Propaganda in Ukraine has a long and complex history, spanning various periods and political events. In the context of modern Ukraine, since the independence in 1991, the development of Ukrainian propaganda has been accompanied by the evolution of propaganda strategies under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, Petro Poroshenko, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
Modern propaganda in Ukraine in the context of information warfare is used to shape public opinion on issues such as the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the war in Donbas, and Russian invasion of Ukraine. In response to these events, both the Ukrainian government and opposition parties used propaganda to influence public opinion and garner support for their goals. This included campaigns to demonize the Russian government and armed forces, countering Russian propaganda, glorify Ukrainian nationalism and mobilize support for Ukrainian forces. During the war in Donbas, various communication agencies developed media and marketing projects to support national propaganda and narratives. Propaganda was also used to spread false information about the war in Ukraine and to discredit the opposition. In the context of describing the Russo-Ukrainian war, the phrase "Ukrainian counter-propaganda" is also used.
Presidency of Leonid Kravchuk Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, state-sponsored events have been dedicated to historical events. They, according to The New Yorker, usually take the form of commemorating departed heroes using impressive metal sculptures.
Nationalists, who occupied important positions in the structures of power, actively promoted ideas aimed at achieving the prosperity of the country. One of the key principles was the call for distancing from Russia, active integration into European structures with the confidence that this would solve internal and external problems.
In the early 1990s, the party-nomenclature elite adopted the ideological concepts of the Western Ukrainian elite and consistently implemented them. These ideas implied a strategic detachment from Russia in favor of European integration. Regional elites interested in politics, having started their careers in Kyiv, adapted their views to the ideological guidelines and ideas of representatives of the western regions, but they may not have had clear visions of the future development of the country.
Presidency of Leonid Kuchma With the arrival of Viktor Medvedchuk as head of the administration of President Leonid Kuchma, the concept of "temnik" appeared in Ukrainian journalism, which has been widely used since 2002. The "temniks" were detailed instructions for the media on how to cover political events in Ukraine. The "Detector Media" organization revealed that in subsequent years, the use of "temniks" became a more complex process, including post-information "temniks" aimed at clarifying the perspective of information presentation on the air. According to the testimonies of Ukrainian journalists, the influence of temniks on the content of the news became especially noticeable. After returning from the event, journalists received new instructions from the editorial office, which determined the perspective and nature of the coverage of the events. Another important stage in the development of the temnik system is associated with the time when the texts of materials began to be sent for proofreading outside the editorial office. This process led to an increased centralization of information content management and the approval of a certain view of events on the air.
On Slava Square in Kyiv, in the immediate vicinity of the presidential administration, there was an office with paramilitary guards, where, according to journalists, dungeons were formed and the actions of the editorial offices supporting the current government were coordinated. The period up to 2005 was characterized by the cooperation of TV channels with the government, which later developed into an opportunity to earn money for channels that talked about the positive aspects of the state's actions.
Orange Revolution Before the Orange Revolution, the theme of antisemitism was used in propaganda campaigns in Ukraine to discredit the opposition. Pro-government TV channels campaigned against "nashism" (from the name of Viktor Yushchenko's block "Our Ukraine") and the "orange plague." Anti-Semitic advertising materials became the reason for the closure of the opposition newspaper Silski Visti.
“Agenda” of the Orange Revolution began to form long before start of Ukraine's presidential campaign. Important role was played by TV Channel 5, TV company Era, and national newspapers “Ukraina moloda”, “Bez tsenzury”, “Pravda Ukrainy”, “Selskie vesti”, as well as many regional papers from central and western Ukraine and many internet media. Their campaign focused on “non-intrusive” problems. Legal expert Sergey Mirzoev notes that pro-Yushchenko media promoted slogans like “Government is criminal”, “Yanukovych is choice of authorities”, “Yanukovych is not legitimate”. Historian Sergey Kozlov lists several campaigns:
Campaign to discredit current government. It claimed that ruling regime was corrupt and authoritarian. It used Yushchenko's message from 2002 elections: no economic crisis, no political crisis, no spiritual crisis, only crisis of power. Campaign to discredit candidate Viktor Yanukovych. Main slogan was “We don't want criminal president”. His victory was shown as change from bad power to very bad power. His past convictions were linked with “criminal” Donetsk business and threat of corporate raids. Campaign to create belief that authorities would use administrative pressure and falsify election results. Kozlov writes that this image became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Campaign presenting Yushchenko as “people’s president”. It used image of Europe as opposite to present situation and as positive future, linking political groups and leaders with “European choice” and European integration.
At the same time, pro-government propaganda, as historian Kozlov notes, was quite successful in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. A key role was played by Yanukovych's promise to give the Russian language the status of a second state language. His campaign focused on the work of his government to solve “intrusive” problems — showing success in reducing unemployment, raising pensions, and supporting economic growth. But the messages about success did not match the everyday experience of many people, who still had many “intrusive” problems that economic growth did not solve. Attempts by pro-government media to discredit Yushchenko by accusing him of nationalism were also unsuccessful.
Presidency of Viktor Yuschenko Following the rise to power of Viktor Yushchenko in 2005, the office responsible for temyky (directive bulletins) was closed, the management of the state television channel was dismissed, and attempts were made to restore journalistic standards among correspondents who had worked under censorship.
After 2005, Ukraine experienced a temporary period of cohabitation between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, which provided television channels with a unique opportunity to monetize their content. Unlike the previous period, when the authorities used their position without paying for the placement of materials, television channels now began to earn money for positive coverage of pro-government actions.
In 2007, themes of antisemitism were again used in propaganda, this time with the aim of discrediting Viktor Yushchenko and Ukrainian nationalism. Propaganda efforts focused not only on discrediting individual politicians but also on criticizing state policy, sometimes taking on an anti-Ukrainian direction.
During Viktor Yushchenko's presidency, active state propaganda was observed in Ukraine, aimed at influencing public opinion in the context of geopolitical and strategic events. This period saw an attempt to centrally use the state propaganda machine and corresponding media to promote political priorities. Propaganda efforts were oriented towards creating a patriotic mood, building support for the idea of Ukraine's accession to NATO, and actively promoting membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The NATO accession campaign, which lacked broad public support, continued to be actively promoted at the state level, including with support from the United States. At the same time, the issue of WTO membership was also introduced into the information discourse, although public interest in this topic was limited. Journalist Vitaly Portnikov notes that under Yushchenko, "there was propaganda that Ukraine could easily manage without coordinating its actions with Russia".
Ideologically, during Yushchenko's presidency, propaganda actively raised themes of the Holodomor, the Ukrainian language, and Russophobic issues. During Viktor Yushchenko's rule, several countries, including Hungary, Latvia, and Georgia, recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Some Russian political scientists noted that Kyiv's propaganda efforts were successful, especially in Eastern European countries and some post-Soviet states that had tense relations with Russia, but, nevertheless, in broader international contexts, the successes in the struggle for the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide were less significant.
According to , Dean of the Higher School of Television at Moscow State University, Russia, showing loyalty to the Ukrainian authorities during the presidencies of Kravchuk, Kuchma, and Yushchenko, "received from Ukraine: constant and purposeful de-Russification and the actual trampling of the rights of Russians in Ukraine; constantly ongoing anti-Russian propaganda and policy, both within Ukraine itself and in the international arena; a systematically implemented project to turn the Black Sea into an internal lake of NATO and the USA with the maximum displacement of Russia from here."
Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2014) After his election in 2010, Ukraine's fourth president, Viktor Yanukovych, attempted to restore the temyky system; however, this time communication was established through loyal managers who were given instructions by phone and in meetings, through owners or political technologists. This approach to content management remained relevant during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko.
Under Yanukovych, a radicalization of public confrontation over issues of culture, language, and identity was observed. The authorities used political technologists to shape a strategy to present the opposition as national-radical and extremist.
Under Yanukovych, negotiations began on the possibility of signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. Propaganda surrounding the Association was conducted, including at the level of state structures. Parallel to this, Ukraine, in particular through certain media and individual politicians, expressed support for the idea of joining the Customs Union. In November 2013, President Yanukovych declined to sign the association agreement with the EU in Vilnius on the initiative of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov's government. Subsequently, an agreement was reached between Yanukovych and Russian president Vladimir Putin, and Ukraine dropped its requirement for Customs Union membership. Throughout 2013, there was a constant discourse in Ukrainian society about the confrontation between the interests of Russia and the West, which was reflected in the public choice between the Association and the Customs Union. Journalist Vitaly Portnikov notes that under Yanukovych, the narrative of friendly and brotherly relations with Russia was promoted.