The Defense of Sihang Warehouse () took place from October 27 to October 31, 1937, and marked the beginning of the end of the three-month Battle of Shanghai in the opening phase of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Defenders of the warehouse held out against numerous waves of Japanese forces to cover Chinese forces retreating west during the Battle of Shanghai.
The Chinese defenders were composed of a single half-strength battalion from the elite German-trained 88th Division, who had fortified and occupied the large "Four Banks" (Sihang) Warehouse in the downtown Zhabei district, along with several buildings. The warehouse's location just across the Suzhou Creek from the Shanghai International Settlement meant the battle took place in full view of the Western powers. Tens of thousands of Chinese and Western civilians were thus able to witness the battle as it unfolded.
After enduring several days of repeated attacks by the Japanese, the Chinese defenders were permitted to retreat into the nearby International Settlement, which they managed to do with most of their strength intact.
The defense of the warehouse and media reporting of the event provided a morale-lifting consolation to the Chinese army and people in the demoralizing aftermath of the Japanese invasion of China.
Japanese sources on the Defense of Sihang Warehouse differ, which record the defense as being a relatively minor skirmish within the entire Battle of Shanghai.
Background
By 26 October 1937, Chinese resistance in the district of Zhabei was faltering. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek wanted to withdraw all forces in the area to defend the rural western regions of Shanghai, and ordered Gu Zhutong, acting commander of the 3rd Military Region, to leave the 88th Division behind to buy time and canvass international support by showing the other nations of the Nine Powers (which were to convene on 6 November) China's determination to resist the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War.Li, Junshan. "Defense of Shanghai and Nanjing". Taipei: Mai Tian Publishing, 1997, p. 124.
Neither Gu, Sun, nor Zhang were about to disobey Chiang's orders, but Sun (via Zhang) suggested to Gu that the number of troops left to cover the withdrawal would not matter for such a show of determination. In his words, "How many people we sacrifice would not make a difference; it would achieve the same purpose."Zhang, Boting. "Recollections of the 8/13 Battle of Shanghai". Zhuan Ji Wen Xue. Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1965, vol. 41.
At 10 p.m. on 26 October, the 524th Regiment, based at the Shanghai North Railway Station, received orders to withdraw to the divisional headquarters at Sihang Warehouse. 1st Battalion commander Yang Ruifu was distraught at having to abandon a position he had held for more than two months.Yang, Ruifu. "The Lost Battalion's Four-day Struggle". 8/13 Battle of Songhu. Shanghai: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2002, pp. 158–159.
Order of battle and equipment National Revolutionary Army
524th Regiment, 88th Division: Regimental commander (CO), Army Lieutenant Colonel Xie JinyuanExecutive officer (XO), Army Major Shangguan Zhibiao (上官志標) 1st Battalion, 524th Regiment: Battalion Commander, Army Major Yang Ruifu (楊瑞符) 1st Company, 1st Battalion: Company commander, Army Captain Tao Xingchun (陶杏春) 2nd Company, 1st Battalion: Company commander, Army Captain Deng Ying (鄧英) 3rd Company, 1st Battalion: Company commander, Army Captain Shi Meihao (石美豪, wounded), Army Captain Tang Di (唐棣) Machine Gun Company, 1st Battalion: Company commander, Army Captain Lei Xiong (雷雄)
Initially containing around 800 men, the 1st was technically an over-strength battalion, but casualties suffered over the course of the Battle of Shanghai reduced its actual strength just prior to the battle to 452 men (some sources give 423), including officers. Because of the confusion of the general retreat, some units may have failed to make it to the warehouse, which caused a further reduction in strength, down to only 414 men present at the beginning of the battle. Two months of intense fighting had also whittled down the original German-trained troops, and after five rounds of reinforcements, the majority of soldiers and officers in the battalion were garrison troops from the surrounding provinces.Sun, Yuanliang. "Xie Jinyuan and the Eight Hundred Heroes". 8/13 Battle of Songhu. Shanghai: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2002. p. 115
Most of the men were from the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment of the Hubei Provincial Garrison. Hubei did not want to send its best troops to Shanghai, as these had trained over a decade to fight against the Chinese Communists. Thus, many of the soldiers sent as reinforcements to Shanghai were green recruits, with the latest batch recruited after the outbreak of war on 7 July.
The regiment was assigned used equipment from the front-line troops of the 88th, and was well equipped considering the poor equipment that most Chinese forces had. Photos and records show that soldiers were each issued a rifle, likely a Hanyang 88 or Chiang Kai-shek rifle, 300 rounds of 8 mm Mauser, two crates of M24 stick grenades, a German-made M1935 Stahlhelm, a gas mask, and food pouch. There was a total of 27 light machine guns, mostly Czech ZB vz.26, approximately one for each squad. The four water-cooled Type 24 Maxim guns were the only heavy weapons available to the battalion—a mortar platoon assigned to them was never mentioned by participants of the battle, and was therefore unlikely to have joined the battle.
Imperial Japanese Forces
Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force: Rear Admiral Okochi Denshichi Shanghai SNLF 10th Battalion: Lieutenant-Commander Haji Kitaro Yokosuka 2nd Independent SNLF Company Kure 1st SNLF Shanghai SNLF 8th and 9th Companies
Captain Okochi Denshichi had been assigned command of the Shanghai SNLF on November 16, 1936, and was promoted to Rear Admiral at the beginning of the following month. Prior to the Battle of Shanghai the Shanghai SNLF had a strength of just over 2300 men, but shortly before the battle the force began to be hastily reinforced with additional Special Naval Landing Forces and ship crews deployed on land. Reinforcements would continue to arrive throughout the course of the battle and by October 1937 the force exceeded 10,000 men in strength.
On the morning of October 27, 1937 the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force would launch an attack to take over Zhabei. Their attacking forces were known as the "Zhabei Force," and made of the Shanghai SNLF"s 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 10th, and 12th Battalions. The Shanghai SNLF 10th Battalion would be assigned to the Zhabei Force's Southern Section and serve as the main force opposing the defenders of Sihang Warehouse.
The 10th Battalion—noted as a reservist battalion—had a strength of 506 men and 21 officers under the command of Lieutenant Commander Haji Kitaro. Haji's 10th Battalion arrived in Shanghai on the evening of August 19 and was initially used as a reserve force. The battalion later served in Yangshupu from August 21 to 24, before returning to guard the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force Headquarters in Hongkou. On September 21 the battalion was deployed to the sector south of Jukong Road on North Szechuan Road. On September 28, the Yokosuka 2nd Independent SNLF "Kobayashi" Company numbering around 257 men was placed under Haji's command and would serve as the 10th Battalion's 3rd Company
From September 29 to October 6, Haji's 10th Battalion and the 2nd Battalion fought fiercely against the 88th Division around the North Szechuan Road in efforts to advance to the Songhu Railway Line. The fighting resulted in eight dead and another 33 wounded in the 10th Battalion.
The Shanghai SNLF's 8th and 9th Companies, originally attached to the 4th Battalion (Artillery Battalion), would also provide support with howitzers and mountain guns during the assault on Sihang Warehouse. The Shanghai SNLF's records on attack indicate they utilized eight 8 cm mountain guns, two 12 cm howitzers, and four more 15 cm howitzers.
Imperial Japanese Army 3rd Division According to Western historian Stephen Robinson, on October 25 following the fall of Dachang, the 3rd Division advanced past Zoumatang creek behind the 9th Division, and entered Zhabei to encounter the remaining Chinese battalion in the Sihang Warehouse. Period Japanese military reports, Senshi Sosho—the official war monographs of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy authored by the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies, and the IJA 3rd Division's unit history record that the division was engaged along the Suzhou River Crossing Operation at the time.The English translation of the relevant sections are as follows: On October 27 the Division spent until the evening moving their front line to the Suzhou Creek from Dachang. The Division subsequently ordered their manpower to pursue retreating enemies, moving to the left of the Suzhou Riverbank and ordering units to the areas listed below:
Right Flank (68th Infantry Regiment) - North of Toyoda Cotton Mills Left Flank (18th Infantry Regiment) - Chenjiabang (陳家浜) 34th Infantry Regiment - Linjiagang and Jixiangwei (林家港、基巷衛) The Other Units - Zhenru Town Area (真如鎮)