Twirwaneho (Swahili for "let's defend ourselves"), officially the Movement of Republicans for the Dignity of Peoples (MRDP or MRDP–Twirwaneho) is a rebel paramilitary group operating in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). MRDP–Twirwaneho is composed primarily of members of the Banyamulenge community, a Tutsi subgroup inhabitants of the South Kivu province.
The group was established in the early 2010s as a self-defense militia formed to counter ethnic violence, land conflicts, and attacks by rival armed factions, notably the Mai-Mai. Although it waned around 2009, it reappeared in 2015 under David Muhoza Ndahigima, also known as "El Shabaab", during a resurgence of insecurity in South Kivu's highlands. Under his leadership, MRDP–Twirwaneho transformed from a defensive militia into a more structured armed organization carrying out offensive operations against opposing militias and ethnic groups. Its ranks expanded over time to include ex-combatants, diaspora members, and allied fighters, with support from transnational Banyamulenge networks. Beginning in 2018, it became a key participant in escalating violence across Uvira Territory, Fizi Territory, and Mwenga Territory, engaging in clashes with Mai-Mai coalitions, fighting Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) units, and interacting with Burundian and Rwandan armed groups. Reports by the United Nations Security Council have linked MRDP–Twirwaneho to serious human rights abuses, including killings, displacement of civilians, and sexual violence.
Following 2020, the group expanded and became more centralized, especially after former FARDC officer Michel Rukunda ("Makanika") joined its ranks. By 2023, it had affiliated with the Congo River Alliance (AFC), and in February 2025, it aligned with the Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement, taking part in joint military operations. MRDP–Twirwaneho's president, Freddy Kaniki Rukema, serves as the AFC's deputy coordinator of economic, financial, and development affairs, while Charles Sematama is the group's military commander.
History
Late 2000s: Origins, agropastoral tensions, and the rise of local self-defense forces
In the late 2000s, the Banyamulenge political-military movement Forces républicaines fédéralistes (FRF), the FARDC 112th Brigade, and various Mai-Mai factions became increasingly involved in local conflict dynamics, largely due to their close personal and familial ties with customary authorities. These relationships often obscured the line between political leadership and armed mobilization. For example, the Bembe groupement chief of Basimunyaka-Nord, Nuhu Mwenelwata-Selemani Munyaka, was a prominent figure in disputes with the Banyamulenge and maintained close links with Mai-Mai commander Aoci. He reportedly encouraged Aoci to resist disarmament and to continue cattle raids against Banyamulenge herders on the Mibunda Plain, from which he personally benefited through a share of the proceeds. Between 2009 and 2010, such raids intensified and led to repeated clashes between Aoci's forces and the FRF, which sought to defend Banyamulenge livestock. Similar tensions arose in Minembwe, where, in 2008, Mai-Mai groups led by Mulumba and Assani Ngungu carried out large-scale cattle raids near Kitumba despite the presence of the 112th Brigade. These incidents strengthened perceptions among Banyamulenge herders that existing security arrangements were inadequate, and, in response, they supported the creation of a local self-defense force known as "Twirwaneho", which was led by Rabani Ntagendererwa Musemakweli. Unlike conventional rebel groups, this group operated intermittently, with members remaining in their villages and mobilizing only when necessary. Inspired by earlier local militias such as the Abagirye during the Simba rebellion, Twirwaneho conducted counterattacks against Mai-Mai groups in 2008–2009 before gradually dissolving. Nonetheless, a similarly named group would re-emerge nearly a decade later in the Bijombo groupement of Uvira Territory as a more organized armed movement.
Cattle raiding has remained a central driver of violence on the Plateaux, as it is used by armed groups as a tactic in conflict and as a way to respond to wider tensions between farmers and herders. These tensions are linked to different social and cultural views about land and livestock. The Banyamulenge, who own most of the cattle in the area, depend heavily on livestock for their economy and way of life, while other communities place more importance on land, which they often associate with their ancestral heritage and spiritual guardianship. These differences lead to repeated conflicts, especially during transhumance, when cattle are moved seasonally to grazing areas such as Lulenge and Ngandja. During these migrations, cattle often damage crops, which creates complaints from farmers, especially when compensation payment, known as itulo, is not paid or is disputed. In the past, such issues were handled through customary systems, but these have weakened and led to more frequent tensions. Mai-Mai groups have capitalized on these frustrations by framing cattle raiding as a form of self-defense against perceived encroachments by pastoralists, sometimes even portraying transhumance itself as an invasion of indigenous land, which thus helps them mobilize support among farming communities. At the same time, cattle raiding has become a strategic tool in the conflict that targets the Banyamulenge's economic foundations while also serving as a means of internal discipline within armed groups. Banyamulenge armed groups, in turn, have gained support by defending their herds and have increasingly carried out counter-raids against other communities. Cattle raiding has also become an important source of income. The relatively high market value of cattle has incentivized participation in looting, taxation of herds in transit, and the establishment of checkpoints by armed groups. This has led to the growth of an illegal economy based on stolen cattle, including their transport, sale, and the use of forged documentation or bribes to make the trade possible. Some FARDC members are believed to be involved in this system, either by not stopping raids, allowing stolen cattle to pass, or taking part in the trade. This has increased distrust among the Banyamulenge, while other communities accuse certain army officers, particularly those perceived as having ties to pastoralist groups, of partiality in protecting livestock. As a result, trust in state institutions has weakened, and many communities now rely more on armed groups to protect their interests.
2011: FRF–FARDC integration, failed integration of Mai-Mai factions, and Richard Tawimbi's Gumino Following negotiations held on the Plateaux in 2011, the FRF and the FARDC reached an agreement that led to the dissolution of the FRF as a political-military movement. As part of this deal, FRF fighters were integrated into the national army, initially within a new structure called the 44th sector under the Amani Leo operations. Most FRF officers retained their ranks, and several were appointed to key positions within this sector. The movement was also expected to be transformed into a political party that would continue to pursue its political goals, including issues related to the status of Minembwe. This agreement was influenced by exhaustion from years of conflict among both the FRF and the Banyamulenge population, the political ambitions of FRF leaders, government efforts to stabilize the country before the 2011 elections, and pressure from Rwanda, which suspected the FRF of having links with opposition figures such as General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa. The dissolution of the FRF created uncertainty among Mai-Mai groups, many of which had justified their armed presence as a response to the perceived threat posed by the FRF. Some groups, such as Mulumba's faction, had also argued that they would only consider laying down arms if the FRF was dissolved. In this context, several Mai-Mai factions, including those led by Kapopo and Mushombe, attempted to pursue a similar integration process into the FARDC to obtain positions within the 44th sector to balance what they saw as Banyamulenge influence, securing formal recognition of their ranks, and gaining important roles within the army. However, these efforts had limited success. Kapopo managed to integrate with only a small number of fighters, while many of his troops refused to be deployed far from their home areas or returned to Itombwe, partly due to concerns about leaving their communities without protection. Local authorities also opposed their departure for the same reasons.
Efforts to integrate the group of Fuliru leader Mushombe Muganguzi based in North Bijombo also did not succeed. Although some Fuliru politicians appear to have reorganized and strengthened the group specifically in anticipation of FARDC integration, which they hoped to use the process to enhance their political standing before elections, the group "was not a complete fabrication", as Mushombe had intermittently mobilized fighters in a loose structure depending on security conditions. In 2011, the group was reorganized again, with Mushombe supported by Célestin Kashama Ngoy (also known as Kashologozi), a former Mai-Mai officer and FARDC captain, and Ilunga Lusesema (aka Kilofoka), a former company commander in Nakabaka's Mai-Mai forces. Encouraged by political sponsors, the group's ambitions grew too large, and prolonged negotiations failed to produce results. The situation was complicated by unclear signals from some political and military actors involved in the talks, who had little incentive to conclude them since they benefited financially from related funding. Another key factor was the army's "regimentation" reform, which aimed to convert FARDC brigades into regiments. Many ex–Mai-Mai officers were excluded from key positions in these new structures, which they often attributed to alleged Rwandophone dominance within the army. Feeling marginalized, many defected and joined Mushombe's group. Similar frustrations fueled other Mai-Mai defections. For example, Fuliru officer Kazadi left the Kilombwe regimentation center in Fizi Territory and later joined Mulumba's faction, where he proclaimed himself a general. Another beneficiary of these defections was the group of "Colonel" Chochi Buzimya Muchanga, who was based in the Moyens Plateaux of Milimba in Fizi Territory. He justified his armed struggle primarily by citing the Banyamulenge threat, stating that one must strike early before being struck. Influenced by young Fuliru intellectuals, the group adopted the name "Biloze Bishambuke", meaning in Kifuliiru "if we must destroy, let us destroy". It also received support from certain FARDC officers, including Colonel Justin Kanyonyi (aka Okapi), a former member of Assani Ngungu's Mai-Mai. Only the FRF was fully integrated into the FARDC in 2011. This created imbalances in the military sector of the Plateaux and generated new security tensions. As FARDC units largely composed of Banyamulenge soldiers conducted operations against Mai-Mai groups, insurgent mobilization increased. The situation worsened further when many FARDC units were withdrawn for the regimentation process. Combined with renewed Mai-Mai activity, these developments contributed to the remobilization of a Banyamulenge dissident faction led by former FRF officer Richard Tawimbi in 2011. With Shaka Alexis Nyamusaraba and Mugaza Semahurungure Kimasa as deputies, the group established its headquarters in the Bijombo groupement.