Ukrainization in the 1920s and 1930s was a policy of Ukrainization (Ukrainisation) by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (initially named "Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)"), aimed at neutralising the aspirations of the Ukrainian people towards independence (as they briefly enjoyed during the Ukrainian People's Republic, 1917–1921), and strengthening Bolshevik power in the Ukrainian SSR in the interwar period. It envisaged the use of national personnel in Soviet, party and public institutions and organisations, the expansion of the Communist Party's ideological influence on Ukrainian society through the use of the Ukrainian language and the promotion of ‘proletarian elements’ in national culture.
The interwar Soviet policy of Ukrainization was an integral part of the Korenizatsiia policy, proclaimed by the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1923, as the official political course after the formation of the unitary USSR, and the factual elimination of the international legal personality of the national republics.Кульчицький: У Росії ведеться пропаганда, що українці й росіяни — уже не братні народи, а один народ // Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, Інтерв'ю з доктором історичних наук, професором, заввідділу історії України 20—30 років XX століття Institute of History of Ukraine, Stanislav Vladyslavovych Kulchytskyj.А. Авторханов. ИМПЕРИЯ КРЕМЛЯ. Советский тип колониализма
Soviet "Ukrainisation" differed significantly from the previous Ukrainisation policies and practices of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Ukrainian State, and the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic, as well as from the Ukrainisation measures resorted to by the national-democratic forces during the period of Tsarist Russia's existence.
During the Tsarist era, the struggle for the Ukrainian national cause was mainly fought in the cultural sphere: for schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, Ukrainian-language printing, etc. Ukrainian national governments used the term "Ukrainisation" to refer to the processes of "derussification," the return of the people to their native language and culture, their own historical traditions and, most importantly, their own statehood.
The Soviet policy of "Ukrainisation" was one of the means of strengthening power for the Bolshevik leadership, rather than the goal of their activities. It did not envisage the development of Ukrainian culture on the basis of universal human values or the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state. The imperial state was not a driving force behind the Ukrainian national revival of the 1920s.
Mykola Skrypnyk was particularly active in promoting "Ukrainisation", as was Oleksandr Shumsky.
Reasons for Ukrainisation
The main reason for Soviet "indigenisation" was the Bolsheviks' attempt to win over the Ukrainian masses to their side, since during the Ukrainian–Soviet War of 1917–1921, most Ukrainians preferred national slogans. The national liberation movement continued to exist underground after the end of the war, threatening to break out into the open. Among the reasons that forced the Bolsheviks to make significant national concessions were economic ones.
The introduction of "war communism" returned the country to the days of the so-called natural economy, resulting in the degradation of the economic system. To save the situation, the New Economic Policy was announced in 1921. In Ukraine, which played a significant role in supplying food to the central regions of Russia, trade replaced the centralised supply system. Therefore, the authorities needed to calm the peasantry, which had been stirred up by the events of 1917–1920 and was the main producer of food.
Foreign policy circumstances also played a significant role in the transition to the implementation of reforms in the sphere of national policy. Hopes for a world revolution diminished as the international situation stabilised. Therefore, attention was focused on national liberation movements that could lead to revolutionary situations in capitalist countries. In addition, given that part of the territories inhabited by Ukrainians were part of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, the Soviet government was not opposed to using the Ukrainian population as a revolutionary element.
A certain role in changing Bolshevik tactics on the national question was played by the fact that its fair resolution was one of the basic tenets of Marxism. Since the USSR was seen by millions of people as the embodiment of Marxist views, ignoring the national question for too long would mean losing its attractive image. The transition to a policy of "indigenisation" was also part of a compromise on the creation of a unitary Soviet state – the USSR. Without granting political and economic rights to the republics, the central government only made concessions in the national-cultural sphere.
Among the reasons for Ukrainisation officially announced in the party and Soviet press was an attempt to bring the Russified city closer to the Ukrainian village, to establish closer ties between the working class and the peasantry, and thus to promote the stability of Ukrainian society, which was a necessary prerequisite for building a "communist future." Subjective factors also played an important role. A number of central government leaders speculated on the national question. During internal party struggles, they tried to win over the Bolsheviks of the national republics, primarily the Ukrainian ones.
Having emerged as a necessity due to certain circumstances, "Ukrainisation" determined the course of its development. It was programmed to be implemented within certain limits, beyond which it was classified as "bourgeois nationalism". However, under the influence of the national-cultural movement, which encompassed millions of people and which it itself empowered and supported with certain legal guarantees, the policy of "Ukrainisation" went beyond its intended limits. The national-cultural movement became a catalyst for Soviet "Ukrainisation," pushing the state apparatus and the Communist Party to implement Ukrainisation measures. In the 1920s, two forms of "Ukrainisation" emerged in the Ukrainian SSR – official and popular – which took place in parallel and influenced each other. The official one was described by the party leadership as "Bolshevik," while the popular one was described as "Petliuran".
The policy of "Ukrainisation" contradicted the imperial ambitions of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), but was forced by the hostile attitude towards Soviet power on the part of Ukrainians, whose national consciousness had grown over the previous decades, and especially as a result of the national revolution of 1917–1920, as well as the threat of intervention by Poland, supported by the Entente. Given these dangers (similar to those in other republics), the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was forced to make concessions to national movements, primarily the Ukrainian one, and after the first years of openly imperialist policies, in a series of congress resolutions, 4 conferences, it recognised the finality of introducing the native languages of the national republics in schools and administration, while simultaneously increasing the proportion of local personnel in all areas of the economy and culture. As a result of this policy change, on 27 July 1923, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree "On measures for the Ukrainisation of school, educational and cultural institutions," according to which the Ukrainian language was to be introduced in all types of schools with specific deadlines for their "Ukrainisation."
The second decree, adopted by the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR on 1 August 1923, "On measures for the equality of languages and assistance in the development of the Ukrainian language," required the introduction of the Ukrainian language at all levels of government. However, both of these decrees (although adopted on the basis of resolutions of the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) (17–24 April 1923), at which representatives of the national republics raised the national question very sharply) met with resistance within the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (CP(b)U), where Ukrainians were a minority at the time (the CP(b)U was then composed predominantly of Russians and persons of other nationalities). More intensive "Ukrainisation" began only in 1925, when, under pressure from the Ukrainian part of the CPU(b)U, the secretaries of its Central Committee E. Kviring and D. Lebed, who had previously openly opposed any concessions to Ukrainian culture, were removed from their posts as secretaries of its Central Committee.
In April 1925, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine adopted a resolution on "Ukrainisation", which stated that "the task of strengthening the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat in Ukraine requires the entire party to make every effort to master the Ukrainian language and promote Ukrainisation...". On 30 April 1925, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a joint resolution on measures for the urgent implementation of the complete "Ukrainisation" of the Soviet apparatus,Resolution of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR No. 202 of 30 April 1925 «Про заходи термінового переведення повної українізації радянського апарату» and the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine on 30 May passed a resolution on the "Ukrainisation" of the party and professional apparatus and Soviet institutions. The main role in the subsequent implementation of "Ukrainisation" was played by the People's Commissariat of Education (which at that time also oversaw all areas of culture), headed until 1926 by Oleksandr Shumsky, and after his removal Mykola Skrypnyk. The secretary of the Central Commission for Ukrainisation of the Council apparatus under the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR was Anton Prykhodko.
Ukrainisation of the workforce and population
In a relatively short period of time, significant changes took place as a result of "Ukrainisation": thanks to Ukrainisation measures (in conjunction with other socio-economic processes) in schools, cultural institutions, the press, etc., and the influx of Ukrainian population from villages and towns, the Ukrainian SSR began to take on a Ukrainian character. Particularly noticeable changes in the national composition of the population and the use of the Ukrainian language took place in large industrial cities. From 1923 to 1933, the number of Ukrainians in Kharkiv increased from 38% to 50%, in Kyiv from 27.1% to 42.1%, in Dnipro from 16% to 48%, in Odesa from 6.6% to 17.4%, and in Luhansk from 7% to 31%.
As a result of this process, changes also took place in the national composition of the workforce. The total number of 1.1 million workers in the Ukrainian SSR in 1926 was divided by nationality as follows: 55% Ukrainians (4% of the total Ukrainian population), 29% Russians (25% of their total population), 9% Jews (15% of their total population) and 7% others. However, only 42% of the total number of Ukrainian workers were employed in industry in cities, with the rest working in agriculture, transport, etc. The situation was somewhat better on the railways, where 69% were Ukrainians, half of whom spoke Ukrainian (in industry, only 22%).