Saudi nationalism refers to the evolving set of political, cultural, and ideological narratives that define national identity in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Unlike ethnic or civic nationalisms found elsewhere, nationalism in Saudi Arabia has historically been rooted in dynastic legitimacy and religious authority, particularly the alliance between the House of Saud and Wahhabi Islam. However, in the 21st century under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), Saudi nationalism has undergone significant development, shifting toward a more assertive, state‑centric, and increasingly secularized civic identity aligned with the government’s Vision 2030 program.
History
Foundations (pre–1932)
Pre-modern Najdi identity Prior to state formation, identity in central Arabia (Najd) was shaped by tribal affiliation, local customs, and religious conservatism. Najdi society possessed proto‑national elements such as shared dialect, cultural norms, and religious homogeneity, but lacked a centralizing political identity.
The Diriyah pact (1744)
The earliest ideological foundation of Saudi nationalism emerged from the 1744 pact between Emir Muhammad bin Saud of Diriyah and religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al‑Wahhab. This alliance provided religious legitimacy for political expansion, ideological cohesion across tribal groups, and a framework for state formation based on Wahhabi doctrine. This period produced a religious‑dynastic nationalism, centered on obedience to the ruler and adherence to Wahhabi norms rather than ethnic or territorial identity.
State formation (1902–1932)
The modern Saudi state was consolidated through military campaigns, tribal alliances, and administrative centralization. National identity was tied to loyalty to the House of Saud, Wahhabi religious authority, and the unification of disparate regions (Najd, Hejaz, Asir, Eastern Province). The incorporation of Hejaz—home to Mecca and Medina—was pivotal in legitimizing the emerging Saudi state. The Najdi composition of Ibn Saud’s forces and the cultural distinctiveness of Najd shaped early Saudi identity, contributing to long-term tensions between regions. A source also highlights the prevalence of warfare, factional mistrust, and the influence of Wahhabism on Najdi society, all of which informed the early contours of Saudi nationalism.
Nationalism in the Oil Era (1938–2015)
Social transformation from oil wealth
The discovery of oil in 1938 helped to reshape Saudi national identity by accelerating urbanization, expanding state welfare, creating new social classes, and the development of Saudi national identity became increasingly tied to the state’s economic role and its management of oil revenues.
Institutionalization under King Faisal King Faisal (1964–1975) expanded state institutions, modernized education, and promoted pan‑Islamic diplomacy. These reforms strengthened national cohesion while maintaining Wahhabi religious dominance. His policies strengthened state institutions, expanded education, and leveraged religious authority to unify disparate regions.
Arab nationalism and regional politics
Saudi nationalism developed partly in opposition to secular Arab nationalist movements such as Ba'athism and Nasserism, with Wahhabism serving as an ideological counterweight and reinforcing Saudi exceptionalism and dynastic legitimacy. Faisal’s promotion of pan-Islamism during the Cold War positioned Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to secular Arab nationalism. The ulama supported Faisal’s ideological struggle against Arab nationalism, helping to frame Saudi identity as rooted in religious authenticity rather than secular nationalism.
Contemporary Saudi nationalism (2015–present) Saudi nationalism is tied to foreign policy, with Saudi Arabia projecting itself as a regional power in a multipolar world. Analysts argue that nationalism has become a new authoritarian foundation for consolidating power, restructuring national identity, and legitimizing domestic reforms.
Rise of Saudi "hyper-nationalism" Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), Saudi nationalism has evolved into a more assertive, state-engineered identity emphasizing loyalty to the leadership, economic modernization, and territorial pride. Analysts describe this as “hyper-nationalism,” characterized by aggressive rebranding, patriotic zeal, and online campaigns such as “Saudi Arabia for Saudis.” The new narrative elevates the image of the modern, entrepreneurial Saudi citizen over the previously idealized pious Muslim identity. It also celebrates pre-Islamic archaeological sites such as Al‑Ula and Madain Saleh, which were once condemned as pagan remnants but are now central to national heritage initiatives.
Analysts note that the rise of nationalism in Saudi Arabia mirrors similar developments across the Gulf, where states have increasingly relied on national identity to consolidate monarchical authority. Historically, Saudi rulers viewed nationalism as a threat to dynastic legitimacy, preferring tribal loyalties and religious identity. However, the Vision 2030 era has seen a deliberate state-led effort to mobilize nationalism to support MbS's reforms and strengthen his political position. Commentators such as Lebanese American political scientist Joseph A. Kéchichian argue that this new nationalism seeks to update—rather than eliminate—the traditional religious establishment, reframing it as compatible with modernization. At the same time, American–Israeli scholar Martin Kramer notes that Saudi Arabia has never possessed a “nation” in the moral sense, as sovereignty historically rested with God and the alliance between the ulama and the House of Saud rather than with the people.
Saudi Vision 2030 and civic identity
Saudi Vision 2030 promotes a modernized national identity aligned with economic diversification, cultural liberalization, and global integration. Nationalism is used to mobilize youth support for reforms and to legitimize rapid social change.
Saudi Founding Day and historical revisionism
In 2022, Saudi Arabia introduced Founding Day, commemorating the establishment of the First Saudi State in 1727—before the Wahhabi alliance. This reframing helped legitimize the de facto leadership of MbS and his reforms by elevating dynastic legitimacy over religion, reducing clerical influence, and constructing a more flexible national narrative. Also introduced alongside Founding Day was Saudi National Day.
The introduction of Founding Day in 2022 marks a significant ideological shift. The holiday moves the symbolic origin of the Saudi state to 1727 which is set before the 1744 Diriyah pact, thereby reducing the centrality of Wahhabism in the national narrative. Scholars argue that this reframing is part of a broader effort to replace religious legitimacy with nationalist legitimacy. A 2024 analysis from George Mason highlights that Founding Day “removes the Wahhabis from the founding narrative,” signaling that nationalism is increasingly displacing Wahhabism as the kingdom’s primary ideological foundation. The state’s official imagery for National Day celebrations similarly emphasizes modernization, gender inclusion, and secular historical motifs, with religious symbols notably absent.
Religion and national identity
Wahhabism remains part of national identity but is increasingly instrumentalized rather than foundational. The state promotes a curated version of religious heritage compatible with modernization and tourism.
Characteristics
Dynastic nationalism Contemporary Saudi nationalism continues to center the monarchy as the locus of national identity. The state promotes loyalty to the royal family, particularly the crown prince, through media campaigns, patriotic festivals, and militarized symbolism. The celebrated “new Saudi citizen” is expected to support state-led modernization, participate in national economic projects such as Aramco share offerings, and act as a “citizen policeman” identifying dissenters. This reflects a shift from religious obedience to political obedience.
State-constructed identity Saudi nationalism is widely described as a top-down project of identity engineering. The state uses education reforms, entertainment venues, archaeological restoration, and social media messaging to cultivate a unified national identity. Textbooks have been revised to distance the country from pan-Arab and pan-Islamic narratives, while religious police powers have been curtailed. The state also promotes gender inclusion as part of national modernization, though legal inequalities persist.
Civic–religious syncretism The development of Saudi nationalism under MbS increasingly blends civic identity with a selectively curated religious heritage, producing what analysts describe as a hybrid civic–religious syncretism. Rather than eliminating religion from national identity, the state reframes Wahhabism as one cultural component within a broader civic narrative centered on modernization, territorial pride, and loyalty to the ruling family.
A major feature of this syncretism is the reorientation of religion from foundational ideology to symbolic heritage. The Maydan analysis notes that the state has deliberately reduced the prominence of Wahhabism in official narratives, particularly through the introduction of Founding Day, which shifts the symbolic origin of the Saudi state to 1727—before the Wahhabi–Saudi alliance—and thereby “removes the Wahhabis from the founding narrative". This reframing allows the state to retain religious imagery when useful, while simultaneously promoting secular historical motifs, gender-inclusive iconography, and modernization as core national symbols.
At the same time, religion is instrumentalized to support civic loyalty rather than to define national belonging. The Cato Institute analysis observes that Islam is being “reoriented to support [the] new nationalist endeavor,” with religious institutions subordinated to a broader project of identity engineering that emphasizes obedience to the state, national pride, and territorial cohesion. This shift is visible in reforms that limit the powers of the religious police, revise school curricula, and distance official history from Wahhabi doctrine.
The syncretic model also incorporates pre‑Islamic heritage into national identity—something previously unimaginable under strict Wahhabi norms. Research on Saudi Arabia’s “embrace of Jahiliyyah” highlights how archaeological sites such as Al‑Ula and Madain Saleh, once condemned as pagan remnants, are now celebrated as national treasures and heavily promoted in tourism, cultural festivals, and state branding campaigns. This blending of pre‑Islamic heritage with selective religious symbolism forms a new cultural repertoire that supports civic nationalism while softening the ideological dominance of Wahhabism.
Political analysts further note that this syncretism is strategically designed to appeal to youth, who constitute over half the population. The European Council on Foreign Relations describes how the state balances religious references with civic messaging to cultivate loyalty among young Saudis, presenting nationalism as compatible with both modern lifestyles and a moderated religious identity.
Finally, the syncretic model is reinforced through territorial nationalism, which integrates religious sites (Mecca, Medina, Diriyah) into a broader narrative of national space while simultaneously elevating secular landmarks, entertainment districts, and new megaprojects. The Nation Building in Saudi Arabia study emphasizes that territorial nationalism now merges religious symbolism with civic pride, modernization, and state-led cultural production, forming a composite identity that is neither fully secular nor traditionally religious.
Youth mobilization