The ()بسیج abadis.ir, formally (), is a volunteer paramilitary organization inside the Islamic Republic of Iran and one of the five branches of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Established by decree of Ruhollah Khomeini in November 1979 and officially founded in April 1980, the Basij serves as a civilian auxiliary to the IRGC. Its activities include enforcing state morality regulations, organizing pro-government rallies, suppressing dissident demonstrations, and providing social services.Molavi, Afshin, The Soul of Iran, W. W. Norton, (2005), p. 88, 316–318 The organization historically recruited heavily from poor, tribal, and rural communities affected by post-revolutionary economic and geopolitical upheaval and served as a major source of manpower during the Iran–Iraq War. Its present-day members, known as basijis (), are drawn largely from religious and politically loyalist segments of Iranian society, as well as from individuals who volunteer in exchange for official benefits.
The Basij has been implicated in widespread human rights violations in Iran, particularly through its role in suppressing major episodes of domestic unrest in 2009–2010, 2017–2018, 2019–2020, 2022–2023, and 2025–2026. As a component of the IRGC, the Basij has been subject to sanctions and covered by terrorist designations imposed by several governments and international bodies, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.
History
Founding
Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini called for the creation of a volunteer militia dedicated to defending the newly established Islamic Republic and promoting the religious principles of the revolution. In a proclamation issued on 26 November 1979, he outlined the formation of what would become the Basij, which was officially founded on 30 April 1980. Initially, membership was open to Iranian citizens between the ages of 18 and 45. In 1981, the Basij was incorporated into the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a move intended to consolidate revolutionary institutions and reduce the potential for inter-service rivalry between the two organizations.
Iran–Iraq War During the Iran–Iraq War hundreds of thousands volunteered for the Basij, including children as young as 12 and unemployed old men, some in their eighties. According to Mehran Riazaty, these volunteers were swept up in Shi'a love of martyrdom and the atmosphere of patriotism of the war mobilization; most often they came from poor, peasant backgrounds. They were encouraged through visits to schools and an intensive media campaign. During the war, the Revolutionary Guard Corps used Basiji members as a pool from which to draw manpower.Khomeinis Warriors: Foundation of Irans Regime, Its Guardians, Allies around the World, War Analysis, and Strategies by Mehran Riazaty, According to Baqer Moin, the Basij are known for their employment of human wave attacks which cleared minefields or drew the enemy's fire.Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah by Baqer Moin
The typical human wave tactic was for Basijis (often very lightly armed and unsupported by artillery or air power) to march forward in straight rows. While casualties were high, the tactic often worked when employed against poorly trained members of the Iraqi regular army.Cited in: Erich Wiedemann, "Mit dem Paradies-Schlüssel in die Schlacht", in: Der Spiegel, no. 31/1982, p. 93.Iran at War: 1500–1988 (Pg. 363) By Kaveh Farrokh
According to Dilip Hiro, by the spring of 1983 the Basij had trained 2.4 million Iranians in the use of arms and sent 450,000 to the front.Hiro, Dilip, Iran under the Ayatollahs, Routledge and Kegan, 1985, p.237 In 1985 the IRNA put the number of Basijis at 3 million, quoting from Hojjatoleslam Rahmani. Tehran Bureau estimates the peak number of Basijis at the front at 100,000 by December 1986.
According to Radio Liberty, by the end of the Iran-Iraq war, most of the Basijis left the service and were reintegrated back into their lives, often after years of being in the front. By 1988, the number of Basij checkpoints dramatically decreased, but the Basij were still enforcing the hijab, arresting women for violating the dress code, and arresting youths for attending mixed gender parties or being in public with unrelated members of the opposite sex.Molavi, The Soul of Iran (2005), p. 89
In 1988, college Basiji organizations were established on college campuses to fight "Westoxification" and potential student agitation against the government.
Revival
Whether the Basij remained intact since their founding or were disbanded and revived is disputed. According to Reuters, the Basij were not disbanded after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, but continued as a loyalist and religious paramilitary group that provides the regime "with manpower and a heavy presence during pro-government rallies". But according to The New York Times, the Basij were reactivated in the late 1990s when the spontaneous celebrations following Iran winning a spot in the 1998 FIFA World Cup, and the student protests in July 1999, gave the Islamic government the feeling that it had lost control of the streets. Giving a slightly different timeline, GlobalSecurity.org reports that it was revived around 2005.
Part of the Basij revival was an emphasis on concepts such as Development Basij (Basij-e-Sazandegi), but protecting the regime from unrest was a high priority. Along with the Iranian riot police and the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, the Basij have been active in suppressing student demonstrations in Iran. The Basij are sometimes differentiated from the Ansar in being more "disciplined" and not beating, or at least not being as quick to beat demonstrators.Molavi, The Soul of Iran (2005), p. 318 Other sources describe the Ansar-e-Hezbollah as part of the Basij.
Some believe the change in focus of the Basij from its original mission of fighting to defend Iran in the Iran-Iraq War to its current internal security concerns has led to a loss in its prestige and morale.
Syrian Civil War, 2011–2021
One foreign conflict the Basij were involved in was on the side of the IRI's ally the Syrian Baathist regime. A Western analyst believed thousands of Iranian paramilitary Basij fighters were stationed in Syria as of December 2013. Syria's geopolitical importance to Iran and its role as one of Iran's crucial allies prompted the involvement of Basij militiamen in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. The Basij militia, similar to Hezbollah fighters, work with the Syrian army against rebel forces. Such involvement poses new foreign policy challenges for a number of countries across the region, particularly Israel and Turkey as Iran's influence becomes more than just ideological and monetary on the ground in the Syrian conflict. The Basij involvement in the Syrian Civil War reflects previous uses of the militia as a proxy force for Iranian foreign policy in an effort to assert Iranian dominance in the region and frightens Salim Idriss, head of the Free Syrian Army.
Protest movements Iran has seen a series of political/social/economic protest movements during the 21st century that its security forces have been active in crushing—the July 1999 student protests, 2009 presidential election protests, protests in 2011–2012, 2019–2020 and the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests. When protests erupt, the Basij often act as the state's "iron fist".
2009 election protests The Basij have reportedly become "more important", more powerful, since the 2009 Iranian election—despite their "poor handing" of the protests over the election results. Mir Hussein Moussavi, opposition presidential candidate in 2009, decried violent attacks by the Basij during the 2009 Iranian election protests. There were also reports of poor performance by Basij after the 2009 election. This was thought to be a reason for the replacement of commander Hossein Taeb and the Basij's formal integration into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces in October 2009. Following the protests, Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, commander of the Basij, stated that eight people were killed and 300 wounded in the violence.Iran opposition says 72 died in post-poll unrest Reuters. 3 September 2009
In 2010, an anonymous Norwegian student doing research in Iran claims he witnessed gruesome atrocities inside a Basij camp after being abducted by the unit while riding on a bus. According to the account the student gave to Norwegian embassy officials, he witnessed detained political dissidents being 'disemboweled', burned to death, and deliberately crushed by a riot control truck.
During the protests, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei created the Haydaryan, a new paramilitary force specifically dedicated to preserving his position; several of the founding Haydaryan members came from the Basij.
Mahsa Amini protests
According to Reuters, Basij were at the "forefront" of the Islamic Republic's efforts to stamp out the protests over the death of Mahsa Amini and related lack of political and social freedoms the country. According to Tara Kangarlou of Time magazine, the Basij were responsible for most imprisonments, injuries, and killings of protesters. These protests, starting in September 2022 and dying out the following spring, led to over 500 deaths, including the deaths of 68 minors according to the non-profit organization Iran Human Rights. Unlike some earlier protests they were "nationwide, spread across social classes, universities, the streets [and] schools".
Journalists and human rights activists have catalogued a number of serious human rights violations used to crush the unrest by the Basij and other IRI security forces. These included forced confessions, threats to uninvolved family members, and torture, including electric shocks, controlled drowning, and mock execution (based on CNN interviews); sexual violence/rape (based on testimony and social media videos corroborated by a CNN investigation), “systematic" attempts to blind protesters by shooting at their eye with projectiles such as "pellets, teargas canisters, paintball bullets" (activist media group IranWire documented at least 580 cases). Using ambulances to transport security forces and kidnapped protesters under the guise of rushing injured civilians to receive emergency medical attention.
The Iranian state media reports that security forces such as the Basij were targeted and killed by "rioters and gangs" mainly the members of a specific unknown organization that orchestrated this whole protest in their efforts to restore order and stop the destruction of public property by protesters, and that by 6 January 2023, at least 68 security force members were killed in the unrest. However, according to BBC Persian service, these figures may not be reliable as some of those reported by state media to be loyalist Basij militiamen killed by the "rioters", were actually protesters killed by security forces, whose families were pressured by security forces to go along with the false reporting, threatening them with death if they failed to cooperate.
Twelve-Day War Following Operation Midnight Hammer in 2025, Basij forces significantly increased their urban patrols, especially at night to “ensure security".
2025–2026 Iranian protests
The Basij militia were reported to play a central role in suppressing the 2025–2026 protests, often operating alongside other Iranian security forces in crowd control, arrests, and enforcement actions against demonstrators. As in previous protest waves, journalists and human rights organizations alleged the use of excessive force, arbitrary detention, and intimidation tactics, including the violent dispersal of protests and the targeting of activists and perceived organizers. Observers noted continuity with earlier crackdowns, particularly in the Basij's decentralized deployment in urban areas and its role in monitoring and controlling civilian activity.