism laws, effectively leaving prosecutors and judges with ample discretion to repress ordinary journalistic activities.Freedom House, Turkey 2015 Press Freedom report The Turkish judiciary can and do censure media outlets under other constitutional provisions and loosely interpreted laws, such as “protecting basic characteristics of the Republic” and “safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation.” Ruken Barış, Turkey #Media legislation , EJC Media Landscapes, circa 2010
Freedom of information principles have been introduced with the April 2004 Right to Information Act, affording to citizens and legal persons the right to request information from public institutions and private organizations that qualify as public institutions, although the implementation of the law is lacking.
The 2007 Press Law was coupled with a “Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes Committed Through Such Publications”, authorising the Telecommunications Communication Presidency (TIB) to execute court orders to block websites and to issue blocking orders for the content providers in or outside Turkey for committing crimes such as child pornography, encouraging drug use and, especially, crimes against Atatürk. Between 2007 and 2010 around 3,700 websites and platforms including YouTube, MySpace, and GeoCities have been blocked.
Status and self-regulation of journalists Media professionals in Turkey face job insecurity and lack of social security, being often forced to work without contract and outside the protection provided by the Law 212 on the rights of journalists. Without a contact under Law 212 media workers in Turkey cannot obtain a press badge and cannot take part in the Turkish Journalists Union (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası, TGS)
Turkey's 2001 financial crisis further strengthened media owners' hands, as 3–5,000 journalists were fired, and the most troublesome ones targeted first.
Some themes have long remained quasi-taboo in the Turkish media, including the role of the Army, the Cyprus issue and the rights of the Kurdish and Armenian minorities. The interests of media owners in the major media conglomerates inevitably cast a shadow over the objectivity and independence of the controlled media outlets.Ruken Barış, Turkey #Accountability systems , EJC Media Landscapes, circa 2010
Ethics in Turkish journalism is based on a couple of documents: the “Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities” by Turkish Journalists Association (1998) and the “Code of Professional Ethics of the Press” by Turkish Press Council (1989).
In 2006 RTÜK introduced a voluntary ombudsman mechanism that media outlets can introduce in order to evaluate their audience's reactions. Yet, ombudsmen lack independence, as they are high-ranking employees of the same media groups.
Media outlets Turkey hosts thousands of registered newspapers, including around 150–200 national titles, although only a fraction maintain significant circulation. A relatively small percentage are nationwide daily newspapers, while the majority consist of local or regional publications. Turkish print media traditionally places strong emphasis on opinion columns and commentary, and outlets are often characterised by pronounced political polarisation.
Broadcast media includes hundreds of television channels and thousands of radio stations, including outlets broadcasting in minority languages. The expansion of Kurdish-language media in the 2000s was regarded as a significant development in minority rights, though such outlets have faced regulatory and financial constraints.
The principal structural issues affecting mainstream media in Turkey include high concentration of ownership, widespread self-censorship among journalists, and the presence of nationalist rhetoric and hate speech. A large share of national newspapers and television channels are owned by conglomerates active in construction, energy, finance, and tourism, increasing their economic dependence on state contracts and public procurement.
Following the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, numerous media outlets were closed by emergency decrees and dozens of journalists were detained as part of what has been described as a broad media purge. Public protests by journalists against arrests and newsroom closures were widely reported.
By the mid-2000s, three major media groups dominated advertising revenues in Turkey: the Doğan Media Group and the Sabah group together controlled approximately 80% of newspaper advertising, while Doğan, Sabah and the Çukurova Group accounted for around 70% of television advertising revenues.Christian Christensen (2007), "Concentration of ownership, the fall of unions and government legislation in Turkey", Global Media and Communication, August 2007 3: 179–199, doi:10.1177/1742766507078416
In the Turkish context, highly concentrated corporate media power (such as Doğan’s) is even more significant when three additional factors are considered: (1) the willingness of corporate owners to ‘instrumentalize’ reporting in order to fit the wider political-economic interests of the parent company; (2) the weakness of journalists and other employees in the face of the power of corporate owners; and (3) the fact that corporate power is combined with restrictive state regulation on issues of freedom of speech.
Since 2018, the structure of media ownership has changed significantly. The sale of the Doğan Group’s media assets to the Demirören Group marked a major consolidation of mainstream media under ownership widely regarded as close to the government. As a result, a substantial portion of national print and broadcast media became concentrated within pro-government conglomerates.
Major cross-media groups active in Turkey in the 2020s include:
Demirören Group (owner of Hürriyet, Posta, Milliyet, Fanatik, and formerly CNN Türk and Kanal D in partnership structures). Turkuvaz Media Group of Çalık Holding (publisher of Sabah and operator of ATV). Doğuş Media Group (owner of NTV and Star TV; Star TV was acquired from Doğan in 2011). Ciner Media Group (owner of Habertürk TV and related outlets). Former assets of the Çukurova Group were transferred through interventions by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF) and subsequently sold to pro-government businessmen in the 2010s.
Observers have noted that while ownership concentration was already significant in the 2000s, the post-2016 and especially post-2018 restructuring further reduced pluralism in terms of ownership diversity, even as the number of outlets remained high.
In 2018, the sale of the Doğan Group’s media assets to the Demirören Group marked a major shift in ownership concentration. The acquisition consolidated a substantial portion of mainstream media under ownership widely perceived as aligned with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling AKP.
Several outlets formerly owned by the Çukurova Holding were transferred through state intervention involving the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF) before being sold to pro-government businessmen.
Television accounts for roughly half of advertising revenues in Turkey, while print media’s share has steadily declined. Given the relatively limited size of the advertising market compared to the number of outlets, smaller and independent organisations face financial vulnerability, contributing to further consolidation.
The broadcast sector is regulated by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), the state authority responsible for licensing and content oversight. Critics argue that regulatory enforcement has disproportionately affected opposition and independent broadcasters.
Overall, although Turkey’s media landscape remains numerically diverse, observers frequently describe it as highly concentrated in ownership, politically polarised, and constrained in terms of independent journalism.
Print media
Until 2017 and into mid-2018, a significant portion of Turkey’s print media was widely regarded as maintaining a relatively independent editorial line, with much of the mainstream press adopting a critical stance toward the government. However, during this period, the government of Turkey, the Erdoğan government intensified financial and regulatory pressure on major media conglomerates. Large tax fines and legal proceedings were imposed on prominent media owners, while the state-controlled Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF) was used to seize and subsequently reassign several media assets.
These developments paved the way for pro-government business groups to acquire major media outlets. One of the most notable examples was the purchase of the Doğan Media Group by the Demirören Group, a conglomerate widely perceived as close to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The consolidation of media ownership under companies aligned with the government was viewed by observers and international watchdogs as a turning point.