Defensive imperialism

Defensive imperialism is a theory of imperialism viewing security as the prime motive of imperialism. The view originated in Roman studies in the late 19th century and is perhaps the oldest of theories explaining Roman imperialism. It is closest to the argument favoured by Romans themselves and their Greek admirers, and continues to have support in our days.Hoyos, Dexter et al (2013). A Companion to Roman Imperialism. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p 7. According to the most notable critic of the thesis, William Vernon Harris, no other overall theory about Roman imperialism in the Middle Republic has received as much support from Historians.Harris, William Vernon (1979). War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC. (New York: Oxford University Press), p 4, https://archive.org/details/warimperialismin0000harr/mode/2up

Until the 1970s, it was widely held that the Romans did not have an aggressive, expansionist policy towards the rest of their world. Rather they built their Empire in self-defense, or in defense of their allies. Facing powerful neighbours who threatened its security or even existence, Rome responded to ward off the peril. The Roman responses ranged from taking preventive offensive action to taking control of the beaten enemy to preclude a revanche. The Romans repeatedly conquered kings and peoples, but then took no steps towards the consolidation of imperial rule. They were not therefore conscious imperialists and the Roman Empire was irrational rather than planned outcome.

The theory draws its strength from the apparent inconsistency of Roman foreign policy, the slowness with which their rulers acted (or reacted), and their reluctance to annex. In this pattern economic and ideological factors appear secondary at most. Key evidence for the view is derived from Second Punic War, Roman policy towards Greece at least down to 148 BC, and towards the Near East until 66 BC. In the chapter, titled "Defensive imperialism," Howard Hayes Scullard claims that in the initial war with Carthage, the first and crucial step in Rome's expansion outside Italy, the primary motive was the defense of Italy from the immediate Carthaginian threat rather than territorial conquest.Scullard, Howard Hayes (1970). "Defensive imperialism." Imperialism in the Roman Republic. (Ed. Gruen, Erich S.. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), p 21.

According to John Rich, the doctrine originated with Theodor Mommsen in 1877.Rich, John (1995). "Fear, greed and glory: The causes of Roman war-making in the Middle Republic." War and Cociety in the Roman world. (Eds. Rich, John & Shipley, Graham. London: Routledge), p 39.Mommsen, Theodor. Roman History. (Tr. Dickson, William Purdie. Project Gutenberg, 2005), pp. 357-358, https://ia601605.us.archive.org/view_archive.php?archive=/33/items/GutenbergENzip/15.zip&file=History%20of%20Rome%20%28Volumes%201-5%29%2C%20The%20-%20Theodor%20Mommsen%2C%202005%20%28886p%29.pdf#:~:text=1%20The%20Project%20Gutenberg%20eBook%2C%20The%20History%20of,no%20cost%20and%20with%20almost%20no%20restrictions%20whatsoever. Later, Tenney Frank, Maurice Holleaux and Ernst Badian added the main terms of the view.Hoyos, Dexter (2013). A Companion to Roman Imperialism. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p 7.Badian, Ernst (1968). Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic. (New York: Ithaca), p 2, https://archive.org/details/romanimperialism00badi_0/page/2/mode/2upGarnsey, Peter D. A. & Whittaker, Charles Richard (1978). Imperialism in the Ancient World. (Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-3, https://archive.org/details/p.-d.-a.-garnsey-imperialism-in-the-ancient-world/P.%20D.%20A.%20Garnsey%20-%20Imperialism%20in%20the%20Ancient%20World/page/1/mode/2up?view=theaterNorth, John A. 1981. "The development of Roman imperialism." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 71: p 1. Beginning with the antithesis of William Harris in 1979, the theory of defensive imperialism has been mostly criticized and interpreted as justification and apology of imperialism by the contemporary Western Colonialists. Later, the concept of apology was challenged.

Harris anti-thesis From the 19th century until the 1970s, defensive imperialism was the preferred theory for many scholars.Edwell, Peter (2013). "Definitions of Roman imperialism." A Companion to Roman Imperialism. (Ed. Hoyos, Dexter. Leiden & Boston: Brill), pp. 46-47. Harris was not the first critic. In 1967, Robert G. Wesson criticized those readers of Roman classics, who are "persuaded that the building of the empire was reluctant self-defense and largely an innocent response to aggression."Wesson, Robert G. (1967). The Imperial Order. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 388. However, the academic consensus changed only following the sustained critique by Harris in 1979. In 168-146 BC, he says, as far as Macedonia is concerned, Rome was clearly compelled to act. But with regards to the Achaeans and Carthage, Rome voluntarily initiated annexations. Other motives were primary with security used as justification.Harris, William Vernon (1979). War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC. (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 234-244, 254, https://archive.org/details/warimperialismin0000harr/mode/2up In one passage Cicero claims that Rome won world domination by defending the allies but in his other passages Rome fought for the empire.Harris, William Vernon (1979). War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 BC. (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 165-166, https://archive.org/details/warimperialismin0000harr/mode/2up Harris ends his period in 70 BC since it is less disputed that later Roman imperialism becomes aggressive and expansionist, demonstrated most intractably perhaps by Julius Caesar’s Gallic conquests and the emperor Claudius’ invasion of Britain. Both lands did not pose a threat.Hoyos, Dexter et al (2013). A Companion to Roman Imperialism. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p 7.

Harris’s anti-thesis was accorded the unique distinction of receiving two reviews in successive numbers of the Journal of Roman Studies, by Adrian N. Sherwin-White (1980) and John A. North (1981).Rich, John (1995). "Fear, greed and glory: The causes of Roman war-making in the Middle Republic." War and Society in the Roman World. (Eds. Rich, John & Shipley, Graham. London: Routledge), p 40. John A. North confirms the antithesis of Harris stressing that Rome was militarist society and its wars were often aggressive in intention, even if not formally so.North, John A. (1981). "The development of Roman imperialism." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 71: p 1. However, North finds the project of proving Rome the aggressor in every case hopeless and, in agreement with Sherwin White, finds such a generalization strained.North, John A. (1981). "The development of Roman imperialism." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 71: p 2.Sherwin White, Adrian N. (I980). "Rome the Aggressor?  Review of War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC by William V. Harris." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 70: pp. 179-180. At best the criticism works only in part. It depends on a Rome-hostile interpretation of what did not constitute a threat to Rome.Hoyos, Dexter et al (2013). A Companion to Roman Imperialism. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p 7. Harris saw economic motives such as plunder and taxation as the primary ones. However, except Macedonia, no revenues were extracted in states subdued between 200 and 148 BC.North, John A. (1981). "The development of Roman imperialism." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 71: pp. 2-3. The view of ever aggressive, plundering Rome is incompatible with the state famous for its fides and strong support of its friends and allies. Such a reputation has to be maintained as well as earned.North, John A. (1981). "The development of Roman imperialism." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 71: p 7.

Harris omitted the Pyrrhic War and the alliance between Philip V of Macedon and Hannibal. Because there were no wars in the Asiatic East for a century after the Battle of Magnesia Harris does not discuss the relevant theme of Roman diplomacy in Anatolia, except for a brief note on Mithridates. He maintains the Polybian doctrine that the Romans aimed at world domination from their victory in the First Punic War onwards but when Polybius proposes less aggressive explanations of particular wars his evidence is regularly rejected. Polybius’ explanation of the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War is also summarily dismissed without supporting argumentation. According to Sherwin White and Paul Burton, Harris cherry-picked both events and sources.Sherwin White, Adrian N. (I980). "Rome the Aggressor?"  Review of War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC by William V. Harris." Journal of Roman Studies, vol 70: pp. 179-180.Burton, Paul J. (2019). Roman Imperialism. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p. 42.

Two more major responses to Harris appeared in 1984 by Erich GruenGruen, Erich S. (1984). The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. (Berkeley: University of California Press). and A. N. Sherwin-White.Sherwin-White, Adrian N. (1984). Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1. (London: Duckworth). Both books focus on the expansion of Roman power in the East, and argue that Rome was, for the most part, a passive, reactive, and remote hegemon. Focusing on the Mithridatic Wars, Gruen shows that Roman imperialism was overwhelmingly defensive. The theory of sheer aggression and militarism is too simplistic for Greece and the East.Gruen, Erich S. (1984). The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. (Berkeley: University of California Press), p 725.Burton, Paul J. (2019). Roman Imperialism. (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p. 44.

The student of Gruen, Arthur M. Eckstein, continued the traditional defensive concept. Despite the "shocking" scale and "savagery" of the Mithridates massacre, Mithridates was left on the throne and allowed to initiate two more anti-Roman wars.Eckstein, Arthur M. 1997. "Ancient Dominions." International History Review. Vol. 19(2): p. 366. The Senate was defensive, the generals sometimes aggressive, expansionist and glory-seeking, but they were under the control of the Senate until the First century BC.Eckstein, Arthur M. (1987). Senate and General: Individual Decision-Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264–194 B.C. (Berkeley: University of California Press). Following the defeat of Philip V of Macedon, the Romans withdrew all their troops from Greece and declared Greek freedom. This involved freedom from interference and tribute, troops withdrawal, and each city preserved its ancestral laws. This order became the Roman modus operandi in the world east of Italy: launch a massive attack, then withdraw all troops and personnel, leaving behind a sphere of influence. Eckstein called it "smash and leave." This interstate structure for him does not even qualify as empire, much less aggressive empire.Eckstein, Arthur M. (2008). Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230–170 B.C. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 285, 301, 305, 336, 339, 378-379.