Demographic change in Germany (German: Demografischer Wandel in Deutschland) is a collective term for various changes and trends in population development in Germany. The term is often used synonymously with the term demographic transition.
The changes affect such factors as:
the age structure of the population, the quantitative ratio of men and women on the population pyramid, the proportions of people with and without German citizenship, as well as naturalized citizens, in the population, the development of birth rates and death rates, The rates of immigrants and emigrants.
The effects of demographic change on the individual federal states and municipalities vary by jurisdiction.
Due to demographic change, the population of Germany has been ageing for 50 years. The number of young people in Germany has sharply declined. In 2020, the population flatlined for the first time in a decade. As of the end of 2024, the population of Germany stood at just under 83.6 million, an increase of 121,000 compared to the previous year.
Factors
In Germany, the aging structure is characterized by the fact that since 1973 the death rate (mortality) has been higher than the birth rate (see also demographic transition). Due to the higher life expectancy of the population and a simultaneously declining birth rate, the proportion of older people is increasing compared to the proportion of younger people (see also age structure in Germany). The proportion of families with three or more children has declined significantly. This explains 68% of the overall decline in births. A further 26% can be attributed to increased childlessness. Although the rate of immigration has steadily declined over the past two decades, it remains positive. Following the introduction of freedom of movement in the labour market for workers from the newly acceded member states of the European Union in 2011, an average annual net migration of between 147,000 and 311,000 people is expected until 2060. Foreign nationals immigrating to Germany are, on average, younger than those emigrating. This results in a "rejuvenation effect" for the population remaining in Germany, but this does not counteract the overall aging of the population. The 15th coordinated population forecast, assumptions, and results include the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, as significant changes. Emigration. In absolute terms – that is, irrespective of citizenship – 734,000 people emigrated from Germany in 2009. In the same period, 721,000 migrated to Germany. Of these, 606,000 were not German citizens.
Effects
The effects of demographic change present legislators, municipalities, welfare organizations, businesses, and citizens with new challenges. For example, (pre-)schools, especially primary schools, must be merged with each other if the investment in education per student is not to increase. Furthermore, the ever-growing proportion of elderly people means that their mobility must be guaranteed. and their care must also be provided. This can be supported, for example, by converting old government buildings into retirement homes and/or assisted living facilities.
Retirement provision
The statutory pension insurance system for workers and employees in Germany is fundamentally organized according to the pay-as-you-go system. However, the costs associated with aging are also covered by government subsidies for the pension insurance, company pensions, and private retirement savings. Demographic trends, characterized by an aging population and a shrinking younger population, mean that, with the retirement age staying the same, a growing number of pensioners will face a decreasing number of contributors to the statutory pension insurance system unless the number of employees subject to compulsory insurance within the overall working-age population is increased. Based on this premise, advocates of reform are calling for raising the retirement age, reducing public pensions and increasing private retirement savings, for example through private insurance and stocks, in order to prevent a looming pension gap.
However, the number of employed persons subject to compulsory insurance and the amount of their total contributions are not solely dependent on population trends. Therefore, trade unions in particular, but also individual academics such as and political commentators such as , criticize policy concepts that focus exclusively on the demographic factor and ignore all others. According to these critics, these concepts primarily serve to relieve the burden on employers.
Critics of the “dramatization of demographic development” argue that the number of employees subject to compulsory insurance, or the contribution payments that determine the pension amount, can also be increased by an increase in the number of full-time employed persons or the total number of employed persons. Besides raising the retirement age, the following factors play a role in this:
the increased (full) employment of women and underemployed men the reduction of unemployment, the mobilization of the the earlier start of employment, the inclusion of civil servants and self-employed individuals in the group of contributors the integration of immigrants into the labour market
The contribution payment can be increased not only by increasing the contribution rate, but also by:
the exclusion of financing non-contribution-related external services such as the increase in the proportionate insurance contributions due to the rise in gross incomes in parallel with productivity development and economic growth The increase in the proportion of insurance contributions due to more permanent positions, full-time contracts, fewer bogus self-employed persons, less precarious employment and more standard employment relationships.
Furthermore, according to , the decline in the number of children and young people also results in cost savings, because in a population with a high proportion of children and young people, significant expenditures must be made for them, which tend to decrease with a lower youth population. The burden on the working population lies not only in old-age provision, but also in the care of children, adolescents, and young adults in school, vocational training, and university studies. When considering this burden, all areas must be taken into account, not just old-age provision.
The fact that employed persons subject to compulsory insurance have to support an increasing number of non-working people entitled to pensions is not a new phenomenon:
From 1900 to 1990, the proportion of the population over 65 years of age steadily tripled from 4.9% to 14.9%. while the proportion of those under 20 years of age halved. Life expectancy increased from 45 years for men to 76 in 2002. The retirement age () decreased from 70 to 65 years (from 1911 onwards). The number of employed persons doubled between 1955 and 2014 due to increased female employment and growing precarious employment. GDP tripled in real terms between 1960 and 2005. According to the Federal Statistical Office, overall workforce productivity per employed person in Germany increased by 22.7% between 1991 and 2011. Labor productivity per hour worked increased by 34.48%. This reflects the simultaneous decrease of 7.5% in the average number of hours worked per employed person.
These extreme changes were managed without altering the pension insurance system; in fact, pensions were dynamically adjusted to income increases, and the pension entitlements of all employees of the former GDR and of immigrant resettlers and late repatriates were adopted ().
Furthermore, critics point out that predictions have never been possible over long periods.
The negative prognosis also implies that all current and all possible family policy measures aimed at increasing the birth rate, or all measures aimed at integrating immigrants, are doomed to failure from the outset. These are prerequisites that are not addressed, critically reflected upon, or justified. Regarding reproductive behavior, the example of France, with its significant increase in the birth rate, shows that attributing low birth rates solely to the modernity of society is not valid. Crucial factors include job security, standard employment, and a child-friendly social environment that highly values family life and children.
In 2016, the Swiss economist Thomas Straubhaar also presented the critique of the “demographic myths”, in particular criticizing what he considered to be erroneous notions of skilled worker shortages, child poverty and the advantages of immigration.
As with the pension insurance system, demographic changes are expected to have a negative impact on the current (as of 2024) German healthcare system. This applies, on the one hand, to long-term care insurance, which must prepare for an increasing number of elderly people requiring care, while the number of employees working in the care sector is declining. On the other hand, the expenditures of health insurance will also rise considerably, since the per capita healthcare costs for people beyond working age are several times higher than those of an average young person or working adult. The problems of health and long-term care insurance are thus essentially the same as those of the pension insurance system.
The shortage of doctors in rural areas (Landarzt) is likely to worsen, as 42% of general practitioners will retire by 2021 and young doctors prefer to practice in cities.
Property prices Financial mathematician Andreas Beck suspects that due to demographic change, more properties will come onto the market from 2025 onwards, while demand will decrease.
At the same time, it can still be assumed that demographic change in Germany will have very different effects on real estate prices. Not only are younger generations increasingly drawn towards urban centres, causing significant increases in both purchase and rental prices there.
At the same time, the large real estate generations of the baby boomers are expected to reduce their own living space in old age, which could increase the supply of larger properties, especially in rural regions and small towns, and lead to a price decline.
Integration challenges