The development of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems was a critical aspect of the Cold War arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. These systems, deployed on nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs), were at the forefront of technological competition between the two superpowers, driving advancements in both military and civilian technologies, including space exploration. The rivalry shaped the design, automation, and operational tactics of these systems, reflecting the distinct economic, scientific, political, ideological, and cultural characteristics of each nation. While both countries pursued similar strategic goals, their approaches to SLBM development diverged significantly, with each responding to the other's technological advancements.
Technologically, the United States favored solid-fuel rocket engines for their SLBMs. The United States Navy emphasized human control, particularly over nuclear reactors, prioritizing stealth through noise reduction. The nation achieved significant innovations, occasionally gaining advantages in specific technical areas. SLBM systems were the most effective means of strategic nuclear deterrence, forming a cornerstone of their respective nuclear triads, alongside land-based missiles and strategic bombers, except during the early Cold War period.
Origins
The concept of submarine-launched ballistic missiles is related to the German V-2 rocket program during World War II. In 1944, Klaus Riedel, a member of the Peenemünde research team, proposed launching V-2 rockets from the North Sea against Great Britain, using submarines to tow launch containers. These containers, approximately 32 meters long, 5.7 meters in diameter, and with a displacement of 500 tons, housed a single V-2 missile, crew quarters, a control center, and fuel and ballast tanks. A single submarine could tow up to three containers. Plans also included towing containers across the Atlantic to target New York City. The crew would travel aboard the submarine, transfer to the container for fueling, and launch the missile. The project, developed at the AG Vulcan Stettin shipyard in Szczecin, reached 65–70% completion for three containers by the war's end, with a prototype tested near Peenemünde.
After the war, many German V-2 scientists, including Wernher von Braun, were recruited by the United States to bolster its ballistic missile program under the United States Army. In October 1946, the NKVD arrested approximately 5,000 German specialists, relocating them to the Soviet Union to advance Soviet ballistic missile development. As a result, the German V-2 designers made a significant contribution to both the American and Soviet ballistic missile programs.
First-generation systems Starting in October 1945, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union began a series of tests on captured or assembled V-2 missiles. On 6 September 1947, an "American" V-2 was launched from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Midway (CV-41), marking the first-ever launch of a ballistic missile from a mobile platform. From that point on, guided missile ships – vessels capable of carrying and launching rockets – became a priority for the United States Navy. The first such vessels were to be multi-role aircraft carriers, capable of both carrying ballistic weapons and fulfilling the usual functions of this class, as well as the unfinished battleship USS Kentucky (BB-66) and the large cruiser USS Hawaii (CB-3). The United States was aware of the German concept of underwater missile launchers, but showed little interest in this idea at the time, placing greater hopes in sea-launched cruise missiles for long-range strikes. The newly formed Air Force (United States Air Force) conducted research in ballistic technology, competing with the United States Army's program led by von Braun.
After launching a V-2 rocket from the aircraft carrier Midway in 1947, the United States Navy paid little attention to ballistic missiles, focusing instead on other types of new weaponry – particularly those related to aircraft carriers. One of the few instances of interest from the United States Navy in ballistic missile weaponry during this period came in 1950, when Commander Francis D. Boyle – a World War II submarine commander – proposed adapting existing submarines into guided missile submarines. This innovative idea included, among other things, vertical launch tubes and replacing traditional propeller-based propulsion with pump-jets. However, no ballistic missile program was undertaken by the United States Navy at that time.
The idea gained momentum only after the Soviet Union conducted a hydrogen bomb test on 12 August 1953. Fear of Soviet advancements in strategic missile technology pushed the United States Department of Defense to order the Navy to join the United States Army's IRBM (Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile) program. In the Navy's case, the missile would be launched from surface ships. Naval leadership, however, was highly skeptical of joining the Army's program, which involved the liquid-fueled Jupiter missile. This fuel was considered too hazardous for handling at sea. The missile itself, measuring 18.3 metres, was also thought to be too unwieldy even aboard a surface vessel.
At the time, the Navy had two additional unofficial reasons for its reluctance to pursue a ballistic missile program. First, since the late 1940s, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Ordnance had each been independently developing cruise missile programs (for submarines) intended for land-attack missions. Neither bureau was willing to divert its scientific and engineering resources to a ballistic missile initiative. The second unofficial reason stemmed from the Navy's bitter loss in a high-profile inter-service rivalry with the Air Force over the B-36 bomber versus the United States-class aircraft carriers. This defeat cost the Navy significant prestige and led to the cancellation of the United States carrier program, an episode known as the "Revolt of the Admirals". As a result, Navy leadership wanted to avoid another inter-branch conflict – this time over ballistic missiles. A further and more tangible reason for resistance was concern over the financial burden of developing a new class of weapons outside the Navy's regular budget. Tensions reached a point where Admiral Robert Carney, Chief of Naval Operations from 1953 to 1955, imposed restrictions on naval officers who supported the ballistic missile program.
The position of the United States Navy toward the ballistic missile program changed when Admiral Arleigh Burke assumed the post of Chief of Naval Operations. According to the admiral's biographer, David A. Rosenberg, Burke's support – despite internal opposition within the Navy – for granting the Navy's ballistic missile program the highest priority was the most significant initiative of his first term in that office, from 1955 to 1957. Despite this backing, the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) program for the fleet did not develop well, primarily due to resistance from Navy bureaucracy. Seeking to elevate the program's status and accelerate work on the Navy's own missile, the admiral established the Special Projects Office (SPO), independent of other technical bureaus, with the sole task of developing a sea-based ballistic missile. In these efforts, Admiral Burke had strong support from Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas. On 8 November 1955, the Secretary of Defense launched a joint Army-Navy IRBM program. The Navy's portion of the Jupiter missile project, along with the Air Force's Atlas ICBM program, was granted the highest national priority – Brickbat 01. Work on the naval version of the Jupiter missile gained momentum in 1956, and the deployment of the first missiles aboard modified commercial ships was scheduled for 1959.
On 8 February 1957, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke established the requirements for the developing ballistic missiles, which were to have a range of 1,500 nautical miles (2,778 km) and be ready for operational use by 1965. This range was calculated to enable an attack on the Soviet capital – Moscow – from a submarine positioned in the Norwegian Sea. However, due to Soviet progress in developing strategic rocket weapons, the Polaris program was repeatedly accelerated. Admiral Burke funded it from the regular United States Navy budget, while also seeking resources for the Navy's top-priority programs, including nuclear-powered surface ships and the Polaris project.
The Polaris undertaking became even more urgent on 3 August 1957, when the Soviet Union conducted the world's first long-range ICBM test. During this test, the R-7 missile flew several thousand kilometers from the launch site at Töretam to strike in Siberia. A few weeks later – on 4 October 1957 – the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial Earth satellite, into orbit using the R-7. This prompted Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates to propose, on 23 October of that year, an acceleration of the Polaris program by deploying shorter-range missiles (1,200 nautical miles – 2,225 km) by December 1959, along with three submarines to carry them by mid-1962 at the latest, and a missile with a range of 1,500 nautical miles by mid-1963. A month later, the program was accelerated again by shortening the deadline for preparing the 1,200-nautical-mile missile to October 1960. In December 1957, after meeting the initial schedule for preparing the submarines to carry Polaris missiles, the ballistic missile program's timeline was revised once more, accelerating the delivery of the second Polaris submarine to March 1960 and the third to December of that year.
Construction of the ships
In order to enable the rapid construction of underwater ballistic missile carriers, the United States Navy altered its plans regarding the nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) that had already begun construction. For this reason, the first five units carrying Polaris missiles (SSBN 598–602) were derivatives of the Skipjack-class submarines.
These vessels had a streamlined hull with a single propeller and a nuclear propulsion system using the S5W reactor, delivering 15,000 horsepower. To accommodate ballistic missiles, this class of submarine was lengthened by 39.6 metres – 13.7 m for specialized navigation and missile control systems, 3 m for auxiliary equipment, and 22.9 m for two rows (eight in each) of launch tubes. The choice of 16 launch tubes per submarine was based on polling members of the Special Projects Office (SPO) team and averaging their recommendations. Much larger than the original Skipjack-type submarines, the SSBNs retained the same propulsion plant, which made them significantly slower than the Skipjack-class vessels.
The first SSBN, USS George Washington (SSBN-598), was created by combining components from the submarine Scorpion (SSN-589), whose keel was laid on 1 November 1958, with those of Skipjack. To build the George Washington, a new order was placed, this time for a vessel of a new type, initially designated SSGN(FBN)-588. Due to the development of the Soviet missile program and, more significantly, the political phenomenon known as the "missile gap", the production of SSBN submarines received the highest national priority.