The Mérida Offensive was a military operation carried out by the Nationalists during the very early phase of the Spanish Civil War in August 1936; it formed part of the Extremadura campaign. Its primary objective was connecting two rebel zones, separated by the loyalist-held southern Extremadura. The operation was designed and prepared by Franco; its starting point was Seville. The raid was executed by an improvised force, which grew from 1,000 at the beginning to 5,000 later, and was mostly composed of the Foreign Legion and the Regulares infantry units. Most of the time the Nationalists operated in two battlegroups usually referred to as "columns", commanded by Asensio and Castejón. Between August 2 and August 11 they performed a breakthrough raid of some 180 km, defeating much more numerous yet loose and poorly organized loyalists during engagements at Santa Olalla, Monesterio, Llerena, Los Santos de Maimona, and Almendralejo; the operation climaxed in the battle of Mérida. The success of the Mérida Offensive linked two rebel-held zones and proved of paramount importance for future military developments in 1936; it was also vital for the future rise of Franco as overall rebel commander.
Preparations
First steps
On July 24, five days after his arrival from Canary Islands to Tetuán, Francisco Franco sent one of his chief aides, colonel Francisco Martín Moreno, by plane from Morocco to Seville. The objective was to start organizing troops for a planned advance north.Francisco Espinosa, La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz, Barcelona 2017, , p. 2 At the time there were some 400 km in a straight line across loyalist-controlled territory from Seville to Madrid; the closest point controlled by the rebels in the north was in the province of Cáceres, some 160 km across the loyalist zone from the rebel enclave in Andalusia. The southernmost point controlled by the rebels in Extremadura was Alcuéscar, taken over on July 18, compare "El día 18 de julio de 1936, sobre las once o doce del mediodía, los niños que jugábamos en la plaza oímos el aterrador redoblar de tambores de guerra.... El alzamiento en Alcuéscar triunfó de inmediato", Angel Hidalgo Valle, Alcuésar y su historia, Alcuésar 2016, p. 110. The town further south, Aljucén, was taken by rebels in mid-August, José Antonio Ramos Rubio, El Patrimonio arqueológico y cultural de Aljucén y su territorio, Cáceres 2016, , p. 68. Hence, the border between the rebel and the loyalist zones must have been some place between Alcuésar and Aljucén On the very same day the Burgos-based rebel military executive, Junta de Defensa Nacional, nominated Franco "Jefe del Ejército de Marruecos y del Sur de España".Espinosa 2017, p. 2
The nomination made Franco commander of rebel troops in Morocco and in the southern peninsular enclave. They were firmly established in the area around Seville and Cádiz, with shaky connection to Córdoba. Numerous smaller locations in both provinces were controlled by the loyalists, though they formed separate islands of resistance and were pressed by the insurgents. The latter were also advancing west, towards another provincial capital, Huelva, in hands of the government. In total, the rebels had some 6,000 rebel troops in the southern enclave, though these were mostly inexperienced recruits in garrisons taken over by conspiring officers. Until July 24 no more than 500-600 battle-worthy soldiers have been transported from Africa across the Straits, some 400 by a unique naval convoy which managed to make it through the governmental blockade, and few hundred lifted by air since July 19. The airlift continued, albeit at a very slow rate, below 100 men daily."The very first airlift in the Spanish war was constituted by the modest flights of Fokkers and Dorniers from Tetuán to Seville carried out by Spanish pilots between 20 and 29 July, carrying 10 legionnaries in each flight, 837 men between 20 and 31 July", Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, London/New York 2012, , p. 357
It is not clear whether the Ministry of War in Madrid had any plan of action for the southern part of the country. At the time its key initiative was an offensive against the rebel-held Albacete.Albacete would be taken by the loyalists on July 25; general Miaja would arrive there 3 days later to organize troops and mount an offensive against Córdoba None of the sources consulted provides information whether the government was taking into account a would-be rebel offensive from western Andalusia towards Extremadura. However, on July 25 the minister of war general Luis Castelló nominated coronel Ildefonso Puigdengolas, an experienced officer who had just suffocated rebel islands of resistance in Alcalá de Henares and Guadalajara, the military commander of Badajoz. Puigdengolas flew from Madrid to Badajoz the same day and assumed command in all loyalist-held Extremadura.Espinosa 2017, p. 72 He immediately started to form organized combat detachments from forces of order, militiamen and what remained of infantry sub-units.Espinosa 2017, pp. 72-73. In 1936 the only city in the Badajoz province which hosted a military garrison at least equal to a battalion was Badajoz, see the map in Antonio Nadal Sánchez, Málaga, 18 de julio de 1936, [in:] Jábega 21 (1978), p. 31. Apart from minor sub-units, the key unit in the city was Regimiento de Infantería Castilla Nº 3, on paper more than 3,000 men (given bureaucratic logs and the summer leave period, its actual strength was probably closer to 2,000). Two of its companies were ordered to proceed reinforce governmental troops in Madrid, though on their way they rebelled and joined the insurgents in Caceres. There is close to nothing known about the remaining sub-units. A monographic article on 3. Infantry Regiment during early days of the war deals extensively with internal debates among officers of the regiment, but very briefly mentions only one combat action of any of its sub-units, namely at Los Santos de Maimona (until the battle of Badajoz), compare Joaquin Gil Honduvilla, “El honor del Regimiento”: del 18 de julio a la toma de Badajoz en el Regimiento de Infantería Castilla n.º 3, [in:] Revista de Estudios Extremeños LXXVI (2020), pp. 195-228, and especially pp. 221-222 How many people he had under his command is not known; intendancy figures for Badajoz-based militia only were up to 5,000;Espinosa 2017, p. 77 together with militiamen from smaller locations and the forces of order, the figure was probably much higher. Though the usual railway connection with Madrid via rebel-held Cáceres was broken, southern Extremadura was linked with the capital by a railway line via Ciudad Real.
On July 28 key rebel commanders in the south met in Seville; the Andalusian commander general Gonzalo Queipo de Llano played the host, Franco and general Luis Orgaz flew in the day before from Tetuán,Nestor Cerda, Political Ascent and Military Commander: General Franco in the Early Months of the Spanish Civil War, July–October 1936, [in:] Journal of Military History 75/4 (2011), p. 20 and general José Varela arrived from Cádiz. Exact content of the meeting is not known, yet historians speculate that it was dedicated mostly to sorting out problems of command, priorities and resources. Reportedly there was some tension about usage of the troops which were being shifted from Africa. Franco, since July 24 the superior of Queipo, was allegedly "furious" about his men being deployed by the latter against local pockets of resistance; Franco claimed that attrition rate suffered when achieving what he considered a secondary objective might prevent an efficient thrust north.Cerda 2011, p. 21
Final touches
During the last 5 days of July loose rebel detachments, unrelated to troops shifted from Africa, were outflanking from both sides the major road leading from Seville towards Extremadura; in northern Andalusia it was controlled by the loyalist militias.Espinosa 2017, p. 5 On July 27–28 so-called Columna Carranza, led by a local Seville Falangist, took control of Guillena (18 km from Seville, 4,500 inhabitants), and Burguillos (22 km, 1,500 inhabitants), two towns east of the main road to Cáceres.Espinosa 2017, p. 5 Slightly later, on July 29–31, a detachment led by a Guardia Civil NCO Juan Ruiz Calderón took over locations west of the road, namely Gerena (22 km, 4,500 inhabitants), Las Pajanosas (23 km, 1,100 inhabitants), and El Garrobo (31 km, 800 inhabitants). In all these cases combat registered, if any, was minor skirmishes and loose shootout.Espinosa 2017, p. 5 On July 29 Franco radioed Mola that "se consolida la situación Andalucía" and new troops were being airlifted every day, but said nothing about any offensive north.Espinosa 2017, p. 7 This was also the day the first German transport plane arrived in Morocco; other German and Italian aircraft would be arriving during the next 10 days, increasingly the airlift capacity. From July 19 until the end of the month some 850 men from the Army of Africa have been airlifted at a rate of some 65 per day,Thomas: "The very first airlift in the Spanish war was constituted by the modest flights of Fokkers and Dorniers from Tetuán to Seville carried out by Spanish pilots between 20 and 29 July, carrying 10 legionnaries in each flight, 837 men between 20 and 31 July" (357, source is Martínez Bande) yet with August commencing rebel commanders believed (overoptimistically, as it would turn out) that they now reached the daily airlift capacity of 500.Espinosa 2017, p. 2
On August 1 Franco issued from Tetuán his Orden General de Operaciones n.º 1 del Ejército de África y del Sur de España. He ordered the troops shifted from Africa to Andalusia to commence a general advance north the following day. The objectives were specified as the cities of Zafra (120 km away) and Mérida (170 km), though no specific date for their capture has been set. Once there, troops should be prepared for further advance, either/or towards Cáceres (230 km) and possibly Badajoz (190 km). The priority was not consolidation and systematic control, but speed: "la característica del avance ha de ser la rapidez, la decisión y la energía evitando toda detención no imprescindible". Formation of another breakthrough unit, to follow suit, was also anticipated. Suffocating local focos of resistance in Andalusia was declared a secondary objective.Espinosa 2017, p. 6 On the very same day Franco radioed Mola that he intended to deliver north 2m cartridges, badly needed by Mola's troops, either via Cáceres or, as option B, via Portugal (Huelva was seized by the rebels on July 27, and hence they reached the friendly Portuguese frontier). In his radiogram Franco confirmed that his offensive would begin on August 2.Espinosa 2017, pp. 7-8
On August 2 Franco flew for the second time from Morocco to Seville. They key reason was to supervise personally the formation and departure of the task force, entrusted with the breakthrough raid to Zafra and Mérida; he "aimed at seeing his first column off".Cerda 2011, p. 23 Another reason was again discussing with (according to some authors protesting to) Queipo the division of resources and preventing intensive use of African troops to suffocate local islands of resistance; Franco continued to believe that his troops were taking too much casualties, which impaired their potential when marching towards Madrid.Espinosa 2017, p. 2
The Raid
August 2 (departure)