The Greater Richmond region of Virginia has a collection of multiple infrastructure and government departments that distribute water utility service and drinking water to area residents, industry, and commercial customers.
State Most funding for water system improvement projects comes from the Virginia Clean Water Revolving Loan Fund, which provides funds for water system quality improvements at a low interest rate.
Regional
"Water War" In 1987 the Henrico County Board of Supervisors, wanting to end their reliance on buying water from the independent city of Richmond, decided to construct a water treatment plant at a cost of $70 million, which eventually increased to $86 million. The facility was to be designed such that it could produce 35 million gallons of water a day, with a potential for expansion to 55 million gallons a day.
Richmond was opposed to this idea, as they were expanding their plant at the time from a 96 million gallon a day (MGD) capacity to a 132 MGD capacity, and identified that the plant could be further expanded to produce 150 MGD, which would allow the system to accommodate growth in the entire metropolitan region for the foreseeable future. They argued that any reduction in water sales to Henrico would cause them to lose revenue, which would hamper their ability to expand the plant. The establishment of a new plant, they argued, would also hamper the ability of regional leaders to establish a regional water utility, which would be able to manage, coordinate,a and supply the distribution of water throughout the metropolitan region. Further, they argued that the project would hamper their ability to engage in a massive planned redevelopment of the downtown.
Another point of opposition raised by Richmond city leadership was that the construction of a new water plant further upstream on the James River would drastically reduce and alter the river's flow. The city noted that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) could then limit how much water the city drew into its own plant, which would be even worse for the city. Henrico responded by referencing a study funded by the USACE and prepared by EA Engineering, Science, and Technology, Inc., which said that a Henricoan withdrawal of up to 55 MGD would not substantially alter the river's flow, harm fish populations or habitats, or affect recreational uses. Richmond leaders attacked the validity of the study in response.
Near the end of October 1992, the debate intensified significantly after Richard W. Glover, then-Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, sent a letter to City Council asking that deliberations on the issue become more intentional and conclusive. He charged that the City had increased its charges for water in the 1980s by 175% and that the city was earning an excessive profit of about $3 to $4 million a year on the sale of water to Henrico, which explained the city's reluctance to resolve the dispute. Glover further insinuated that any additional delay could result in the USACE deciding to impose more stringent water intake restrictions on both localities.
Richmond Mayor Walter T. Kenney responded to the letter by saying that the city's profit was only about $350,000, accusing the County of making veiled threats, and saying that the new water plant was not needed and that no new water production facilities would be needed for another 40 years. In response, the Board of Supervisors voted to retain the law firm of Hazel and Thomas to help the county with the water dispute.
A dispute occurred in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, starting in March 1993. An editorial was published arguing that Henrico did not need its own water plant, saying that Richmond's plant expansion would provide the county more water than even the expanded Henrico plant. Then-County Manager Virgil R. Hazelett responded that Henrico's construction of an additional water treatment plant was in line with recommendations made by the Regional Water Resources Plan. He cited the need to provide water during low-flow conditions in the James River and railed against the common perception of Henrico as regionally uncooperative. Another editorial, "The Latest Drop," was published, saying that Henrico's new facility would dramatically harm the city's ability to pursue its riverfront development project. Hazelett responded by saying that the project, especially the portion on the James River and Kanawha Canal, was facing issues for entirely separate reasons, namely that the flow diversion of the James River was very significant and because USACE had found the city's canal improvements to be subject to federal regulations. He said that Henrico's withdrawals would be, at most, 12 percent of all withdrawals from the river. City Manager Robert C. Bobb responded in a letter to the editor, saying that Henrico's construction of a new water plant would unnecessarily cost the region money and would have an overly detrimental impact on the James River.
The Metropolitan Richmond Chamber of Commerce offered to help resolve the dispute. Upon the acceptance of the two localities of the offer, the organization appointed a Technical Committee, composed of prominent area business leaders. The Committee issued a report detailing 4 courses of action, each of which endorsed the County's request to construct and operate its own water treatment plant. A Water Review Panel composed of other prominent area business leaders endorsed the report of the Technical Committee and recommended that several actions be taken, all of which included the construction of a water plant in Henrico. Henrico's leaders endorsed the report's conclusions, whereas those of Richmond continued in their steadfast opposition.
Seeking to keep the dispute out of the public eye, both City Council and the Board of Supervisors authorized Bobb and Hazelett, respectively, to engage in private negotiations regarding the dispute. In May 1994, following a protracted and often contentious series of talks, Bobb and Hazelett issued a 15-point Memorandum of Understanding, mostly resolving the dispute. The Henrico Board of Supervisors endorsed the report, followed by the Richmond City Council. This document formed the basis for the signing of a water agreement between Richmond and Henrico in September 1994.
In the agreement, Henrico agreed to delay the commencement of operations until 2003, in exchange for the city supporting Henrico's facility and its permit application to the USACE to withdraw water from the river. The county also agreed to purchase 25 to 26 MGD from 2003 to 2006, and up to 45 MGD during peak demand periods. From 2006 onward, the county agreed to purchase about 12 MGD, or up to 20 MGD during peak demand periods. The county has the option of purchasing a maximum of 35 MGD, starting in 2006. The county also agreed to support the city's application for permits at various levels of government to redevelop the canal system and downtown riverfront. Additionally, both localities agreed to abide by the James River Management Plan.
In 1996, the USACE granted Henrico the final permit necessary to build the water treatment plant.
Final water purchasing contract In 2023, Henrico purchased about 11 million gallons of water a day from the city, at a cost of about $15 million. It has purchased roughly $20 million worth of water from the city since 2019. Alt URL The county is the city's largest water customer. The contract that allowed for this was made in 1994 and runs through 2040. It absolves both parties of responsibility for a variety of issues, but not negligence. The agreement is designed to remain in force, even if a certain provision is no longer in force. Any change after 2040 would require a 5-year notice period.
1994 proposal In 1994, a proposal to regionalize water, sewer, trash, and transportation services in Henrico, Chesterfield, and Richmond was put up for a vote in the three localities. The counties didn't want to bail out the city, while the city didn't want to lose control; the measure failed. A survey had found around 40% support for the idea.
Richmond The city reservoir is typically at about 18 feet and is located near Byrd Park. There are additional tanks, one of which is called the Cofer Road tank and one of which is called the Ginter Park tank. The Ginter Park tank is smaller than the rest.
The city maintains around 1200 miles of water lines.
The Richmond Department of Public Utilities, which is responsible for the water system, was already involved in customer service and billing issues before the outage. Its working environment was described as being a "culture of complacency," where officials were aware of issues, including broken or substandard systems, but normalized working around the issues, rather than trying to fix them. Training and standard operating procedures were limited, along with proactive planning and staffing.
Before the crisis, DPU did not regularly participate in tabletop planning scenarios, except for participating sometimes with the fire department's sessions. DPU emergency plans were being updated every 5 years before the crisis, which is the minimum recommended by the EPA. The city uses WebEOC, an emergency communications platform, to manage its response to crises. The city did not regularly meet with regional partners to discuss the state of the water treatment plant, nor did it have an "asset management plan" to maintain water infrastructure equipment.
Political strategist Paul Goldman argued that Richmond city leaders cut back on infrastructure spending in the 1980s, as city revenues decreased. A return to increased spending was promised, but never realized, by many in the following decades. Douglas Wilder tried to modernize the city's infrastructure, but political issues got in the way. Goldman argues that Mayor Dwight Jones and Levar Stoney played the race card to the city's detriment, especially the detriment of its infrastructure; and that the focus on Stoney's proposed sports arena happened at the detriment of the city's infrastructure.
When she took the role in 2021, Richmond Department of Public Utilities (DPU) Director April Bingham stated that she inherited a lot of problems at DPU, including those related to customer service, lead service lines, natural gas, storm water, and combined sewer overflows, and that the water plant was not her top priority. Her salary in 2023 was $217,739. She did not hold an engineering degree, unlike the DPU directors in the surrounding counties and her predecessor and replacement; rather, her career was focused on customer service, first in Washington, DC, and then Richmond. She holds a Bachelor's in Business Administration from the University of Mary Washington and a Master's in Public Administration from the University of Phoenix.
It was found that Bingham did not regularly communicate with Henrico's DPU director. In all of 2024, only one meeting was held with the city's major water customers, Hanover, Chesterfield, and Henrico.
The city fluoridates its water, with a target of 0.7 mg/L; the Maximum Contamination Limit (MCL) allowed by the EPA is 4.0 mg/L. The EPA requires waterworks to provide a special notice to customers when fluoride levels pass the secondary MCL of 2.0 mg/L. At levels higher than that, children under 9 can develop cosmetic discoloration of their adult teeth, called dental fluorosis. The city also chlorinates its water.
The employees of the plant are represented by the Teamsters Union.
Since 2023, Levar Stoney's administration spent almost $100,000 on traditional and digital billboards advertising City of Richmond drinking water and saying that it was "Clean, Safe, [and] Reliable." Lamar, which operates the billboards, mistakenly put the ads up during the January and May water crisis, months after new ads from DPU about lead service lines, natural gas safety, and available financial assistance were supposed to have been displayed.