Foreign involvement in the Sudanese civil war has been rampant, with many countries having been involved heavily in supplying aid and arms to either side of the war. Sudan's de facto army Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has mostly received funding and military support from countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Iran and Egypt. While its rival, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has received major funding from countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya, Uganda, Chad and Ethiopia. Nordic Africa Institute describes the war as shaped not only by internal rivalries but also by the involvement of external actors providing financial, military, and diplomatic support to the warring parties, contributing to dynamics resembling a proxy war.

In June 2024, a briefing by Amnesty International stated that the constant flow of foreign weapons is fueling the war and breaching the Darfur arms embargo. The organization found that the recently manufactured or transferred weapons and ammunition were being imported in large quantities into Sudan from China, Russia, Turkey, Yemen, the UAE and Serbia. The weapons supply has impacted the war by causing massive civilian displacement and a humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Both warring sides were using Chinese-manufactured advanced drone jammers, mortars and anti-materiel rifles. The RSF were also reported to be using recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers (APCs) from the UAE.

Foreign arms supplies and aid to the SAF Egypt

On 15 April 2023, RSF forces claimed, via Twitter, to have taken Egyptian troops prisoner near Merowe, and a military plane carrying markings of the Egyptian Air Force (EAF). Initially, no official explanation was given for the Egyptian soldiers' presence, while Egypt and Sudan have had military cooperation due to diplomatic tensions with Ethiopia. Later on, the Egyptian Armed Forces stated that around 200 of its soldiers were in Sudan to conduct exercises with the Sudanese military. Around that time, the SAF reportedly encircled RSF forces in Merowe airbase. As a result, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that it was following the situation as a precaution for the safety of its personnel. The RSF later stated that it would cooperate in repatriating the soldiers to Egypt. On 19 April, the RSF stated that it had moved the soldiers to Khartoum and would hand them over when the "appropriate opportunity" arose. Of the captured Egyptian troops, 177 were released and flown back to Egypt aboard three Egyptian military planes that took off from Khartoum airport later in the day. The remaining 27 soldiers, who were from the Egyptian Air Force, were sheltered at the Egyptian embassy and later evacuated.

On 16 April 2023, the RSF claimed that its troops in Port Sudan were attacked by foreign aircraft and issued a warning against any foreign interference. According to former CIA analyst Cameron Hudson, Egyptian fighter jets were a part of these bombing campaigns against the RSF, and Egyptian special forces units have been deployed and are providing intelligence and tactical support to the SAF. The Wall Street Journal said that Egypt had sent fighter jets and pilots to support the Sudanese military. On 17 April, satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone revealed that one Egyptian Air Force MiG-29M2 fighter jet had been destroyed and two others had been damaged or destroyed while stationed at Merowe Airbase. A Sudanese Air Force Guizhou JL-9 was among the destroyed aircraft. After initial confusion, the RSF accepted the explanation that Egyptian combat and support personnel were conducting exercises with the Sudanese military before the outbreak of hostilities.

Egypt's position is driven primarily by national security concerns, including stability along its southern border, Nile water security, and the regional balance of power. Cairo has long viewed the SAF as its most reliable institutional partner, reflecting decades of cooperation on border security and counterterrorism. As the RSF expanded its capabilities during the war, Egypt increasingly perceived it as a destabilising force, particularly if it advanced toward northern Sudan. These concerns, heightened by tensions with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), have reinforced Egypt's preference for a unified Sudanese state and its opposition to fragmentation.

Since at least mid-2025, drones launched from an air base in Egypt’s Western Desert, along the border with Sudan, have supported the SAF by striking RSF targets. This marked Egypt’s direct entry into the war; before this, support for the Sudanese government was primarily diplomatic.

Eritrea

Eritrea is seen as an ally of the SAF, providing military support in Sudan's eastern borders. During a state visit to Asmara in November 2024, al-Burhan thanked President Isaias Afwerki for Eritrea's support to the SAF. Eritrea's support is seen as a counterbalance to Eritrean opposition groups and their possibility of growing in influence under the advance of the RSF in Sudan's eastern border. President Afwerki has implied Eritrea's military readiness to respond in the case of an RSF advance to its borders.

Iran

In October 2023, Iran and Sudan resumed diplomatic relations, aligning Tehran with the SAF. A June 2024 BBC investigation revealed that Iran violated the UN arms embargo by supplying drones to both sides. Analysts see this move as part of Iran's strategy to counter UAE influence in Sudan and secure access to the Red Sea. Although Sudanese officials denied receiving Iranian aid, multiple sources — including Reuters — confirmed its impact on the battlefield.

Libya

On April 2, 2026, the head of the Libyan Army (which is aligned with the Government of National Unity) al-Namroush met with SAF representatives and offered logistical and mechanical support to the Sudanese army.

Pakistan

In January 2026, Pakistan and Sudan entered the final stages of a $1.5 billion defense deal under which Pakistan would supply 10 Karakoram-8 light attack jets, more than 200 UAVs and Kamikaze drones along with air defence systems.

In April, reports emerged of the deal being cancelled due to Saudi objections over who was to fund it. However in early August 2026, Heavy Industries Taxila delivered approximately 100 Mohafiz-V armored cars to the SAF.

Qatar

Qatar has maintained a long-standing bilateral military relationship with Sudan. Since the start of the war, it has aligned itself with the SAF, in part to counter the UAE, which has supported the rival RSF. Doha has also tried to discreetly supply the SAF with weapons during this conflict, with reports indicating that Qatar provided at least six Chinese warplanes to the SAF.

Russia

For much of the Sudanese civil war Russia has sent weapons to both the RSF and SAF. This began to shift during mid-2024, with the Russian government beginning to favour the SAF, concurrent with Russia–SAF discussions around the construction of a Russian naval base north of Port Sudan. The same year, Russia began delivering large quantities of weapons, jet components, fuel, and drones, to the Sudanese government in its effort against the RSF, allowing the SAF to recapture parts of the capital, Khartoum, from the RSF.

Russia's involvement is also driven by broader strategic and economic interests, including efforts to secure a naval presence on the Red Sea and access to Sudanese gold resources. These resources have been particularly valuable in mitigating the impact of western sanctions. In addition to its military engagement, Russia has used its diplomatic position, including at the United Nations, to protect its interests and resist ceasefire initiatives.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has provided military support and financial aid to the SAF, although it officially denies doing so, in an effort to counterbalance the influence of the UAE, which supports the RSF. Several analyses have consequently described the conflict as a proxy war between the two Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia's engagement is also shaped by security concerns related to the Red Sea crisis and a preference for a unified Sudanese state capable of containing armed groups and preventing regional spillover. Saudi policy has remained broadly aligned with the SAF and coordinated with Egypt, reflecting shared concerns over fragmentation and border instability. Its support has largely taken diplomatic and political forms, avoiding direct military escalation.

In March 2025, al-Burhan visited Saudi Arabia in his first trip outside Sudan since the SAF retook Khartoum. There, he thanked Saudi support for Sudanese unity and the fight against the RSF.

Somalia

The government of Somalia, led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has maintained military ties with the SAF during the war, agreeing to provide military training and resources to the Sudanese forces. In January 2025, the Somali government agreed to host SAF troops at Camp TURKSOM for training, as part of a plan jointly supported by the governments of Somalia, Turkey, Egypt and Eritrea to bolster military support to the SAF.

Turkey

Turkey's engagement reflects a combination of strategic ambition and commercial interests in Sudan and the wider Red Sea region. In addition to its role as a security partner, Ankara has sought to expand its economic footprint, including potential access to mineral resources and port infrastructure. This dual approach, combining defence cooperation with diplomatic outreach, has allowed Turkey to increase its influence while maintaining flexibility in its relations with different actors.

Turkey appears to be engaging with both sides, notably through Baykar, owned by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's son-in-law, selling $120 million worth of weapons, 6 TB2 UCAV's, 3 ground control stations and 600 warheads to the SAF in 2023, violating US and EU sanctions. Meanwhile, Arca Defense, another Turkish company, had extensive contact with RSF's procurement officer, though it denies selling weapons, adding complexity to Turkey's role. Turkey's interests include expanding military and diplomatic ties in the Horn of Africa, offering to mediate between Sudan and the UAE in December 2024.

Ukraine

On 19 September 2023, CNN reported that it was "likely" that Ukrainian special forces were behind a series of drone strikes and a ground operation directed against the Wagner Group-backed RSF near Khartoum on 8 September. Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence, stated in an interview on 22 September that he could neither confirm or deny Ukraine's involvement in the conflict, but said that Ukraine "will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals... sooner or later".

On 6 November 2023, the Kyiv Post released drone footage of what it claimed was Ukrainian special forces attacking Wagner Group personnel in an unidentified urban area in Sudan with an explosive projectile, which was believed to have been taken about two weeks before its publication. Two months later on 30 January 2024, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian special forces had launched three drone strikes targeting the Wagner Group and other Russian organisations in Sudan as well as their Sudanese partners in the preceding weeks. The Kyiv Post released a report on 5 February 2024 with a video showing the aftermath of an attack allegedly by Ukrainian special forces on a Wagner Group unit which had purportedly suffered several deaths and the capture of at least one member of the unit who was seen being interrogated on camera.

On October 2, 2025, the SAF claimed to have killed Ukrainian mercenaries during clashes with the RSF in the Darfur region.

Foreign arms supplies and aid to the RSF

Central African Republic