The war aims of the First World War were formulated after the conflict began, reflecting the territorial, political, and economic objectives pursued by the belligerent states. Governments and public opinion often did not distinguish between war aims, causes of war, and the origins of the conflict. While some war aims, whether publicly declared or kept confidential, included extensive demands such as territorial annexations, these objectives alone do not fully explain the decision to enter the war. In certain cases, however, war aims and the casus belli overlapped, as seen with countries such as Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria.
During the First World War, additional war aims developed for the conflict, extending beyond the original casus belli. According to Professor Ernst Rudolf Huber, from the perspective of annexationist objectives, neither side can be accused of having entered the war to conduct a war of conquest. During and after the conflict, war aims and the question of responsibility were often seen as closely connected, although this association was largely superficial. War aims were also employed as instruments of warfare, particularly by the Western Allies.
Difficulties in formulation
The formulation of war aims was a sensitive issue for most belligerents during the First World War. Many governments viewed the declaration of specific objectives as potentially risky, fearing that unfulfilled aims could later be interpreted as a failure or defeat. In the early stages of the war, references to war aims were typically vague, with governments focusing instead on rallying public support around the general goal of victory. Until 1917, detailed war aims remained secondary to promoting the perceived heroic nature of the conflict. However, publicly stated expansionist ambitions often negatively influenced the stance of neutral countries. Over time, the public articulation of war aims became increasingly necessary to assess the relevance and feasibility of specific objectives.
Buffer zones and border adjustments remained central to strategic considerations during the First World War, despite technological advancements that had reduced the importance of geographical distance compared to the 19th century. Historian Gerhard Ritter noted that the limited military significance of territorial changes in the context of mass warfare, modern transportation, and air power was not widely understood, even among professional soldiers, and was therefore also overlooked by politicians and the press. Nationalism heightened public sensitivity to border issues and territorial losses, often resulting in significant and lasting diplomatic tensions. In the context of nationalism and imperialism, few recognized that territorial annexations were unlikely to weaken adversaries or secure lasting peace, and instead risked further conflict.
Like the Allied powers, the Central Powers employed their war aims to mobilize domestic support, influence allies, appeal to neutral states, and deter adversaries. War aims on both sides also had an economic dimension, involving efforts to occupy or control key commercial sectors to promote exports and secure access to raw materials.
War aims of the central powers
German empire
War aims at the outbreak of the conflict
At the outset of the First World War, the German Empire considered the conflict a defensive war. However, early military successes on the Western Front led to the development of expansive annexationist ambitions. The initial economic objective—focused on colonial expansion in Africa and Asia Minor—was soon supplanted by a broader goal of asserting German dominance within Europe, motivated by concerns over Germany's central geographic position. Through extensive territorial annexations in eastern and western Europe, the Empire aimed to establish long-term continental hegemony, which was seen as a prerequisite for achieving global influence.
On 9 September 1914, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, in collaboration with Kurt Riezler, outlined Germany's war aims in the Septemberprogramm. Since the Empire's foundation, German policy had been oriented toward consolidating power and pursuing global ambitions. The Septemberprogramm emphasized securing Germany's position through the weakening of France, which was to be stripped of its great power status and rendered economically dependent on Germany. Proposed concessions included the cession of the Briey iron basin and the French coastline between Dunkirk and Boulogne-sur-Mer. Concerning Belgium, the plan called for the annexation of Liège and Verviers into Prussia and the transformation of Belgium into a vassal state and economic dependency. The program also included the proposed annexation of Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
The Septemberprogramm also aimed to reduce Russian influence in Eastern Europe and to consolidate German power through the establishment of a customs union. This proposed economic bloc would have included France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and potentially Italy, Sweden, and Norway. The program reflected the strategic objectives of Germany's political, economic, and military leadership. Industrialists, particularly those in the steel industry, supported measures to limit the autonomy of other states, notably concerning control over the Briey-Longwy basin. The Septemberprogramm represented the synthesis of various plans regarding the future political and economic order in Europe.
Most members of the Reichstag supported the annexationist goals outlined in the program, with the Social Democratic Party being the primary opposition. By 1915, internal contradictions in war aims began to emerge. Initially developed in the optimistic atmosphere of the war's early stages, these aims were increasingly seen as unrealistic. In late 1914, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg prohibited public discussion of war aims to avoid alienating neutral countries and to manage domestic concerns, particularly among the working class. This restriction, however, was short-lived. Under pressure from the Third Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL) and in response to the need for continued psychological mobilization of the population, the ban was lifted. The resumption of public debate on war aims became a tool for promoting total war and ideologically motivated military conduct.
A central element of Germany's war aims in the West during the First World War was the status of Belgium. Since the formulation of the Septemberprogramm, the prevailing objective among German political leaders had been to transform Belgium into a vassal state, accompanied by territorial annexations wherever feasible. In the East, a primary objective was the establishment of control over Poland, including the annexation of a border strip. Additional territorial ambitions focused on regions such as Courland and Lithuania, motivated both by geographic proximity and the presence of non-Russian populations, including a minority of Baltic Germans. Plans for these eastern territories included the displacement of local populations, such as Latvians, and the resettlement of ethnic Germans—particularly those previously living in the Russian Empire—on lands owned by the crown, the church, or large estates. These settlements were often intended to complement the holdings of the Baltic German nobility. Ethno-nationalist (völkisch) ideas played a significant role in shaping Germany's colonization policies, integrating demographic and ideological considerations into its broader war aims.
The objective of establishing a German Central Africa was a significant component of Germany's colonial war aims during the First World War. In August and September 1914, Wilhelm Solf, Secretary of State for the Colonies, proposed the partition of French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonial territories in Africa, a plan later incorporated into the Septemberprogramm by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Although annexationist sentiment peaked in mid-1915, public support for such ambitions declined as the war's human and material costs became increasingly evident. Initial enthusiasm gave way to widespread disillusionment. Annexationist propaganda had the greatest influence among industrial and intellectual elites, while broader segments of the population remained less receptive—a trend that would shift during the Second World War. In the latter half of the conflict, the socialist demand for a "peace without annexations" gained significant popular support. Public morale, particularly among soldiers, increasingly opposed the Pan-German League and its more aggressive nationalist elements.
War aims toward the end of the war
As part of Germany's Randstaatenpolitik (policy toward border states), which aimed to push back Russia by creating a buffer zone of states from Finland to Ukraine, the focal point of German expansionist ambitions in the East lay primarily in the Baltic countries. The majority of Germany's leadership, from the right to the anti-tsarist left, adhered to a concept of division. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed with the Soviet Union on 3 March 1918, stipulated the secession of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Courland from Russia, as well as the independence of Ukraine and Finland. Russia was required to withdraw its troops from Finland and the province of Kars, including the cities of Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi. As a result, Russia lost 26% of the territories under its control, 27% of its arable land, 26% of its railway network, 33% of its textile industry, 73% of its steel industry, and 75% of its coal mines.
In 1918, Germany reached the height of its war aims. Between the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the defeat of the Central Powers, the German Empire developed plans for extensive annexations in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. During negotiations for additional clauses to the treaty, General Erich Ludendorff aimed to extend German influence over Lithuania, Estonia, Crimea, the Cossack territories of the Kuban and Don as a link to the Caucasus, as well as the Caucasus region, the Tatar territories, the Astrakhan Cossacks, the Turkmens, and Turkestan. Although initially reluctant, the German Emperor eventually accepted these proposals. The plan also envisaged dividing Russia into four independent tsarist states following the cession of Poland, the Baltic provinces, and the Caucasus. These included Ukraine, the Südostbund (Ciscaucasia) as an anti-Bolshevik zone between Ukraine and the Caspian Sea, Central Russia (Zentralrussland), and Siberia. One objective of this strategy was to establish a geopolitical corridor toward Central Asia, to challenge British interests in India. The Südostbund project, however, conflicted with the territorial ambitions of the Ottoman Empire.