The Horka massacre was the murder of wounded soldiers and members of the medical staff of the Second Polish Army carried out by the Wehrmacht on 26 April 1945, in the final days of World War II, in the village of Horka near Crostwitz.
During the fighting in Lusatia in April 1945, the Polish 9th Infantry Division managed to advance to the outskirts of Dresden, but was soon surrounded. The order to turn east and join the main forces of the Second Polish Army came too late, and the map with the division's route accidentally fell into German hands. During the retreat, the 15th Independent Medical Battalion, which was evacuating the wounded from the divisional medical point, was surprised by the enemy while stopping in Horka. A massacre ensued, during which soldiers of the Panzergrenadier Division Brandenburg, likely supported by collaborators from the Free Ukraine 104th Anti-Tank Brigade, murdered between 150 and 300 Poles.
Battle of Bautzen
On the night of 10–11 April 1945, units of the Second Polish Army took up positions on the eastern bank of the Lusatian Neisse, relieving the Soviet 13th Army. As part of the upcoming Battle of Berlin, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front entrusted the Polish operational formation with the task of capturing Dresden and reaching the Elbe.In Polish literature, the Second Polish Army is usually assigned the task of solely covering the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front. According to , however, the content of Marshal Ivan Konev's directive No. 00211/op of 8 April 1945 clearly indicates that the Polish combat group was to participate in the attack on Dresden. The same task was given to the neighboring Red Army formations – the 52nd Army and elements of the 5th Guards Army.
On 13 April, the first subunits of the Second Polish Army began combat operations aimed at reconnaissance of enemy positions and capturing of bridgeheads on the western bank of the Lusatian Neisse. On the morning of 16 April, the main forces of the army launched an attack. After three days of fierce fighting, the Poles managed to break through the main line of German defense, advancing about 30 kilometers deep into a 13-kilometer-wide attack zone. It became possible to move on to pursuit operations.
Soon, however, the situation of the Second Polish Army began to complicate. The German Army Group Centre, commanded by Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, was preparing a counterattack from the vicinity of Görlitz and Löbau against the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Meanwhile, Marshal Ivan Konev, preoccupied with the offensive the Berlin, underestimated the threat emerging to the south. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which was originally supposed to strike in a south-westerly direction with the task of entering the rear of Army Group Centre and pinning down its reserves, was directed north-west on the night of 16–17 April. The 4th Guards Tank Corps, which was originally supposed to participate in the offensive on Dresden, was also redirected to the northwest on the second day of the operation. In addition, most of the forces of the 2nd Air Army were engaged in the Berlin direction, giving the Luftwaffe air superiority over Lusatia. To make matters worse, units of the 52nd Army, which were supposed to attack the left flank of the Second Polish Army, were blocked by the Germans on bridgeheads on the western bank of the Lusatian Neisse. Only the 7th Guards Mechanised Corps and the 254th Motor Rifle Division (the so-called Korchagin Group) managed to break through the front, but they soon became embroiled in fierce fighting in Bautzen.
On the third day of the operation, the commander of the Second Polish Army, General Karol Świerczewski, became aware of the threat emerging on his left flank. He managed to obtain the consent of the 1st Ukrainian Front command to temporarily switch to defense. Only the 9th Infantry Division and the 3rd Armoured Brigade, along with several smaller units, continued their advance towards Dresden, while the 1st Armoured Corps, together with the 8th Infantry Division and the entire army artillery, turned south. Thanks to these moves, the first German attack on the left flank of the Second Polish Army, carried out on 18–20 April south of Niesky, was repelled by the Poles.
After this failure, Field Marshal Schörner decided to shift the axis of attack slightly further west, towards Weißenberg and Bautzen. Meanwhile, before dawn on 21 April, Marshal Konev unexpectedly ordered the 1st Armoured Corps, together with three infantry divisions, to resume the offensive on Dresden.In Polish and foreign literature, there is a persistent opinion that it was General Karol Świerczewski, obsessed with the desire to capture Dresden, who failed to notice or disregarded the threat to the flanks of the Second Polish Army and independently decided to continue the offensive (; ). However, according to , this is contradicted by the content of Marshal Koniev's order No. 00215/op of 21 April 1945. As a result of this order, the Second Polish Army split into two groups, between which a rapidly widening gap formed. In addition, both Soviet intelligence and General Świerczewski were unaware that the enemy was also preparing a counterattack from the north, from the vicinity of Uhyst and Boxberg.
As a result, the German counteroffensive launched on 21 April led to the splitting of the Second Polish Army. The headquarters of the 5th Infantry Division were destroyed, as were the 16th Armoured Brigade and the 14th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade. Other Polish tactical units also suffered heavy losses. In this critical situation, the units of the Second Polish Army began to concentrate near Bautzen, with the aim of stopping the advance of Army Group Centre and relieving the remnants of the Korchagin Group, which had been cut off in the city.
Massacre of the medical convoy in Horka
Fighting of the 9th Infantry Division on the outskirts of Dresden
Upon learning of the successes of the German counteroffensive, the chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General Ivan Petrov, agreed to halt the advance on Dresden and return to Bautzen with the 1st Armoured Corps, the 8th Infantry Division, and most of the army's artillery. However, the Soviet general was aware that reaching the Elbe was a political priority for Stalin. Therefore, he ordered the 9th Infantry Division, together with accompanying units – part of the 9th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade, the 30th Sapper Battalion, the 44th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, and the 69th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment – to remain in their current positions.
Meanwhile, from 22 April, the 9th Infantry Division fought on the outskirts of Dresden. Within four days, the gap between the division and the main forces of the army reached a width of 40 kilometers, and German units began pushing into it. Finding itself partially surrounded, the 9th Infantry Division took up defensive positions in the Radeberg, Pulsnitz, and Bretnig triangle. The Polish troops soon began to experience a shortage of ammunition and fuel, while having to repel attacks by the enemy, who was trying at all costs to destroy the advanced Polish group and thus eliminate the immediate threat to the capital of Saxony. Particularly fierce fighting took place around Großröhrsdorf and Bretnig. On the night of 24–25 April, after recapturing the first of these towns, the Germans murdered 23 seriously wounded soldiers in the captured medical station of the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment (according to Leszek Kania, members of the medical staff who remained with the wounded were also killed).
Ultimately, given the difficult situation of the main army forces repelling Schörner's attacks north of Bautzen, General Świerczewski ordered the 9th Infantry Division to withdraw from Dresden and join the rest of the Polish formation. A liaison officer, Major Konstantin Fedoseyev, was sent with the appropriate order to the division headquarters in Pulsnitz. After delivering the message, the major decided, despite warnings from Polish officers, to return to the army headquarters via a motorway partially occupied by Germans. As a result, on the way back, his car was fired upon by the enemy. The driver survived and managed to escape, but Fedoseyev was killed on the spot. Next to his body, the Germans found a map with the marked route of the 9th Infantry Division's retreat.
Massacre
While the 9th Infantry Division was preparing to retreat, its divisional medical point was deployed in Pulsnitz. Military medical personnel were caring for 282 wounded soldiers. Colonel Aleksander Łaski made his chief of staff, Colonel Grzegorz Kuczmisty, and his deputy for rear affairs, Lieutenant Colonel W. Jóźwienkiewicz, responsible for their safety. The latter was the officer who issued the official order to evacuate the divisional medical point from Pulsnitz.
Some sources suggest that Horka – a small village a few kilometers from Crostwitz – was to become the temporary resting place for the divisional medical point, according to Lieutenant Colonel Jóźwienkiewicz's orders. Other authors, however, state that the wounded and medical personnel were ultimately to be evacuated to Königswartha, located further to the northeast. The evacuation plan was to have the 15th Independent Medical BattalionIt was one of five independent medical battalions assigned to the infantry division of the Second Polish Army. Their main task was to organize divisional medical stations and evacuate the wounded from individual regimental medical stations to them. During the Battle of Bautzen, the commander of the 15th Independent Medical Battalion was Lieutenant (Doctor) Igor Dzieszuk Ciszewski (). Records in the preserved register show that 124 non-commissioned officers and privates served in the battalion, 98 of whom took part in the fighting on the outskirts of Dresden. Over 60% of them came from Kresy (). move eastward along side roads and forest paths – through Elstra, Panschwitz and Kuckau, Horka, and Neschwitz.
The 15th Independent Medical Battalion was mainly equipped with horse-drawn wagons, so Lieutenant Colonel Jóźwienkiewicz assigned the 13th Motor Transport Company to support it. Thus, the evacuation column consisted of about 15–20 trucks, accompanied by horse-drawn wagons and one passenger car. Over 300 people, including 282 wounded, were loaded onto the vehicles marked with Red Cross symbols. Some authors state that the command of the 9th Infantry Division assigned one company of infantry or a "reinforced reconnaissance company" to escort the 15th Independent Medical Battalion. Zbigniew and Krzysztof Kopociński, on the other hand, claim that the medical column was moving without an escort, which they consider to be an "unforgivable error" on the part of Lieutenant Colonel Jóźwienkiewicz and other officers responsible for the evacuation of the wounded.
states that the 15th Independent Medical Battalion, together with the wounded, left Pulsnitz at dawn on 26 April as the first of the 9th Infantry Division's units. , claimed that due to the need to prepare vehicles for transporting the wounded, the column did not leave until after 4:00 PM (which, however, contradicts the accounts of the residents of Horka). Zbigniew and Krzysztof Kopociński assume that the 15th Independent Medical Battalion left Pulsnitz at 12:00 PM or shortly thereafter. Jacek Domański also indicates 12:00 PM as the start of the evacuation of the wounded.