The 106th Rifle Division was first formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in July 1940 in the North Caucasus Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of the previous September. In May 1941 it was assigned to the Odessa Military District, where it deployed in and around Yevpatoria in Crimea. Two days after the start of the German invasion it became part of the 9th Rifle Corps, which was subordinated to 51st Army in August. This Army was responsible for the defense of the Crimea, with just two regular divisions, including the 106th, initially on strength. The German 11th Army began its attack on September 24; the division was on the Army's right flank south of the Chonhar Strait but was soon partially committed to the main battle on the Isthmus of Perekop. When this position was broken in late October the division began a long retreat to the Kerch Strait and then across to the Taman Peninsula, where it was assigned to 56th Army of Southern Front. Under these commands it took part in the follow-up operations after the liberation of Rostov-na-Donu, and after a short time under direct Front command was assigned to 57th Army deep inside the Izium salient. Before the start of Southwestern Front's offensive to retake Kharkiv the 106th was moved to 9th Army, still in Southern Front. In 1st Panzer Army's counteroffensive that began on May 17 the division was encircled but soon broke out at a considerable cost in casualties and equipment. 9th Army was again badly beaten up in fighting near Izium in June and stood little chance against a full-blown panzer offensive on the Caucasian steppes. With much of the rest of the Army the 106th was encircled near Millerovo in late July and largely destroyed, being disbanded in September.
The second formation of the 106th was based on a division recruited from NKVD personnel in the Transbaikal Military District in November 1942. In February 1943 it was one of six such divisions that came under Red Army control as part of the new 70th Army, which was soon assigned to the reformed Central Front. During February and March, after concentrating near Kursk, it pushed toward Oryol, but this objective was not reached, in part due to ineffective Army leadership. It remained in this area through the spring and early summer, preparing for the German offensive that began in July, but played little active role in the fighting. Shortly after it took part in the campaign that drove German 9th Army out of the Oryol salient, before advancing through eastern Ukraine and into Belarus under 65th Army. In mid-October the division made a major crossing of the Dniepr River in the vicinity of Loyew and was awarded the river's name as a battle honor, while 38 men, including the divisional commander, were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. During November and December it took part in several operations in the swampy terrain of southeastern Belarus before being sent south to 1st Ukrainian Front west of Kyiv; it would remain in this Front for the duration of the war. It came under 13th Army for a few months, but in April 1944 it was reassigned to 3rd Guards Army, where it would also remain for the duration. In August, for its role in penetrating the German defenses in front of Lviv, the 106th was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. As the campaign continued it forced a bridgehead across the Vistula River where it suffered considerable casualties in a late August counterattack. In January 1945 to broke out of the bridgehead and rapidly advanced across southern Poland and into Silesia, where it took part in fighting through February, arriving at the Neisse River in the third week of the month. From this line it attacked into the German heartland in April, first taking part in routing the German Cottbus grouping, and then the encirclement battle against the 9th Army in the Spree Forest. When the German surrender came it was advancing with its Front toward Prague. Shortly after hostilities ceased it was awarded the Order of Suvorov for the battle with 9th Army. As with many other distinguished divisions it was disbanded a few months later.
1st Formation The division officially formed on July 16, 1940, from troops stationed around the North Caucasus Military District. Kombrig Mitrofan Sergeevich Tkachev was appointed to command the same day; this cavalry officer had most recently served as deputy commander of the 10th Cavalry Division. In November he was sent to the Frunze Military Academy for training, and returned in May, 1941 just as the 106th was moving to the Odessa Military District, where it took up positions on the west coast of Crimea, based on Yevpatoria. On June 22 its order of battle was as follows: 397th Rifle Regiment 442nd Rifle Regiment 534th Rifle Regiment 553rd Artillery Regiment (until July 3, 1942)Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 54 201st Antitank Battalion 430th Antiaircraft Battery (later 449th Antiaircraft Battalion) 167th Reconnaissance Company (later 167th Reconnaissance Battalion) 156th Sapper Battalion 500th Signal Battalion 143rd Medical/Sanitation Battalion 77th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company 197th Motor Transport Company (later 197th Motor Transport Battalion) 145th Motorized Field Bakery 16th Divisional Veterinary Hospital 734th Field Postal Station (later 650th) 37th Field Office of the State Bank At this time the division had some 12,000 personnel in its ranks. On June 24, in accordance with STAVKA Order No. 20466, the 106th was subordinated to the 9th Separate Rifle Corps, along with the 156th Rifle Division and the 32nd Cavalry Division.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 12 The Corps had a strength of about 35,000 personnel, all under command of Lt. Gen. P. I. Batov, and was tasked with defending the Crimea and preparing for amphibious operations elsewhere in the Black Sea.Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 77 Tkachev left the division on July 1; he would later lead the 243rd Rifle Division for two brief periods in 1944 but was forced to leave due to the effects of wounds. He was replaced by Col. Aleksei Nikolaevich Pervushin, who had been serving as deputy commander of the 156th. On August 20 9th Corps was subordinated to 51st Army.Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 44
Defense of Crimea 51st Army, with a strength of some 95,000, was placed under command of Col. Gen. F. I. Kuznetsov, who began preparing a defense of the Isthmus of Perekop in mid-August with most of his assigned forces, apart from 9th Corps, still en route. Roughly 30,000 civilians were drafted into building defenses alongside the Red Army troops on the Perekop and the Chongar Peninsula. His deployment was badly affected by faulty intelligence from the STAVKA in General Staff Order No. 001033 of August 18 which stated in part:In fact, the Axis had no amphibious capability to speak of, and the German airborne force had been devastated on Crete in May, so it was odd that this information was given credence. It led Kuznetsov to deploy 40,000 troops to defend the coast against landings that were effectively impossible, while a further 25,000 were in the Crimean interior on anti-paratroop duty. Just 30,000 were left to defend the northern approaches, including 7,000 of the 156th at Perekop.Robert Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, 2014, pp. 43-44
The Army was not initially assigned any tanks, so Southern Front managed to scrape up ten T-34s and 56 T-37s from repair facilities to form the 5th Tank Regiment under command of Maj. S. P. Baranov, giving Kuznetsov a small mobile reserve. On August 30 the German 11th Army forced a crossing of the Dniepr River at Beryslav in the face of resistance from Southern Front's 9th Army. The attackers broke out on September 9–10, forcing a shattered 9th Army back toward Melitopol and opening the approaches to the Crimea. The 11th Army commander, Gen. E. Ritter von Schobert, directed his LIV Army Corps toward Perekop, without any clear idea of what that force would face; in fact German intelligence had not yet identified 51st Army. Schobert directed the Corps commander, Gen. E. Hansen, to form a forward detachment in an effort to take the Perekop by coup de main, just before Schobert was killed in an air crash on September 12. Gen. E. von Manstein was appointed by Hitler as his successor, but he would not arrive for five days.Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, p. 44
On the day of Schobert's death the reconnaissance battalion of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, under command of Sturmbannführer K. Meyer, made a 35km dash from Beryslav toward Perekop, followed by the 22nd Reconnaissance Battalion, and reached the village of Preobrazhenka, 8km north of the ancient Tatar Wall, at around 0600 hours. Meyer's force consisted of motorcycle infantry, a few armored cars, and a battery of towed Pak 36 antitank guns, but no engineers and no other heavy weapons. As it entered the village his lead company took 76mm artillery fire from the armored train Voykovets as well as small arms fire from the 156th's 361st Rifle Regiment entrenched at the nearby Chervonyi Chaban Sovkhoz. Meyer could see that extensive fortifications continued to the south and as he retreated he reported back to Hansen that "coup against Perekop impossible."Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, pp. 44-45 Battle of Perekop Manstein arrived at Mykolaiv on September 17 and found that Hansen had moved up his 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions toward the Perekop but had not attempted to reduce the Soviet defenses. Furthermore, XXX Army Corps had sealed off the Chonhar and the Arabat Spit with Leibstandarte but had also made no effort to push into the Crimea. The 156th had constructed three defensive lines across the Perekop, with the main line making use of the Tatar Wall. The Wall itself was fronted by the old moat, now 12m deep and 33m wide; the Wall sat on 5m-high earthen berm. The surrounding countryside was barren of trees and other vegetation, completely open to Soviet observation. Most concerning for the attackers, however, was the extensive employment of antipersonnel mines, including thousands of wooden PMDs which could not be found by conventional detectors, plus improvised devices including aerial bombs and naval mines. Remote-control buried flamethrowers were also in service. Overall, the German Army had not had to penetrate such a defence to date in the war.Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, pp. 46-47
Manstein was keen to avoid a frontal assault and set 11th Army's engineers to find some way to bypass these lines. One possibility was cross the shallow Syvash as had been done by the Red Army in 1920, but due to the tidal conditions and soft bottom at this time German engineers trying to wade across quickly sank to their hips. The use of Sturmbooten was also considered, but rejected. In addition, Kuznetsov was expecting this move and had ordered the 156th to deploy two battalions on the Litovskii Peninsula where the 1920 crossing had occurred. On the Chonhar the railroad bridge had been destroyed and obstacles placed in the water below, while the Arabat was so long, narrow and exposed that it could only be crossed if unopposed.Forczyk, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, pp. 47-49