The history of the People's Liberation Army began in 1927 with the start of the Chinese Civil War and spans to the present, having developed from a peasant guerrilla force into the largest armed force in the world.
Before the founding of the People's Republic of China
In 1925, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Department, was renamed the Central Military Commission (CMC). It was first led by Zhang Guotao who was replaced by Zhou Enlai in 1926 as head of the CMC. At the time, the CMC was concurrently the Shanghai District Military Commission. During the First United Front, it not a unified military command structure but was more of an administrative liaison with other armed communist groups.
The divisions of the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" (中國工農紅軍) were named according to historical circumstances, sometimes in a nonconsecutive way. Early Communist units often formed by defection from existing Kuomintang forces, keeping their original designations. Moreover, during the Chinese Civil War, central control of separate Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-controlled enclaves within China was limited, adding to the confusion of nomenclature of Communist forces.
The 1929 Gutian Congress was important in establishing the principle of party control over the military, which continues to be a core principle of the party's ideology. In the short term, this concept was further developed in the June 1930 Program for the Red Fourth Army at All Levels and the winter 1930 Provisional Regulations on the Political Work of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Army (Draft), which formally established Party leadership of the military.
By the time of the 1934 Long March, numerous small units had been organized into three unified groups, the First Front Red Army (紅一方面軍/红一方面军/Hóng Yī Fāngmiàn Jūn), the Second Front Red Army (紅二方面軍/红二方面军/Hóng Èr Fāngmiàn Jūn) and the Fourth Front Red Army (紅四方面軍/红四方面军/Hóng Sì Fāngmiàn Jūn), also translated as "First Front Red Army", "Second Front Red Army" and "Fourth Front Red Army".Peoples Liberation Army Daily (August 14, 2006) Notes Retrieved 2007-02-17
Mao's military thought grew out of the Red Army's experiences in the late 1930s and early 1940s and formed the basis for the people's war concept, which became the doctrine of the Red Army and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In developing his thought, Mao drew on the works of the Chinese military strategist Sun Zi (4th century BC) and Soviet and other theorists, as well as on the lore of peasant uprisings, such as the stories found in the classical novel Shuihu Zhuan (Water Margin) and the stories of the Taiping Rebellion. Synthesizing these influences with lessons learned from the Red Army's successes and failures, Mao created a comprehensive politico-military doctrine for waging revolutionary warfare. People's war incorporated political, economic, and psychological measures with protracted military struggle against a superior foe. As a military doctrine, people's war emphasized the mobilization of the populace to support regular and guerrilla forces; the primacy of men over weapons, with superior motivation compensating for inferior technology; and the three progressive phases of protracted warfare—strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive (see Mobile Warfare). During the first stage, enemy forces were "lured in deep" into one's own territory to overextend, disperse, and isolate them. The Red Army established base areas from which to harass the enemy, but these bases and other territory could be abandoned to preserve Red Army forces. In addition, policies ordered by Mao for all soldiers to follow, the Eight Points of Attention, instructed the army to avoid harm to or disrespect for the peasants, regardless of the need for food and supplies. This policy won support for the Communists among the rural peasants.Indo-Asian News Service (October 22, 2006): Retracing Mao's Long March (Retrieved 23 November 2006)
In June 1946, the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the CCP resumed. On September 12, 1946, the Liberation Daily was the first to use the title of "People's Liberation Army" in its editorial. Subsequently, the title of "People's Liberation Army" appeared publicly many times in articles published by Mao Zedong and Xinhua News Agency. On October 3, 1946, the Liberation Daily formally proposed the title of "Chinese People's Liberation Army" for the first time in the editorial "Struggle for the Realization of the January Armistice Agreement and the CPPCC Resolution". At that time, the People's Daily quoted Xinhua News Agency's telegram that in the Northeast Summer Offensive in May 1947, the "Hebei-Chahar-Rehe-Liaoning People's Liberation Army" (rather than the title of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army ) captured Weichang County. On October 10, 1947, the "Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" was published, which marked the change of the name of the entire army to Chinese People's Liberation Army.
By the beginning of 1948, all units of the army were renamed the People's Liberation Army. The CCP Politburo held an enlarged meeting from September 8 to 13, 1948, proposing to build a 5 million PLA. In accordance with the meeting of the Politburo, the CCP Central Committee and the CCP Central Military Commission issued the "Regulations on Unifying the Organization and Unit Numbers of the Whole Army" on November 1, pointing out that the People's Liberation Army is divided into three categories: field troops, local troops and guerrilla troops. All troops above the regiment level were named "People's Liberation Army of China". On January 15, 1949, the CCP Central Military Commission decided to reorganise the regional armies of the PLA into four field armies.Historical Dictionary of Modern China (1800-1949), James Zheng Gao, Scarecrow Press, 2009, , 116
People's Republic of China In the PRC's early years, the PLA was a dominant foreign policy institution in the country.
In 1950, the Central Organization Department transferred its responsibility for PLA cadre management to the PLA General Cadre Department, thereby separating Party and CMC personnel management.
Since the 1960s, China had considered the Soviet Union the principal threat to its security; lesser threats were posed by long standing border disputes with Vietnam and India. China's territorial claims and economic interests made the South China Sea an area of strategic importance to China. Although China sought peaceful unification of Taiwan with the mainland China, it did not rule out the use of force against the island if serious internal disturbances, a declaration of independence, or a threatening alliance occurred.Kissinger, H. On China, Penguin, New York, p.346
In 1964, the Central Military Commission proposed to abolish ranks in the PLA, stating that ranks were an expression of bourgeois right and hierarchy which led to individualist attitudes, inequality, and a sense of disunity. Ranks were abolished the next year; they remained abolished until they were re-instated in 1988.
Cultural Revolution The PLA was divided into two distinct groups: Corps and Regional Forces. The Corp was the backbone of the PLA each one consisted of three divisions and smaller supporting units totalling about 45,000 men. A division in a Corp is in excess of 12,000 men with much heavy artillery and armaments. The Corps were large unit formations that guarded the Sino-Soviet Border and the coastline. Regional Forces include three different types of units: border defence, independent divisions and regiments, and garrisons in cities and counties. Independent and garrison units are lightly equipped forces, smaller than equivalent echelons in the corps. Independent divisions might have less than 10,000 men, without tanks or heavy artillery.
In 1966 there were 13 military regions which were in turn divided into 23 provincial military districts.
Upon the creation of the Red Guards in August 1966, the military districts and garrisons were required to send out numerous cadres from their political departments and units Party committees to serve as propagandists and chaperones to the teenagers. The corps sent political officers to make contact with local Red Guards. On 31 December 1966 the PLA was ordered by Beijing to give “short term military and political training” to Red Guards in schools throughout China.
On 5 October 1966, the Central Military Commission and the PLA's Department of General Political Tasks directed military academies to dismiss their classes to allow cadets to become more involved in the Cultural Revolution. In doing so, they were acting on Lin Biao's 23 August 1966 for "three month turmoil" in the PLA.
On 21 January 1967, Mao Zedong wrote to Lin Biao and ordered the PLA to “support the left.” While the order was issued to all armed forces, the military regions, districts and garrisons were in fact charged with the main responsibility of supporting the left.
The PLA regional forces were ordered to aid the left because the left was too weak to be able to seize power from Party leaders in most areas. The need to support the left gave garrisons and district headquarters power to decide which Red Guard group succussed. The order was largely seen as a failure by Beijing with regional forces failing to enact the orders from 21 January. The PLA regional forces favoured supporting local governments and party incumbents and conservative Red Guard factions while inhibiting radical Red Guard factions.
The Corp leaders were not assigned to political positions during the Cultural Revolution, with only a few expectations. The Corps remained in the control of Beijing in an attempt to remove the PLA from provincial politics. The involvement of the PLA led to its involvement in the politics of the time. The PLA Corp only intervened at the request of Mao Zedong.
On 20 July 1967, Wang Li was kidnapped with the support of the First Hubei Military District Independent Division and members of a Red Guard group known as Million Heros. On 22 July 1967 command of the Wuhan Military Region was transferred to Kong Qingde and Ye Ming by Zhou Enlai. Unit 8199 of 15th Corps was ordered to move into the city of Wuhan. In the following weeks after the Wuhan incident army Corps were ordered to seize control of several military districts from regional forces. On 27 July, the Military Affairs Commission disarmed the First Hubei Military District Independent Division, with its men transferred to a labour camp outside the greater Wuhan area.
In August 1967, the policy of arming the left was given to the PLA by Mao Zedong. The policy was for the PLA to provide arms to the left. The Left according to the Mao were students and workers. By September the number of rifles distributed to organized masses exceeded 40,000. The policy of arming the left would be abandoned on 4 September 1967.
On 5 September 1967 the Central Committee, State Council, Central Military Commission, and Central Cultural Revolution Group empowered the PLA to reestablish law and order. The PLA took control over the government in cities, towns, and villages across China. The PLA also took control of judicial powers and duties. Trials were carried out by the PLA, presided over by the PLA, defendants were sentences by the PLA, and executions were carried out by the PLA.
In early October 1967 Red Guards were told to return to school with the PLA entrusted to enforce the call to return to school. PLA military instructors took over the ideological education from the Red Guard leaders.