The middle strike campaign, launched by the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine in early April 2026 during the Russo-Ukrainian war, has been aiming to achieve a "logistics breakdown" for Russia in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine, especially Crimea. The primary targets of the middle strike campaign, characterised by the rapid technological advancements and effectiveness of Ukraine's one-way attack drones, have been Russia's military supply trucks driving on the highway on the land corridor between Rostov-on-Don and Simferopol and Sevastopol in Crimea, which became known as the Highway of Death or the Novorossiya highway.
This 700-kilometre motorway on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine has been playing an important role in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as ground line of communication (GLOC) for Russia's military logistics, particularly for supplying Crimea. It is a combination of two stretches from the existing Highway M14 of Ukraine (part of European route E58) from the Russo-Ukrainian border via Mariupol until Melitopol, and from there the existing Highway M18 of Ukraine (part of European route E105) to Simferopol. At the Russo-Ukrainian border, Highway M14 connects with Russian federal highway R-280 (or R280) via Taganrog to Rostov-on-Don. The pair of two highway stretches was dubbed the "Novorossiya highway" by Russia in the mid-2020s, and formally added to the existing R-280, a move rejected by Ukraine.
A similar situation exists for the Russian-designated highway R-150, which is a connected combination of stretches of Highway H20 of Ukraine from Mariupol to Donetsk city, Highway M04 of Ukraine between Donetsk and Luhansk city, and Highway H21 of Ukraine from Luhansk city via Starobilsk to the Russo-Ukrainian border.
On 9 June 2026, commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi of the 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Brigade ("Birds of Madyar") reported that because of the middle strike campaign, Russian military cargo traffic along the highway of death had fallen by 71% during the previous two weeks. This soon resulted in severe fuel shortages, as well as food and goods shortages, in Crimea and other occupied regions in southeastern Ukraine.
Background The Novorossiya highway became crucial in supplying Crimea over the "land bridge" through occupied southern Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts instead of the Crimean Bridge (Kerch Bridge), that was severely damaged in 2025 and remains vulnerable.
Since then, the Bridge has been closed off for heavy vehicles, meaning the only remaining ways for supplying Crimea are via air (but mutual air denial has practically eliminated this option since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022), the Kerch Strait ferry line, and the M14 and M18 highways over the land bridge. However, the ferry line has a limited capacity, and the highway has come under the fire control of the Ukrainian military around early 2026, particularly with the rapidly advancing developments in drone warfare technology.
Before the launch of the middle strike campaign in early April 2026, Ukrainian mid-range drones, aimed at striking "Russian targets at operational depth behind the front — typically defined as between from the front lines" — had been in routine use for well over a year. However, the targets had until that time been predominantly air defence systems, command centers, and ammunition dumps (some of which were moved back into Russia after successful Ukrainian attacks on Russian air defence systems, radars, and command, supply and ammo depots on occupied Ukrainian territory).
The middle strike campaign changed the focus to destroying Russian supply trucks and disrupting logistics instead.
Middle strike campaign Objectives and preparations
As set out by Mykhailo Fedorov, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, the targeting of the R-280 highway since mid-April 2026 was designed to achieve a "logistics breakdown" (or "logistics lockdown") for Russia.
Unlike a year earlier, by mid-May 2026, Ukraine's rapidly expanded capacity to produce and deploy advanced drones enabled an unprecedented and sustained campaign to pressure and isolate Crimea. The low cost of Ukraine's latest drones, such as the Hornet and Dart, also financially defeated the much more expensive MANPAD missiles and about equally expensive proximity-fused shells for a heavy anti-aircraft gun that the Russian military tried to intercept them with. Ukrainian anti-bridge drones striking the Chonhar and Henichesk Bridges, such as the Behemoth, cost less than US$50,000, a fraction of a Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missile at US$2,000,000 apiece that Ukraine used to take out the Chonhar Bridge in 2023.
On 27 May 2026, Fedorov announced an additional 5 billion Ukrainian hryvnia (US$113 million) in funding for the frontline units that had proven most effective in carrying out operations of the middle strike campaign.
On 22 June 2026, SBU major general Viktor Yahun told UNIAN that the campaign's objective was not (yet) a Ukrainian ground offensive to liberate Crimea, but to make maintaining the Russian military occupation of Crimea "as difficult and expensive as possible for the enemy". "That is why the key targets are not seaside resorts, nor even military bases. The targets are bridges, railway junctions, fuel depots and logistics centres." USF commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi similarly told Reuters: "The aim is to deprive the Kremlin of the ability to use Crimea as a springboard for new offensive operations."
Initial observations
By May 2026, Ukrainian drones had become highly effective at targeting and destroying Russian military supply trucks all over M14 and M18 highway stretches, earning it the nickname "Highway of Death", or "Highway to Hell". The motorway became a prime target for the 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("Nemesis") and other Ukrainian UAV units during the "middle strike campaign" of early 2026. Reportedly, the fixed-wing U.S.-made Hornet drones and Ukrainian-produced Morrigan drones have been significantly involved in striking Russian military trucks on the road.
On 25 May 2026, an Institute for the Study of War (ISW) report noted that "Ukraine significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike campaign against dynamic targets in Spring 2026 in order to degrade Russian logistics at operational depths ahead of a planned Ukrainian manoeuvre." Both Russian officials and milbloggers were confirming "in mid-to-late May 2026 that Ukrainian drones were increasingly targeting Russian vehicles and logistics … at distances over 160km from the frontline." By geolocation, the ISW was able to verify approximately 35 attacks on vehicles on the motorways M14 and M18, as well as the H20 between Mariupol and Donetsk, with circumstantial evidence suggesting the real number was much higher.
On 29 May, OSINT monitoring group Tochnyi managed to "geolocate 55 strikes on Russian logistics vehicles in April and 130 strikes in May, with the number increasing on a daily basis." A 31 May Kyiv Independent analysis of video footage of Hornet drones, released by the 1st Azov Corps alone (since mid-April), was able to confirm more than 50 strikes on key logistics corridors, including the R-280.
Formations involved
According to a June 2026 article by the Kyiv Post, about 5,000-8,000 Ukrainian drone operators and maintainers were involved in the middle strike campaign, targeting the supply lines that about 250,000 to 300,000 "Russian ground forces occupying Ukraine's Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea regions are dependent on." The Russian forces mostly fell under the command of the 5th and 8th Combined Arms Armies. Most Ukrainian USF forces consisted of 300 to 500 personnel, who would launch at most 30 to 40 one-way attack drones plus a smaller number of reconnaissance drones per strike package.
Ukrainian formations involved in the middle strike campaign: Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine (USF or SBS) 1st Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces (for SEAD/DEAD) 413th Regiment of Unmanned Systems ("Raid", split from the 1st USF Center in 2024, for Russian drone warehouses and SEAD/DEAD in Berdyansk and Mariupol) 20th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("K-2", for anti-logistics operations in northern Crimea) 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("Nemesis", for the R-280 highway) 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Brigade ('Birds of Madyar') 2nd Battalion "Wormbusters" (for logistics hubs around Mariupol and freight vehicles along the H-20 Donetsk-Mariupol highway) 9th Battalion "Kairos" (for SEAD/DEAD, supply trucks and trains, and oil depots) 422nd Unmanned Systems Regiment (for fuel and freight trucks in southern Zaporizhzhia) Ukrainian Ground Forces 1st Separate Assault Regiment (for bridges and causeways) Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR) (for fuel tankers on the R-280 highway) National Guard of Ukraine Pilum Regiment of the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard "Azov"
Drone types involved
Ukrainian drones (mostly one-way attack drones, including loitering munitions) frequently used in the middle strike campaign: Morrigan: 2 metre-long lightweight fixed-wing drone, operated by the 412th Unmanned Systems Brigade ("Nemesis") Dart 250: US$2,000 Hornet: 5 kilogram warhead, range of 150 or up to 200 kilometres, cost (up to) US$5,000, operated by the Pilum Regiment of the 1st Azov Corps : heavy, anti-bridge warhead, less than US$50,000, operated by the FP-2: heavy, anti-bridge warhead, operated by the
Escalation On 19 June 2026, French OSINT statistical analyst Clément Molin noted an intensification of Ukraine's medium-range strike campaign, reaching a rate of 30 struck targets a day on Russian supply lines in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine. For 22 June, Molin counted 47 successful drone attacks, and for 22 June 56 successful strikes. From 19 to 23 June, the total of Russian trucks and other pieces of military equipment (including bridges, crossings, trains and railways) on the highways was counted as 193, with the total number of such targets successfully attacked since early May 2026 estimated at nearly 800. Molin attributed this to the increasing effectiveness, availability, deployment of Ukrainian drones on the one hand, versus the "typically sluggish response" of the Russian military, a shortage of classic short-range air defence systems within the Russian military to equip mobile anti-air defence teams to protect the supply lines (only on key roads, not detours), and the effectiveness of Russia's radars and electronic warfare systems being undermined due to systematic Ukrainian targeting. The Russian mobile anti-air defence teams assigned to protect the supply lines have themselves become the target of Ukrainian drone strikes, and have much more frequently been observed to flee, or forced to abandon their positions, rather than successfully counter-attacking and shooting down incoming Ukrainian drones.