Battle of Chupan-Ata was a military engagement between the Russian Empire and the Emirate of Bukhara that took place during the Russian conquest of Central Asia on 1 May 1868.
After failed negotiations, and repeated raids from the Emirate, the Russian army commenced a new campaign in spring of 1868 to decisively defeat the Emir.
The Russian Army, led by Konstantin Kaufmann and Alexander Abramov, marched from Yan-Kurgan towards Samarkand. The Russian army arrived sooner than the Emir could fortify his positions and after a quick shock attack the Emir was forced off the heights.
The battle allowed the Russian army to capture Samarkand and integrate it into the Russian Empire. It was the first significant engagement of the 1868 campaign against Bukhara.
Following the capture of Samarkand, the Russian army would win more battles against the Emirate including the Battle of Zerabulak and the Defence of Samarkand. The 1868 campaign decisively defeated Emir Muzaffar causing the Emirate of Bukhara to become a dependent protectorate of the Russian Empire.
Background
Previous campaigns and battles In the 1860s, the Russian army won several victories including:
Battle of Ican 1864 Siege of Tashkent 1865 Siege of Khujand 1866 Battle of Irjar 1866
After a series of defeats, the Emir made peace with Russia; however, treaty negotiations were slow and the ceasefire terms were not honoured.
State of the Russian army By the spring of 1868, the Russian army in the Syr-Darya region consisted of:
11 infantry battalions Four batteries of field artillery - with 32 guns 2100 Cossacks from Orenburg and Ural One company of sappers Two companies of fortress artillery with 177 guns.
However, there was a shortage of troops and the Russian numbers were insufficient in the region. The primary reason for this shortage was the high incidence of illness and disease among the troops. The year 1867 was particularly difficult in this regard. Reinforcements dispatched from the Orenburg Line in early spring to replenish the region's forces suffered greatly due to the harsh hot climate and inexperience of the commanders.Terentyev, 1903, p. 408.
Fever spread rapidly among the troops, who were exhausted by the labor of constructing quarters, guard duty, and marches. Overcrowded quarters and the lack of clean water combined with physical exhaustion contributed to the rising number of sick soldiers. The region had a shortage of infirmary space, medicines, doctors, and medical assistants. Moreover, the winters of 1867 and 1868 were exceptionally rainy, which increased the spread of disease. During these months, over 12,000 men were admitted to the infirmaries, and 820 died - the average monthly death toll was nearly 130. Sickness was most prevalent among the infantry stationed on the front line near Jizzakh.Terentyev, 1903, p. 409.
The natives reported to the Emir that the Russian army was weakened and he saw that moment as an opportunity.
Bukharan army By the spring of 1868, the Bukharan army consisted of 12 000 to 13 000 infantry, 1500 artilerists with 150 artillery pieces, and 2000 to 3000 cavalrymen. A small part of army was equipped with old flintlock and matchlock guns. Most of the army was equipped with melee weapons including batiks, spears, and sabers. The Emirate had a conscription system which formed and replenished the regular army. In wartime, the Emir's forces grew considerabley through the addition of militia from cities and tribes. However, the number of militia depended on the popularity of the war. In appearance, the militiamen differed in no way from the rest of the peaceful population in the region.Terentyev, 1903, p. 409-410.
Peace talks fail & Preparation for the campaign By April 9, the Emir still had not sent the ratification of the treaty. Menawhile, he was covertly gathering his troops near Samarkand.Terentyev, 1903, p. 411-412.
By April 1868, in the area closest to Bukhara, the Russian army had:
2000 men at Yan-Kurgan 800 men at Ura-Tyube 1500 men at Khujand 2000 men at Tashkent
Total - 6300 menTerentyev, 1903, p. 413.
Those numbers were enough to protect each of the strongholds, but it was insufficient for systematic defensive warfare. On April 14, the Russian commanders started to gather troops in Jizzakh by calling for soldiers from other surrounding cities. Additionally, soldiers and officers who were on leave were recalled to service. New reinforcements were requested to be dispatched from the Orenburg Line.Terentyev, 1903, p. 413.
On the night of April 14–15, two hours before dawn, a large band of Bukharan men, attacked the Russian camp near Jizzakh. The Russian troops, alerted by an alarm, quickly rose and repulsed the attack with rifle and artillery fire.Terentyev, 1903, p. 414.
By April 27, the following forces were gathered in Jizzakh:Terentyev, 1903, p. 414-415.
16 companies of infantry 6 artillery pieces 600 Cossacks Half a company of engineers One platoon of a light battery One company of Afghan volunteers
The army had an adequate stocks of ammunition and supplies. The army hired a huge number of local arba carriages to transport supplies and artillery. The Russians could not secure a mobile field hospital due to a lack of hospital supplies and because the Russian army relied on local resources during their campaigns.Terentyev, 1903, p. 415.
Throughout the night of the 26th-27th, there was extremely heavy rain, and toward dawn such a violent hurricane arose that many of the officers' tents were blown away. However, by seven o'clock the rain stopped and at eight o'clock the Russian army marched out of Jizzakh.
March towards Samarkand The rain turned the road into a quagmire, which slowed down the Russian transport. The Russians crossed mountains and flooded rivers, which further slowed their march. Halfway along the route, the advance halted at the place known as Timur's Gates and at four o'clock the entire army arrived at Yan-Kurgan. April 28 and 29 were spent on site as final preparations were made for the campaign. Soldiers who fell ill during the march were transported to Jizzakh. Meanwhile, envoys from Samarkand, and the commanders of the Bukharan troops, were constantly sending letters to Kaufmann, which requested that he does not begin the campaign and instead wait a little longer until the Emir sent the treaty terms. According to Terentyev, those letters were sent in attempt to buy time.Terentyev, 1903, p. 416-417.
On April 30, at four o'clock in the morning the Russian army marched to Samarkand.
The Russian army that marched to Samarkand consisted of the following:
21 companies of infantry 16 artillery pieces 500 Cossacks
Total - 3500 menTerentyev, 1903, p. 417.
A rearguard was left at Yan-Kurgan to protect communications with Jizzakh.Terentyev, 1903, p. 417.
Bukharan envoys tried to stall the Russian advance while also performing reconnaissance for the Emir. The heat grew increasingly and the Russian army quickly ran out of water. Some soldiers were so thirsty that discipline collapsed and they resorted to drinking water from dirty puddles. At five o'clock in the evening the detachment arrived at the locality of Tash-Kupryuk (“Stone Bridge”).Terentyev, 1903, p. 417.
Battle
Russian army arrives at Chupan-Ata On the morning of May 1, the Russian army continued marching towards Samarkand. They encountered more Bukharan envoys and abandoned villages along the road. Some Russian soldiers fell ill due to drinking water from dirty puddles. The Russian vanguard encoutnered a small detachment of Bukharan soldiers. After a failure in negotiation, the first shots were fired. Two hundred Cossacks arrived to aid the vanguard, causing the Bukharans to retreat. Soon, the Russian army arrived to the Zarafshon river.Terentyev, 1903, p. 418.
The Emir had a plan to construct a dam on the Zarafshon river in order to flood the fields at the foot of Chupan-Ata. By doing so, he hoped to bog down the Russian advance and to get an advantage in the battle. However, the Russian army arrived before the dam was built. The Russian vanguard, forced through the orchards and drove any Bukharan soldiers across the river. Four hundred Cossack, along with four light artillery pieces and one rocket launcher, engaged the Bukharan cavalry, which was forced onto the left bank of the river. The Bukharan artillery was ineffective in providing support for the cavalry. The Russian vanguard halted between the channels of the river, at a distance of one and a half verst the heights occupied by the Bukharans.Terentyev, 1903, p. 419.
Bukharan positions Chupan-Ata was located near the stony bed of the Zarafshon, which was divided into numerous deep and swift channels. The Chupan-Ata heights towered above in a high, sheer precipice against the left bank of the Zarafshon. The heights had a chapel located on its summit. Bukharan infantry occupied both the summit and the foot of the heights while the cavalry was spread unevenly in the area. All three roads leading to Samarkand were guarded by Bukharan artillery. One battery of 20 artillery pieces was positioned in the centre. Six more cannons were positioned to the left and fired upon the crossing of the Zarafshon along the road that skirted the heights on the northern side. Another six cannons were positioned on the right to fire upon the third road, which ran south of the first two. While waiting for the main army to arrive, the Russian vanguard sent an ultimatum to the Bukharans. The ultimatum demanded that the Bukharans withdraw from the heights within two hours if they wanted to continue negotiations. After two hours, there was no response and the main Russian army arrived. The infantry formed in battle order while the transport train was built into a wagon fort. After 45 minutes, the Bukharan army opened fire with cannons and rifles. The smoke revealed the position of all Bukharan batteries. Kaufmann spent 15 minutes making observations, then he ordered the infantry to attack.Terentyev, 1903, p. 419-420.
Storming Chupan-Ata
Russian battle order The Russian centre line consisted of six companies of the 5th and 9th Turkestan Line Battalions. The infantry was supported by eight field guns, four on each flank. The reserve of the right flank consisted of three companies of the 8th Battalion, two companies of riflemen, and one company of Afghan volunteers. The reserve of the left flank consisted of three companies of the 4th Battalion and half a company of engineers. Four hundred Cossacks, with four guns and a rocket battery, served as the general reserve. The Russian wagon fort was guarded by four companies of the 6th Battalion, four cannons, and fifty Cossacks. The Russian centre was commanded by General Golovachev, who personally led the troops toward the heights. He was ordered to attack two points of the enemy position - the right flank and the center. The Russian troops on the left flank, under the command of Colonel Abramov, moved against the right flank of the Bukharan position. The heights of Chupan-Ata had few places suitable for an assault. The Russian army did not know the location of all river fords. Moreover, the left flank of the Bukharan position was impregnable because of the steepness of the cliffs.Terentyev, 1903, p. 420-421.
Russian attack