The General Staff of the Ottoman Empire (Ottoman Turkish: ) was the title held by the highest-ranking officer in the Ottoman Army after the Minister of War between 1880 and 1922. In terms of duties and responsibilities, the office was subordinated to the office of the Serasker between 1880 and 1908, and to the Ministry of War between 1808 and 1922. The office attained an autonomous structure from 1908 onwards. The institution was officially abolished in 1922 with the liquidation of the Istanbul government.
Early history
Precursors and early concepts
The early 18th century saw shifts in the regional balance of power, resulting in a growing engagement of Ottoman political and military elites with contemporary European military doctrines and technologies. The century was characterised by increasing momentum of institutional reorganisation and technological adaptation, but a systematic and centralised restructuring of the military apparatus became a primary state policy under Sultan Selim III. The 19th century was a period of large-scale institutional change, characterised by the demolition of old military structures and the creation of new formations. In this context, Ottoman administrative and military authorities sought to assimilate Western European organisational models, tactical doctrines and technical innovations to consolidate state authority and protect territorial integrity against external threats.
European influence and early organization
In 1843 the jurisdiction of the Military Council (Ottoman Turkish: Dâr-ı Şûrâ-yı Askerî) was expanded and the Ordnance Council (Ottoman Turkish: Meclis-i Tophâne-i Âmire) was established to reorganise the artillery branch. Simultaneously, the authority of the Military Ministry (Ottoman Turkish: Bâb-ı Seraskerî) was strengthened; the Serasker (Commander-in-chief), the commander-in-chief of the regular army (Nizâmiye) was formally appointed the commander of all land forces. The Serasker's bureaucratic rank was raised to be equal to the rank of the Grand Vizier and the Sheikh ul-Islam in terms of administration. In 1845 the newly established Gendarmerie Marshalsy (in Ottoman Turkish, Zabtiye Müşirliği) took over the internal security and public order in Istanbul and the provinces. In 1848, the Army of Iraq and the Army of Hejaz were created, following the organisational structure set forth in the 1843 Regulation that had divided the Ottoman land forces into five regional armies. Structurally the Ottoman army was reorganised and the French infantry and cavalry manuals were adopted with Prussian tactical regulations being used for the artillery. Conscription policies were also formalised, with quota distributions based on regional demographics, creating a system in which one eligible individual per household was conscripted, while only children were exempt from military service.
The Ottoman army was compelled to accept foreign military aid because of the absence of highly skilled staff officers to implement far-reaching organisational reforms. Sultan Abdul Hamid II, diplomatically wary of France and Great Britain, found a willing partner in the newly unified German Empire, which was eager to establish itself on the international stage. One of the main geopolitical reasons for the acquisition of Prussian military expertise was the fact that the Ottoman statesmen saw Berlin, unlike other European powers, not as a threat to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the immediate future. The Congress of Berlin upheld territorial losses under European pressure, but the German leadership did not appear to have immediate expansionist intentions toward Ottoman territories. The Prussian army’s decisive victories against the Austrian Empire in 1866-1867 and the Second French Empire in 1870-1871 had also made the Prussian general staff system a global model and forced the Ottoman administrators to look to this military establishment for help.
The Ottoman request to Prussia for military organization and training in the reign of Abdul Hamid II was not without precedent. In 1798, at the orders of Sultan Selim III, Prussian Colonel Adolf von Goetze came to Istanbul to inspect Ottoman military units. Similarly Helmuth von Moltke (later Field Marshal and Prussian General Staff) was a military advisor and instructor in the Ottoman army from 1835 to 1839. Five years after Moltke’s departure, the Prussian Colonel von Kuczkonski arrived in Istanbul to train the Ottoman law enforcement apparatus. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire had always turned to Prussian military know-how to modernise its troops.
Under Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman government once more sought Prussian officers, technical experts, and military specialists to supervise reforms of the army. This demand for trained personnel was not limited to purely combat roles, but also into the technical and administrative sectors. The diplomatic reorientation initiated by the Sultan, combined with the later Eastern policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II (Weltpolitik), established the basis for a long-term strategic alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany. Prussian officers were incorporated into the Ottoman command structure, Ottoman military cadets received advanced training in Berlin as a priority, and bilateral trade increased significantly. Thus, Ottoman-German relations were much better than in the past. Ottoman leaders saw the partnership as a way of institutional survival and modernization, but it also served to advance German geopolitical interests in the Near East and provide a lucrative market for the German defence industries.
Prussian military mission and the Goltz era
Kaehler mission and initial reports
Sultan Abdul Hamid II sent his advisor, Major Dresysse of French origin, to the German Ambassador, Paul von Hatzfeld, in May 1880 to discuss the potential deployment of German military officers to serve in the Ottoman Empire and to request that the matter be brought to the attention of the German government. Although the German government was receptive to providing such assistance in order to expand its sphere of influence in the region, the political circumstances of the time prolonged the process of realizing Sultan Abdul Hamid II's desire. In August 1881, the Ottoman Empire renewed its request for the dispatch of German military officers. Finally, on 11 April 1882, the President of the German Military Cabinet formally notified the Foreign Ministry that the Emperor had given his consent for the deployment of four officers to Turkey. Consequently, a team of four German officers, led by Colonel Otto August Johannes Kaehler, and comprising Infantry Captain Kamphövener, Cavalry Captain von Hobe, and Artillery Captain Ristow, arrived in Turkey after being granted leave from their respective units.
Upon their arrival, the military mission faced immediate institutional friction within the Ottoman military infrastructure. Kaehler's initial assessments heavily criticized the deep operational and cultural divide between the formally educated staff officers (mektepli) and those who had risen through the ranks without academic training (alaylı). In his comprehensive reports submitted to the Sublime Porte, Kaehler highlighted that while the senior command structure possessed theoretical familiarity with contemporary doctrines "on paper", the practical implementation (safhası) suffered from severe systemic deficiencies.
Kaehler’s attention was drawn especially to three vital structural weaknesses: the absence of shared tactical training among officers, the operational insufficiency of the "Redif" (reserve) system and, above all, the overcentralization and bureaucratization of command, which virtually suppressed tactical independence and inhibited maneuvering in the field. To remedy these problems, the mission recommended the creation of model units (numune taburları) in Istanbul to show modern Prussian tactical drills and logistical planning with the goal of improving the overall training quality of the Ottoman infantry, cavalry, and artillery branches. Yet even with these initiatives, the extensive bureaucratic resistance and the inherent instability of the administrative apparatus prevented Kaehler’s suggested structural reforms from being put into practice immediately.
The report prepared by Kaehler was as follows:
The '''Ottoman Army''' should be reorganized into a structure consisting of twelve corps and six cavalry divisions, similar to the Prussian model.
Each corps should have a mix of '''Nizamiye''' and '''Redif''' divisions, which would be the first to be mobilized in times of war.
The report noted that officer training was inadequate and that practical training should be given more emphasis. It also recommended that the transition from non-commissioned officer to commissioned officer should be completely halted, and that the '''Ottoman General Staff''' should be reorganized according to the Prussian model.
Goltz Era
Although the initial initiatives of the Kaehler mission yielded limited immediate structural results for the Ottoman military, the Sublime Porte continued to prioritize the improvement of its military education system by seeking further assistance from Berlin. Early in 1883, the Ottoman government requested the deployment of a high-ranking officer from the German Empire to oversee military instruction and academic curriculum. Major Baron Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz was selected by the German command for this mission. Arriving in Istanbul on 18 June 1883, Goltz formally entered Ottoman service on 25 August, beginning a tenure that would deeply influence Ottoman military modernization. Appointed as the Inspector of Military Schools (), Goltz subsequently assumed the leadership of the German military mission following the death of Colonel Otto Kaehler. Concurrently, he was appointed as the Assistant Chief of the Ottoman General Staff ().
During his tenure, Goltz engaged comprehensively with various facets of the Ottoman armed forces, focusing heavily on the restructuring of the military academies to elevate the professional standards of the officer corps. He systematically reorganized the curricula of the military schools and authored several influential technical manuals published in Ottoman Turkish, including Staff Duties in War and Peace (), Staff Duties on Maps (), Staff Duties in the Field (), Tactical Handbook (), and Instructional Techniques ().
To ensure that newly commissioned officers possessed practical command capabilities, Goltz emphasized field exercises and applied tactical training over purely theoretical instruction. His advisory role extended into broader defensive infrastructure, contributing significantly to the drafting of the 1886 Conscription Law, the structural reorganization of the reserve (Redif) units, the streamlining of mobilization protocols, and the development of strategic transport infrastructure, including road and railway construction. Serving as a military advisor from 1883 until 1895, the Prussian general played a decisive role in integrating Prussian military doctrine into the mindset of the Ottoman officer corps. Simultaneously, this overarching institutional consensus provided a near monopoly for German defence contractors in the Ottoman market. Goltz’s strategic and technical recommendations always coincided with the commercial and political interests of German arms producers and heavy industries.
Reforms of the Staff College and Prussian model