The government response to Hurricane Katrina fell under heavy criticism during the aftermath in the United States in 2005. Local, state, and federal government were accused of failing to prepare and respond effectively to the natural disaster.

Hurricane Katrina landed on August 29, 2005. Within days, the US Government's role in preparations and responding to the storm was covered in heavy public debate. It is thought to be the largely televised footage of distressed politicians and residents who remained in New Orleans without water, food or shelter following the hurricane to be the cause of the criticism. The deaths of several citizens by lack of supplies, and the treatment of evacuees in facilities such as the Superdome also came undone to criticism in the media.

Criticism in New Orleans

New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin was widely condemned for failing to implement a flood plan and for ordering residents to a shelter of last resort without any provisions for food, water, security, or sanitary conditions. Nagin also delayed his emergency evacuation order until less than a day before landfall, leading to the deaths of hundreds of residents who were unable to evacuate the city prior to the disaster." Adding to the criticism was Nagin's refusal to use a fleet of school buses pictured sitting idle in the city in an image syndicated by the Associated Press. Nagin cited a lack of insurance liability and a shortage of bus driversFrontline: The Storm for the decision to order residents to shelter in the Superdome, rather than use the available buses to assist in evacuations.

A temporary coalition set up in New Orleans to deal with Hurricane Katrina was another focus of criticism following the disaster. Public and private actors such as the Red Cross attempted to coordinate joint response and recovery efforts, but misunderstandings and system failures are thought to have contributed to the ineffective, temporary, and inefficient evacuation and provision of resources during the disaster.Burns, P.; Thomas, M.. "The Failure of the Nonregime: How Katrina exposed New Orleans as a Regimeless City". Urban Affairs Review 41 (4): 517-527.

Criticism of the evacuation process New Orleans was already one of the poorest metropolitan areas in the United States in 2005, with the eighth-lowest median income in the country. At 24.5%, Orleans Parish had the sixth-highest poverty rate among U.S. counties or county-equivalents. The 2000 U.S. census revealed that 28% of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people, were without private mobility. Despite these factors preventing many people from being able to evacuate on their own, the mandatory evacuation made no special provisions to evacuate homeless, low-income, or sick individuals, nor the city's elderly or infirm residents. Consequently, most of those stranded in the city were the poor, the elderly, and the sick.

The official evacuation order issued for the hurricane stated that from noon on August 28, all city buses were redeployed to shuttle local residents to "refuges of last resort" that had been designated in advance, including the Louisiana Superdome.Davis, Matthew. "Fema 'knew of New Orleans danger'." BBC News. October 11, 2005. Retrieved on July 18, 2006. The orders also stated that the state had prepositioned enough food and water to supply 15,000 citizens with supplies for three days the anticipated waiting period before the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would arrive in force and provide supplies for those still in the city. Later, it was found that FEMA had provided these supplies, but FEMA Director Michael D. Brown had underestimated the number of citizens requiring support, and subsequently the first wave of supplies were quickly depleted.

A large number of deaths were a result of the insufficient response and evacuation before Katrina's arrival, primarily due to the reluctance of city and state authorities to issue an evacuation order and risk losing face in the event the hurricane left its predicted path. Had contra-flow on highways been initiated sooner and more of the available school buses were used to evacuate residents, it is believed the numbers of stranded New Orleans occupants would have been significantly less, and subsequently the supplies provided by FEMA would have been more adequate.

Federal government response to the state of emergency U.S. President George W. Bush signed a $10.5 billion relief package on the evening of September 2,"Bush signs $10.5 billion disaster aid bill." CNN. September 3, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. and ordered 7,200 active-duty troops to assist with relief efforts.

Due to the slow response to the hurricane, New Orleans's top emergency management official called the effort a "national disgrace" and questioned when reinforcements would actually reach the increasingly desperate city.Staff Writer. "Katrina day-by-day recap." Palm Beach Post. September 1, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. New Orleans's emergency operations chief Terry Ebbert blamed the inadequate response on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). "This is not a FEMA operation. I haven't seen a single FEMA guy", he said. "FEMA has been here three days, yet there is no command and control. We can send massive amounts of aid to tsunami victims, but we can't bail out the city of New Orleans."

In the early morning of September 2, mayor Ray Nagin expressed his frustration at what he claimed were insufficient reinforcements provided by the President and federal authorities."WWL Interview with an Upset New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin." (audio) WWL (AM). September 2, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. "Mayor to feds: 'Get off your asses'." (complete transcript of interview) CNN. September 2, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006.

However, many police, fire and EMS organizations from outside the affected areas were reportedly hindered or otherwise slowed in their efforts to send help and assistance to the area. FEMA sent hundreds of firefighters who had volunteered to help rescue victims to Atlanta for 2 days of training classes on topics including sexual harassment and the history of FEMA.Firefighters stuck in Ga. awaiting orders, Greg Bluestein, Associated Press Writer. "." USA Today. September 7, 2005. Retrieved on December 7, 2009. Official requests for help through the proper chains of command were not forthcoming due to local and state delays in engaging FEMA for federal assistance, even after approached by such authorities. Local police and other EMS workers found the situation traumatic; at least two officers committed suicide, and over 300 deserted the city after gang violence and "turf wars" erupted around the city."House-to-house rescues underway in New Orleans." CNN. September 5, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. A report by the Appleseed Foundation, a public policy network, found that local entities (nonprofit and local government agencies) were far more flexible and responsive than the federal government or national organizations. The federal response was often constrained by lack of legal authority or by ill-suited eligibility and application requirements. In many instances, federal staff and national organizations did not seem to have the flexibility, training, and resources to meet demands on the ground."

Presidential role

Early Tuesday morning, August 30, a day after the hurricane struck, President Bush attended a V-J Day commemoration ceremony at Coronado, California, while looking over the situation with his aides and cabinet officials.Kucher, Karen; Baker, Debbi Farr. "Bush marks the anniversary of World War II's end with comparison to post-war Iraq ." San Diego Union Tribune. August 30, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. 24 hours before the ceremony, storm surges began overwhelming levees and floodwalls protecting the city of New Orleans, greatly exacerbating the minimal damage from rainfall and wind when the hurricane itself veered to the East and avoided a direct hit on New Orleans.MacCash, Doug; O'Byrne, James. "After the mighty storm came the rising water ." Times Picayune. August 30, 2005. Initial reports of leaked video footage of top-level briefings held before the storm claimed that this video contradicted Bush's earlier statements that no one anticipated the breach of the levees.Staff Writer. "Video shows Bush Katrina warning." BBC News. March 2, 2006. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. Transcripts revealed that Bush was warned that the levees may overflow, as were Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin.

Bush was criticised for not returning to Washington, D.C. from his vacation in Texas until after Wednesday afternoon, more than a day after the hurricane hit on Monday. On the morning of August 28, the president telephoned Mayor Nagin to "plead" for a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. Nagin and Governor Blanco decided to evacuate the city in response to that request.

Bush flew over the devastated area in Air Force One as he traveled from Texas back to Washington, D.C.,"Press Release." White House. August 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006. and subsequently visited the Gulf Coast on Friday and was briefed on Hurricane Katrina. Turning to his aides during the flyover, Bush remarked, "It's totally wiped out. It's devastating, it's got to be doubly devastating on the ground." Later, in a televised address from the White House, he said, "We're dealing with one of the worst national disasters in our nation's history."Associated Press. "President vows aid to the storm-hit area." NBC News, August 31, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006.

Vice President Dick Cheney was also criticized in his role in the aftermath. On the night of August 30, and again the next morning, he personally called the manager of the Southern Pines Electric Power Association and ordered him to divert power crews to electrical substations in nearby Collins, Mississippi, that were essential to the operation of the Colonial Pipeline, which carries gasoline and diesel fuel from Texas to the Northeast.Maute, Nikki D. "Power crews diverted." Hattiesburg American. September 11, 2005. Retrieved on July 15, 2006 (copy available at Newsdesk). The power crews were reportedly reluctant to divert the power, as they were in the process of restoring power to two local hospitals, but agreed to comply with the request.

In January 2006, the President gave his 2006 State of the Union Address:

In January 2007, the fired FEMA director Michael D. Brown charged that partisan politics had played a role in the White House's decision to federalize emergency response to the disaster in Louisiana only, rather than along the entire affected Gulf Coast region, which Brown said he had advocated. "Unbeknownst to me, certain people in the White House were thinking, 'We had to federalize Louisiana because she's a white, female Democratic governor, and we have a chance to rub her nose in it,'" Brown said, speaking before a group of graduate students at the Metropolitan College of New York on January 19, 2007. "'We can't do it to Haley [Mississippi governor Haley Barbour] because Haley's a white male, Republican governor. And we can't do a thing to him. So we're just gonna federalize Louisiana.'" The White House fervently denied Brown's charges through a spokeswoman.Toosi, Nahal. "Brown: Politics played role in Katrina." The Associated Press via the Insurance Journal, Jan. 20, 2007.

Discussion of the recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina took a back seat to terrorism and Iraq in his 2006 State of the Union Address. In that speech, Bush did not mention any human suffering caused by the storm or its aftermath and did not acknowledge any shortcomings in his administration's response. Many people criticized Bush for failing to mention hurricane recovery in his 2007 State of the Union Address.Peeples, Melanie. "Bush's State of the Union Omits State of Louisiana", NPR, January 24, 2007.

Investigation of State of Emergency declaration