Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza adopted a pro-Iraq stance, while Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation adopted a more ambiguous stance that was widely perceived as pro-Iraq. Palestinian support for Iraq was motivated by a number of factors, including Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's linkage of the Gulf crisis with the Israeli occupation of Palestine, Hussein's anti-Israel posturing, frustrations over the stalled course of the First Intifada, and resentment towards the richer Gulf states.
The stance backfired significantly, as the Iraqi invasion and Palestinian support for the invasion received near unanimous international condemnation and Iraq was resoundingly and quickly defeated in the Gulf War. As a result, most Palestinians in Kuwait were expelled from the country, a socially and economically damaging six-week curfew was placed on the West Bank and Gaza by the Israeli military, the PLO's diplomatic standing was severely damaged, most Arab funding for the PLO was cut, and Palestinians lost much of the international sympathy they had gained in the previous three years due to the harsh Israeli responses to the Intifada. Philip Mattar of the Institute for Palestine Studies has described the Gulf War as "one of the worst setbacks for the Palestinians in modern times." Anthony Lewis of The New York Times wrote that "over many decades Palestinian nationalism has made crucial political mistakes. This may be the worst."
Background First Intifada
The First Intifada was a mass uprising by Palestinians against Israeli occupation that began in December 1987. During its early stages, the Intifada was largely non-violent, with actions including labour strikes, tax strikes, boycotts of Israeli goods, boycotts of Israeli institutions, demonstrations, the establishment of underground classrooms and cooperatives, raisings of the banned Palestinian flag, and civil disobedience. The Israeli government responded to the Intifada with a harsh crackdown, with Minister of Defence Yitzhak Rabin pledging to suppress it using "force, might, and beatings," including ordering Israeli soldiers to break the bones of Palestinian protestors, imposing widespread lockdowns on Palestinian cities, mass arrests, and demolitions of Palestinian houses. During the later stages of the Intifada, as the Israeli crackdown severely damaged the Palestinian economy and morale, as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership-in-exile wrestled to take on greater day-to-day control over the Intifada from the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, and as extremist Islamist factions grew significantly, the uprising grew more violent during its last stages, including Palestinian internal political violence against rumoured collaborators.
Palestinians in Kuwait In 1990, there was a major Palestinian community in Kuwait, with 400 000 Palestinians living in the country. This community represented the largest non-Kuwaiti population in Kuwait and the third largest community of the Palestinian diaspora in the world. This community would play an important role in Kuwait during the second half of the 20th century, particularly being overrepresented among schoolteachers in Kuwait. However, by the late 1980s, tensions between the Palestinian community in Kuwait and the Kuwaiti authorities had grown. Restrictive naturalisation laws meant that few Palestinians were able to gain Kuwaiti citizenship, even those who had been born in Kuwait, which significantly restricted education and employment opportunities for Palestinians. Following the early 1980s recession in Kuwait, the government had also adopted a Kuwaitisation policy, aiming to replace non-citizen workers with citizens, and cut funding to foreign aid initiatives, including an almost 50% cut to its support for the PLO.
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion provoked nearly unanimous international condemnation, culminating in United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 that gave the Iraqi government a final deadline of 15 January 1991 to withdraw its troops from Kuwait or face potential military intervention. After the Iraqi government failed to do so, a 42-state coalition began an aerial bombardment campaign against Iraqi forces on 17 January 1991. Later that day, the Iraqi government began firing missiles towards Israel in an attempt to provoke the Israeli government into joining the war, which it hoped would push Muslim-majority states to withdraw from the Coalition. Iraq would fire a total of 42 Scud missiles at Israel between 17 January and 23 February 1991, killing two civilians directly and up to 74 indirectly. Israel did not join the Coalition, and by the end of February 1991, Kuwait had been liberated.
History PLO stances and statements According to journalists Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early August 1990 caught PLO leader Yasser Arafat by surprise. At a meeting of Arab League foreign ministers on 3 August 1990, the PLO abstained from voting on the resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion but rejecting foreign intervention. On 4 August, the PLO abstained from voting on an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation resolution condemning the invasion. On 10 August, the PLO voted against a new Arab League foreign ministers resolution condemning the invasion that now included language calling for Gulf states' right to self-defence.
Several factions of the PLO did explicitly support the Iraqi invasion, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. PFLP General Secretary George Habash called for "Arab masses and all its nationalist, democratic and progressive forces to resist the American invasion of the Arab region." In early September 1990, Habash made his first visit to Iraq in fourteen years to meet with Hussein. Muhammad Zaidan, leader of the minor Palestinian faction the Palestinian Liberation Front that was based in Iraq, also supported the Iraqi invasion, calling it "the day of the great victory" that would lead to "pan-Arab unity and awakening."
According to Philip Mattar of the Institute for Palestine Studies, by mid-August 1990, even though the PLO had not explicitly supported the Iraqi invasion, a perception had been created "throughout most of the world - including among Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jordan - that the PLO supported Saddam and opposed the international consensus." As a result, some prominent moderate members of the PLO began to issue statements on their own accord, including Salah Khalaf, who stated that "it is unacceptable to occupy others' territory by force" and claimed that the PLO would have supported a resolution calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait "had it not been condemnatory," and Faisal Husseini, who called for "the restoration of Kuwait's self-determination." On 14 August 1990, Youssef M. Ibrahim of The New York Times wrote that the PLO was "deeply divided over what policy to follow," with different parts and individuals of the organisation issuing statements that seemed contradictory of each other.
On 19 August, the PLO issued a statement claiming that it was the victim of a "ferocious political media campaign" that had been distorting its position on the crisis and that it was simply calling for a negotiated settlement. Later in August 1990, Arafat would give his first formal statement on the crisis, summarising the PLO's position as wishing to act as a mediator in the crisis, support of an Arab solution to the crisis without American involvement, and linking Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to Israeli withdrawal from Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
After a mid-October meeting with French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas, Arafat claimed that foreign intervention against Iraq "would be a disaster for everyone," but stated that he was "optimistic, and I am continuing my efforts to bring about a peaceful solution within an Arab context with international collaboration."
In early January 1991, Arafat complained that the US was "asking Palestinians to open talks with their enemies, the Israelis," without being willing to open talks with Iraq, and called for the international community "to solve all the problems in the Gulf, in the Middle East." That month, Arafat visited Iraq to meet with Hussein. On 7 January, Arafat addressed a rally in Baghad, pledging that Palestine and Iraq would stand "together, side by side."
Support for Iraq in Palestine There was widespread grassroots support for Iraq among the populations of Palestine. A number of small demonstrations were held in Palestinian cities following the Iraqi invasion in support of Iraq, and some Palestinians celebrated when Iraq began its Scud missile attacks against Israel in 1991. According to Helena Lindholm Schulz of the University of Gothenburg, "the atmosphere in the West Bank and Gaza during the Gulf War was one of feverish expectation."Lindholm Schulz, Helena. The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood (New Approaches to Conflict Analysis). Manchester University Press, 2000. Page 74. American political scientist and activist Norman Finkelstein wrote in 1992 that "few persons I met in Palestine even understood that cheering the Scud missiles was a "controversial" issue."
In late August 1990, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Saad al-Alami called for Hussein to "get rid of the American army and its allies which are deployed on Saudi soil" and to "act to purify the places sacred to Islam in Mecca and Medina from the foreign invaders."
Support for Iraq among Arab citizens of Israel Arab Democratic Party MK Abdulwahab Darawshe expressed support for the Iraqi invasion, saying in August 1990 that "British imperialism detached Kuwait from Iraq. We support the return of the historic rights."
Causes PLO strategic ambiguity According to journalists Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, Arafat was "trying to resurrect his credibility with the White House and demonstrate that he can act as a peacemaker." According to Philip Mattar of the Institute for Palestine Studies, "Arafat is known to be a master of ambiguity, which allows him to appear to be all things to all people. His "yes/no" approach to politics and diplomacy had served him well in keeping disparate Palestinian groups together and in surviving the minefields of Arab politics. The PLO's position during the gulf crisis seems to be consistent with this approach." In October 1990, Time Magazine argued that, "as Arafat sees it, he is covering his bets. Whether there is war or peace, he reckons, the Palestinian issue will have to be addressed. Moreover, if a peaceful solution is found in the gulf, he figures he will share the credit as a mediator."
Iraqi military strength American researcher Cheryl Rubenberg noted that, as the Soviet Union began its collapse in the late 1980s, the PLO was left "without the diplomatic support of a superpower," while relations with Hafez al-Assad's Syria were extremely poor, relations with Egypt and Jordan cool, and Arab states in the Gulf had begun to cut aid to the PLO during the 1980s, leaving a situation in which "only Iraq appeared to be a genuine ally."Rubenberg, Cheryl. The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Page 26.
According to Helena Lindholm Schulz of the University of Gothenburg, "the Scud missiles fired by Iraq represented a flexing of muscles; it was perceived as though an Arab state was finally threatening the air power of Israel." According to Ann Mosely Lesch of Villanova University, Hussein's "threats appeared credible because he controlled a powerful battle-hardened army that had already used missiles and chemical weapons in war."
Potential for peace negotiations