The Portuguese conquest of the Gaza Empire was an armed conflict that took place in 1895 in territory that is now part of Mozambique. It was part of the Portuguese Campaigns of Pacification and Occupation and Mouzinho de Albuquerque distinguished himself by capturing the Vatua emperor, Gungunhana.
The occupation of Gaza took place during the Scramble for Africa, and Vatua power was weakened by epidemics, famine, youth emigration and internal revolts by subjugated peoples.João Paulo Oliveira e Costa, José Damião Rodrigues, Pedro Aires Oliveira: História da Expansão e do Império Português, Esfera dos Livros, 2014, p. 416.
The Marracuene and Gaza campaigns were the first of the so-called 'age of the centurions', marked by the rapid annexation of territory by experienced officers of the Portuguese Army sent to Africa ahead of large and well-equipped expeditions, which lasted until 1909.
Context The Portuguese had been active establishing forts and cities in what is now Mozambique beginning in the 16th century, namely in Sofala, Mozambique Island, Tete, Sena, Quelimane, and Lourenço Marques, modern-day Maputo. In the early 19th century, Anguni tribes migrated to the Gaza region. Among them were the Vatuas, who founded several kingdoms in territory formerly dominated by the Tsonga, who were overwhelmed and reduced to the status of tributary vassals.
After the independence of Brazil, Portugal turned to its territory in Africa, but in the 19th century, several other European powers set out to divide the African continent. Great Britain wished to expand the Cape Colony, while the British South Africa Company sought to establish itself in the Gaza region in Mozambique. One of its directors, the influential magnate Cecil Rhodes, promoted the idea of a Cape to Cairo Railway.
Gungunhana, the Vatua emperor, sought to preserve his independence by negotiating with all parties, taking advantage of traders, diplomats and missionaries to obtain weapons, luxury goods and money. As early as 1870, the Vatua had sent a delegation to visit the Natal Secretary for Native Affairs Theophilus Shepstone, to drum up trade but Shepstone refused to entertain their proposals as he considered the Gaza Nguni to be subjects of the Portuguese, which the Vatua denied.Vandervort, 2006, p. 149. In October 1890 he scored his greatest diplomatic victory, in the form of a mining and railroad concession to the British South Africa Company in exchange for a yearly subsidy and 1000 rifles.Vandervort, 2006, p. 152. The treaties negotiated between Europeans for the division of Africa in 1891 left Gungunhana squarely within the Portuguese sphere of influence however.
In Gaza, meanwhile, Gungunhana moved his capital to Manjacaze, in the low savannah between Limpopo and Inhambane, leading him into wars with the Chope people.Newitt, 1995, p. 334. The sending of young men to work in the mines of South Africa also forced the Vatua to rely increasingly on warriors from their Tonga subjects rather than Nguni warriors. The Portuguese, for their part, wished to expand Mozambique's territory, establish plantations and build railways but Gungunhana and the British South Africa Company continued to sign agreements, which worried the Portuguese government. Vatua power was weakened, however, by epidemics, famine, emigration and revolts by subjugated peoples, while the First Matabele War demonstrated that a rapid military conquest of the Gaza Empire would be possible.Newitt, 1995, p. 335.
The Tsonga revolt Between Lourenço Marques and the Gaza Empire lay the regulados da Coroa ("Petty Kingdoms of the Crown"), small Tsonga kingdoms that were a protectorate or vassals of Portugal, paid taxes to the Portuguese Crown, provided labour and auxiliary soldiers, whom the Portuguese called landins. Among the Tsongas, however, resentment against Portuguese authority was growing due to the unscrupulous behaviour of labour recruiters and Portuguese merchants.Telo, 2004, p. 16.
In 1894, several Tsongan petty kings revolted under the leadership of king Matibejana Zixaxa of Mafumo, who mobilised 1,000 warriors, while Mazul, king of Magaia, mobilised 3,500 warriors. Cheringa, Munhangua and Mutua jointly mobilised 1,300 warriors. The king of Moamba joined the revolt but withdrew soon afterwards.
The rebel kings attacked the Anguane post, 20 kilometres north of Lourenço Marques, on 23 September, at a time when only the police forces and a detachment of African troops, the Batalhão de Caçadores da África Oriental nº 3, were in the city, with just over 100 soldiers supported by another 300 armed Europeans.
Lourenço Marques was attacked, but the Tsongas were repelled.Telo, 2004, p. 18. In South Africa meanwhile, British newspapers presented the revolt as evidence that Mozambique ought be removed from Portuguese rule. On 15 October, four British warships anchored in the harbour to protect British nationals in the city; they were soon joined by the famous German cruiser Seeadler and among the Portuguese, suspicion grew that the revolt had been instigated by foreign powers, namely the United Kingdom.Telo, 2004, p. 19.
In Lisbon, the Portuguese government saw the revolt as an opportunity to organise a major expedition that would assert its control over the region.Telo, 2004, p. 17. The moment was critical, as it was close to the inauguration of the railway that would connect Lourenço Marques to Transvaal, confirming the city's importance as the best port in East Africa. Safeguarding southern Mozambique against Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company was also seen as important.Nuno Severiano Teixeira; Francisco Contente Domingues; João Gouveia Monteiro: História Militar de Portugal, Esfera dos Livros, 2017, p. 432. António Enes was appointed comissário régio or "royal commissioner", with full civil and military powers to lead an expedition that would pacify the region. Enes informed the government that it would be easy to quell the rebellion, but before leaving Lisbon he warned that it would be necessary to organise a second expedition to annex the Vátua Empire, as reports from Mozambique indicated that Gungunhana was gathering troops to attack Portuguese territory. Some argued for the establishment of a protectorate over Gungunhana, but this was not the policy advocated by Enes, the military, and the Portuguese government.
For the Marracuene campaign, 782 men left Lourenço Marques at 5 a.m., at the sound of the national anthem and cheered on by civilians. On the night from 1 to 2 February 1895, Portuguese troops camped in a square formation in the savannah north of Lourenço Marques. Towards morning, the Angolan soldiers of the 3rd Caçadores Battalion thought they recognized a missing patrol but they were suddenly attacked by Tsonga rebels who wore the missing patrolsmens uniforms. As the Angolans were pushed back, bands of rebels who were in hiding charged to break into the square and hand-to-hand combat ensued until the gap in the square was plugged and all rebels inside were neutralized one by one. At the Battle of Marracuene on 2 February 1895, the Portuguese faced 3,000-4,000 Tsongas commanded by Matibejana Zixaxa, who were routed by 6 a.m. due to the superior firepower of the Portuguese, armed with machine guns and cannon. The combat lasted half an hour. Nevertheless, the Portuguese acknowledged they had only barely avoided a disaster.
Despite the victory, heavy rain prevented the crossing of the river and the Portuguese troops were ordered to return to Lourenço Marques. After the battle however, the Tsonga kings who had until then remained neutral in the conflict began actively supporting the Portuguese against the rebels and attacked them, causing them heavy losses in an ambush. The effective demonstration of their firepower had won the Portuguese allies.Vandervort, 2006, p. 154. From that moment on, the rebel Tsonga population migrated north and sought refuge within the Gaza Empire.António José Telo: Moçambique - 1895: A Campanha de Todos os Heróis, Tribuna da História, 2004, pp. 44-51. Gungunhana welcomed the refugee tribes and accepted the vassalage of their leaders, as well as that of the Matabele after their defeat at Lobengula.
The Gaza Campaign
After the Battle of Marracuene, António Enes decided to annex the Gaza Empire and address the shortcomings exposed during the campaign. He dispatched officers to South Africa to purchase boats, carts and pack animals from the English or Boers in order to improve logistics by land or river. Steam-boats were purchased to German ships that docked at Lourenço Marques, to travel up the Incomati and Limpopo rivers. From Lisbon equipment never before seen in Mozambique arrived: a heliograph, searchlights, pontoon material and electric detonators for mines.
Rebel lands were largely abandoned by the indigenous population. They were reoccupied and new military posts were built on the islands of Xefina Grande and Xefina Pequena, at Marracuene, Benguelene Island and Incanine, where a pontoon bridge was built. With the support of loyal kings and their troops, the terrain was explored and the few groups of warriors who had not yet left for the north with their tribes were cornered.
Preparations for the campaign
António Enes planned the campaign in April: the main Portuguese column would be transported to Inhambane and from there it would proceed to Manjacaze, the Vatua capital, while another column would head north from Lourenço Marques to pursue the rebel Tsonga kings. In Limpopo, in the middle, a river squadron would act as a diversion and prevent any hostile warriors from crossing. In 9 months, Portugal assembled a total of 2,600 soldiers in Mozambique for a campaign in unfamiliar territory and against an adversary who openly boasted of being able to assemble 60,000 warriors. For this reason, more limited objectives were officially set, which included the establishment of military posts on the border with Gaza, though António Enes did not rule out the possibility of annexing Gaza or, at least, reducing Gungunhana to a protectorate if the opportunity arose. He also intended to show to other European powers that Portugal had the capacity to impose its authority over the claimed territories.
António Enes sent conselheiro José de Almeida to negotiate with Gungunhana, but he made no attempt to reach an agreement. Gungunhana, on his part, intended to drag out negotiations until the monsoon season. Negotiations were long and marked by several incidents, but the Portuguese bought long months to move troops and equipment without suffering attacks.Telo, 2004, p. 52.
Come May 1895, the Southern Column, commanded by Caldas Xavier, left Lourenço Marques with orders to establish several military posts. On 18 June, it began building a 92 km road from Pasene to Stokolo.Telo, 2004, pp. 52-54. At the same time, the Eastern Component of the Southern Column, commanded by Freire de Andrade, began its journey up the Marracuene River to Manhissa, where it was to establish a post and open a path to Stokolo. On 10 July, part of the Stokolo garrison advanced to the left bank of the Incomati and erected Post X there. The Eastern Column left Manhissa on 10 July, transported by the steam boats Bacamarte, Chefina and Magaia, and landed at Chinavane, where it built another post. On 31 July, the Dom Afonso Bridge over the Incomati River was inaugurated. Another was built at Xinavane. By August, the Southern Column was in position. The Portuguese established friendly relations with king Chonguela Manavi, who controlled the territories neighbouring Post X, crossed the Incomati to Cossine and erected a new post at Magude. Several kings who were vassals of Gungunhana then switched to the Portuguese side.
The Battle of Magul