Portuguese–Safavid relations extended beyond Iran's borders as both nations engaged in official and unofficial interactions across the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and India. Safavid Iran was regarded by the Portuguese Empire as a potential ally to deter rival powers from using the Persian Gulf against its interests in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the Portuguese-ruled parts of India viewed the efforts of the Safavid dynasty to spread Shia Islam as a threat and acted to prevent a possible Shia alliance against their territories.
Political history Background
From 1320 until the 17th and early 18th century, the Hormuz Island was the primary naval entry point to the Persian Gulf. It achieved this supremacy by eliminating competing transshipment ports and by ensuring safety in both market operations and along land and maritime trade routes. At the time, both Hormuz Island and its capital city were known as Jarun, while the ruling kingdom was named Hormuz. Gradually, the name Hormuz also came to be used for the island and city, and after the collapse of the kingdom in 1622, it fully replaced the name Jarun. In scholarship, "Hormuz" is commonly used to refer to the kingdom, island and city. People from the Fars province made up the majority of the island's population, while Persian functioned as the primary language, with Arabic, Portuguese, and several other languages also in use. The kingdom's ruling family was of Arab origin, while its administration was mainly composed of Persians. In the 16th and 17th centuries, real power was usually held by the vizier, many of which came from Fal in Fars.
Portuguese knowledge and information about the Iranian world were limited and mostly outdated before their first meeting with Safavid authorities near the Hormuz Island in 1507. Due to the writings of Marco Polo, the Portuguese had some information about Ilkhanate Iran. As Portugal's trading networks expanded across the Mediterranean Sea in the 15th century, they gained more knowledge about Iran. It was first in 1489 that the Portuguese directly interacted with the Iranian world, when the diplomat and explorer Pêro da Covilhã went to the Persian Gulf twice to gather intelligence about the Asian commercial world.
Only the southern edges of the Iranian world are mentioned in Portuguese texts up until 1507. This included the Persian Gulf and the Hormuz Island, which they had considered an important trading place since 1500. Relations between Portugal and Iran emerged from Portuguese activity in the Persian Gulf. The Portuguese presence provoked conflicting opinions among Iranian officials up to 1750, ranging from collaboration to antagonism.
Early contacts In 1507, the Portuguese conquered Hormuz, which was controlled by Seyf al-Din Aba Nazar, who had recently become a vassal of Shah Ismail I (). Afonso de Albuquerque, who had led the conquest, was visited in Hormuz by Iranian officials from Shiraz. They had come to collect the moqarrariyeh, a tribute paid by Hormuz to its surrounding realms to allow the movement of its goods and enable tax-free trade up to an amount determined by their importance.
At that time, Albuquerque learned about Ismail I's achievements and discovered that he and his Qizilbash followers were Twelver Shia Muslims. Albuquerque thought their prophet was Ali instead of Muhammad, as he was more acquainted with Sunni Islam in the Maghreb. Other Portuguese writers, also confused by Twelver Shia Islam, continued this misinterpretation. Hormuz was lost by Albuquerque in 1508, but he reconquered it in 1515, putting the island under Portuguese "protectorate". This would last until 1622, and caused a dispute with Iran, which considered Hormuz to be their vassal.
Attempts at cooperation against the Mamluk Sultanate and early tensions over Hormuz (1510–1524) Both countries had established collaborations and maintained diplomatic contacts in India since 1510, even though they did not interact directly on Iranian territory until 1514. Beginning in 1504, Ismail I became the object of European diplomatic efforts, particularly by the Republic of Venice and the Papal States, which attempted to form alliances with him. The goals of the Portuguese sometimes differed from other European nations.
Because Portugal and the Mamluk Sultanate were competing for control of the Asian spice trade to Europe, the Portuguese were more concerned with the Mamluks than with the Ottoman Empire, who were the main adversary of Southern Europe at the start of the 16th century. The Portuguese were becoming increasingly worried by reports of the Mamluks assembling a navy in the Indian Ocean. Since Ismail I was also pursuing expansionist projects against the Mamluks, he appeared to be a useful ally. Both Ismail I and the Portuguese king Manuel I () planned conquests with messianic intent, and eventually made an alliance. The alliance was made easier by Albuquerque's earlier appointment as governor of the Portuguese-ruled parts of India in 1509, since he was a major promoter of Portugal's policies throughout Asia.
After the Portuguese conquest of Goa in 1510, Albuquerque was informed of Ismail I's ambition to expand into India by one of the latters diplomats, Amir Khvajeh. This was also further proven by the continuous activity of Iranian diplomats at the Deccani courts, and made Albuquerque worried. Nevertheless, the desire of an Iranian–Portuguese alliance grew stronger, and Albuquerque sent a second diplomatic group led by Miguel Ferreira in 1514–1515, following the first unsuccessful one in 1511.
Due to Ismail I's defeat against the Ottomans at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the Portuguese diplomatic group failed to fulfill their goals. However, Ferreira did not learn of the event at Chaldiran until he departed Iran in 1515 with Khvajeh Ali Khan, another Iranian diplomat. Before Ferreira left Iran, Albuquerque had dispatched his nephew Përo de Albuquerque to obtain the latest information on Safavid development in the Persian Gulf. It was revealed that the ruler of Hormuz, Turanshah V (), had officially become a subject of Ismail I. To prevent the Safavid annexation of Hormuz, which would have undermined his plans to trade horses with India, Albuquerque recaptured the island in 1515. He quickly had the Fort Nossa Senhora da Conceição fortress constructed in Hormuz, which had original started as a tower in 1507. Its establishment represented Portuguese imperialism to the Safavids. Albuquerque's capture of Hormuz and establishment of a fortress there made Ismail I furious.
In an effort to highlight Manuel I's authority and grandeur, Albuquerque arranged a lavish reception for Khvajeh Ali Khan. A similar diplomatic tactic had previously been attempted by Ferreira at Ismail I's court, though it had been unsuccessful. While still in Hormuz, Albuquerque sent Fernão Gomes de Lemos to arrange an agreement with Ismail I against the Mamluks in 1515–1516, in which Manuel I would receive Jerusalem and Ismail I would receive Medina and Mecca. This would allow Ismail I to declare himself the leader of the Islamic world, and Manuel I to declare himself the leader of the Christian world.
Albuquerque was not informed about Chaldiran until the delegation of Lemos had left for Iran, which, according to the modern Portuguese historian Joao Teles e Cunha, made Albuquerque perhaps discover "that the shah was not the ally his king had thought him to be." On 5 May 1515, Lemos left Hormuz and reached Maragheh on 23 August 1515, where Ismail I was staying. They were unable to reach an agreement, since Ismail I had recently suffered defeats against the Ottomans in the west and the Khanate of Bukhara in the east, thereby delaying any potential attack on the Mamluks indefinitely. Ismail I's representative Ebrahim Beg also informed Lemos that they were unhappy with the Portuguese capture of Hormuz. On 8 September 1515, during another discussion, Ismail I's vakil (vicegerent) Mirza Shah Hossein complained to Lemos about the Portuguese capture of Hormuz, claiming that it was a Safavid land and that it had paid them 2,000 ashrafis a year. He said that the Portuguese had not acted as friends, despite their claims to the contrary. Nevertheless, Mirza Shah Hossein and Ismail I still wanted an alliance with the Portuguese.
Mirza Shah Hossein told Lemos that Ismail I would only fight the Mamluks once he had dealt with the Ottomans, and thus requested gunners and cannon founders from them. Mirza Shah Hossein also said that Albuquerque had pledged to use Portuguese ships to carry 12,000 Safavid troops to Bahrain and Qatif, which had rebelled against the Safavids. In a later discussion, Lemos said the Portuguese captain of Hormuz needed Albuquerque's approval to provide ships to Ismail I, but he had already left for India. Ismail I considered this to be an excuse. After Albuquerque's death in 1515, he was succeeded by Lopo Soares de Albergaria, a member of a faction opposed to King Manuel I's plans for Jerusalem, which marked the end of the prospect of an alliance between Ismail I and Portugal.
During the local revolt against the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf in 1521–1523, Turan Shah IV requested the aid of Ismail I in 1522, sending him the first payment of moqarrariyeh since 1515. At the start of 1523, the Safavids blocked caravan routes supplying Hormuz, disrupting its trade and reducing its income. Instead of interfering in the events in Hormuz, a diplomat from Ismail I arrived to request all the previous unpaid moqarrariyeh. The Safavid forces lifted the blockade after its commander was paid. Due to the interfering by the Safavids, the Portuguese sent an embassy under Balthasar Pessoa to Ismail I in 1523. While Pessoa was waiting for an audience in Tabriz, Ismail I died on 24 May 1524. He was succeeded by his eldest son Shah Tahmasp I (), whose representatives told Pessoa that the shah refused to make any concessions.
Unstable partnership (1524–1602)
The new Portuguese king John III () abandoned his father's messianic goals in favor of a more calculated strategy to strengthen Portuguese authority. As the Ottomans worked to keep trade connections intact between spice-producing regions and their Levantine ports, their expansion in the Middle East created a challenge for John III and put Portuguese interests in the Indian Ocean at risk.
In 1534–1535, during his stay in Baghdad, the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent () secured the loyalty of several rulers in the Persian Gulf, some of whom had previously acknowledged Portuguese authority, marking a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East by the mid 1530s. The Portuguese also became vulnerable to attacks through the Persian Gulf after the Ottomans captured a port there. By that point, the European countries saw Iran as a potential ally against the Ottomans. Since 1533, Tahmasp I had ruled independently and initiated a series of military, administrative, and political reforms to reinforce his authority. Despite this, the Safavid army lacked the resources to match the Ottomans.
Rebellion in Rishahr (1534 and 1539–1540)
Throughout his rule, Tahmasp I generally had an unclear and indifferent stance towards the Portuguese. Although he still declined to cancel his alliance with the Portuguese at the request of Badr Bu Tuwayrik (), the emir of Hadhramaut, in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. With the exception of the two Portuguese operations against Rishahr in 1534 and 1540, Tahmasp I very rarely valued his alliance with the Portuguese. Shah Ali Soltan, the Safavid governor of Rishahr, had rebelled in April 1534 and began targeting the shipping routes. According to Portuguese records, Shah Ali Soltan was a vassal of the king of Hormuz.