In 2009, the United States conducted missile strikes in Yemen against targets associated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Two strikes were launched on December 17—one at a training camp in al-Majalah, Abyan, and another at a safehouse in Arhab, Sanaa—followed by a strike on a safehouse in Rafadh, Shabwah, on December 24.
Throughout the year, the Barack Obama administration engaged in negotiations with Yemeni government for US military intervention to address the rising threat posed by AQAP. Intelligence collected by early December indicated AQAP was planning imminent attacks on American targets in Yemen, prompting action by Joint Special Operations Command. The primary target of the strikes was in al-Majalah, a small settlement believed to be the site of an AQAP training camp preparing an attack on the US embassy in Sanaa.
Tomahawk missiles destroyed the al-Majalah training camp and killed an estimated 14 militants, including ringleader Mohammed al-Kazemi, but also struck the nearby huts of local residents, killing 41 civilians including women and children. The strike on Arhab was followed by Yemeni grounds raids, leaving three militants dead but not the targeted commander Qasim al-Raymi. A separate strike was later launched on a compound in Rafadh where AQAP leaders Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Said Ali al-Shihri were believed to be present, but neither were among the five militants killed. A Yemeni parliament-endorsed inquiry cited a targeting error as the cause of civilian casualties in al-Majalah. The Yemeni government compensated the victims by 2013.
Yemen publicly claimed responsibility for the strikes, but news reports quickly disclosed American involvement, and later an Amnesty International report included photographs taken from al-Majalah of munitions exclusively used by the US military. Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks on November 28, 2010, revealed a secret agreement between top American and Yemeni officials in which the Yemeni government would take responsibility for US operations, including the 2009 strikes.
The attempted bombing of an American airliner a day after the strikes was attributed to AQAP and prompted further US intervention in Yemen. The strikes have been considered a failure as they did not eliminate the core leadership of AQAP and led to heavy civilian casualties, the latter AQAP exploited for propaganda purposes to boost recruitment of disgruntled Yemenis. Scott Shane argued the inaugural operations permanently tarnished the US' reputation within Yemen.
Background
Al-Qaeda resurgence The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted a covert drone strike in 2002 which killed al-Qaeda's head in Yemen, Abu Ali al-Harithi. It was the first targeted killing in the war on terror—after Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz publicly leaked it, violating an agreement to maintain secrecy, the Yemeni government banned any further drone strikes in the country. Regardless, the elimination of Harithi and capture of other militants by local security forces rendered al-Qaeda effectively dismantled in Yemen by 2004. The US shifted its attention to the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, expecting Yemen to serve only as a potential safe haven for al-Qaeda members rather than an independent theater of jihadism. The Yemeni government also began concentrating on security matters unrelated to al-Qaeda, and ties with the George W. Bush administration cooled as the latter further emphasized democracy and human rights concerns in Yemen.
These conditions were exploited by a group of 23 jihadists who escaped from a prison in Sanaa in February 2006. The US focused on other, more notable escapees at the time, but it was Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi who reorganized and led al-Qaeda in Yemen. Their ranks included a younger and more radical generation of jihadists intent on overthrowing the Yemeni government and refusing any dialogue with it. The group waged numerous attacks throughout the following years at an increasing rate. It had begun attacking local American targets by 2008, culminating in an attack on the US embassy in September which left at least 18 people dead and served as "a wake-up call for all of Washington."
In January 2009, the affiliates of al-Qaeda in Yemen and in Saudi Arabia announced their merger to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Based in Yemen, AQAP conducted several attacks in the country over 2009, notably a pair of bombings targeting South Koreans in March. Its regional threat was amplified following an assassination attempt on Saudi prince Muhammad bin Nayef in August.
Obama administration policy After being inaugurated as the president of the United States, Barack Obama was only in office for a few days when a video announcing the formation of AQAP was released on January 23, 2009. Of particular concern to the government was the fact that two of the four AQAP leaders featured in the video, Saudi nationals Said Ali al-Shihri and Muhammad al-Awfi, were previously incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. From the early stages of his presidency, Obama and his administration were intent on covert military intervention against AQAP in Yemen, though publicly their focus was still on addressing the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Incoming security officials in the new administration were in "complete shock" with the underdeveloped intelligence network in Yemen in relation to the substantial threat posed by AQAP, which was underscored by the embassy attack the previous year.
Deputy homeland security advisor John Brennan was Obama's primary policy advisor regarding Yemen. The planned closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, a priority for the Obama administration, led to complications with the Yemeni government as the US was reluctant to transfer detained Yemeni nationals to the latter's custody. Brennan's negotiations with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh to allow counterterrorism operations in the country were often linked to Saleh's demands regarding the detainees, whom he used as bargaining chips.
Obama opted for a military-centric approach to Yemen overseen by US Central Command head General David Petraeus and directly led by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under Vice Admiral William H. McRaven. McRaven initially envisioned a counterterrorism system similar to that in Iraq where special forces would capture militant leaders, interrogate them, and utilize newfound intelligence to launch further raids. He was forced to rethink his strategy as the Obama administration believed that Saleh would not permit US military ground presence in the country or any sort of kill or capture-style operation. Petraeus authorized a directive in April for more expansive American military presence in Yemen, including unilateral strikes against AQAP.
Several senior American officials visited Yemen throughout 2009 to pressure Saleh into addressing AQAP. Saleh, in turn, proved to be more cooperative with the Americans over time. During a meeting with CIA deputy director Steven Kappes in May which focused on intelligence cooperation, Saleh made clear that he considered AQAP his main priority rather than the local Houthi insurgency or southern secessionist movement. Ambassador Stephen Seche later began informal negotiations for US aircraft to fly over Yemen's territorial waters under the pretense of combating weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. In July, Petraeus visited Saleh to both confirm a boost in foreign aid and urge him to directly combat AQAP. A raid by Yemeni special forces the next month targeting an AQAP cell was a failure, but assisted the US to portray the Yemeni government as directly on the frontlines against AQAP, disguising future US intervention.
The attempted assassination of Nayef further underscored with Washington the necessity of combating AQAP. When Brennan returned to Yemen in September, Saleh told him that he would grant the US authority to conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations in Yemen, on the condition that he was to avoid blame for any terrorist attacks by AQAP in response. This meeting effectively served as the go-ahead for the US government to begin preparing military operations in Yemen. Later in the month, shortly after a meeting with Obama and other top officials, Petraeus signed off on the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order, which officially authorized special forces to conduct covert operations outside of official battlefields such as Yemen. The directive also permitted more expansive intelligence-gathering efforts by the military. In October, a meeting between McRaven and Saleh, ostensibly for discussing cooperation between Yemen and the US in combating AQAP, ended in Saleh granting McRaven's request for JSOC surveillance drones to fly over Yemen and for "the implementation of some special operations similar to what is happening in Pakistan and Somalia."
The drawdown in Iraq allowed JSOC to reassign more personnel to Yemen, leading to an expansion of the military and intelligence presence at the Sanaa embassy. The latter half of 2009 saw an uptick in analysts and agents arriving to expand intelligence-gathering on AQAP. However, this also led to further difficulties and risks for agents operating in the country and attempting to infiltrate AQAP, resulting in US agencies turning to Yemeni human intelligence, which was viewed as less reliable. Signals intelligence was therefore prioritized, with eavesdropping by the local Special Collection Service station playing a large role.
Prelude By early December 2009, the intelligence community in Yemen had acquired evidence that AQAP was in the final stages of preparing terrorist attacks on undetermined local Western targets. According to National Counterterrorism Center head Michael Leiter, the US "surged resources for targeting in Yemen" in response despite not knowing the specific threat. A months-long JSOC search determined that near the remote village of al-Majalah, Abyan Governorate, where locals had seen surveillance aircraft passing by, AQAP commander Mohammed Saleh Mohammed Ali al-Anbouri, better known as Mohammed al-Kazemi, was in charge of a training camp for suicide bombers who were likely planning to attack the US embassy in Sanaa.
A former Afghan Arab, Kazemi was arrested in 2005 by local authorities on charges related to terrorism and released in 2007. He and his family moved then to al-Majalah and he claimed to have renounced jihadism. In contrast, American intelligence reports indicated that Kazemi was an operational commander within AQAP. These reports implicated Kazemi in a 2007 suicide attack in Marib, and suggested he was in the final stages of planning the embassy attack. Strong support for military action from Petraeus was tempered with caution from national security advisor James L. Jones, who was skeptical of the quality of US intelligence in the region. Obama approved military action to interdict the pending attack. Saleh's government was also informed and quickly approved it.
On December 16, McRaven headed an interagency video conference which proposed multiple targeted killings in Yemen to be conducted by JSOC within 24 hours. Under a top-secret special access program with the codename "Operation Copper Dune", JSOC planned to launch strikes against three targets given code names of several cities in Ohio. The primary target, Kazemi, was labeled Objective "Akron", and had been located at the training camp near al-Majalah, while Objectives "Toledo" and "Cleveland" were identified as additional targets. Petraeus had hastily included Cleveland as a target generated from fresh intelligence on their location. State Department and Department of Defense legal advisors Harold Koh and Jeh Johnson were given 45 minutes in advance to review the intelligence on the targets and approve them from a legal perspective.