Brunei People's Independence Party or natively known as the (BAKER), was a political party in Brunei that emerged as a vocal advocate for the country's independence from British protection, parliamentary democracy and national sovereignty. Formed during a period of constitutional debate and political uncertainty, BAKER sought to accelerate Brunei's path to sovereignty and push for greater political representation. The party actively engaged in discussions with the British government and challenged the government's cautious approach to constitutional reforms. Despite its initial momentum, BAKER struggled to gain widespread electoral support, and internal fractures weakened its influence. Following Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's ascension in 1967 and a series of political setbacks, the party's operations gradually declined, leading to its eventual dissolution by 1985.
History Formation
In August 1966, Brunei's political leaders united to form BAKER, a stronger and more organised coalition than its predecessor, the Brunei Alliance Party (BAP). The new alliance emerged from the merger of (BARA) and (PAKAR), following an agreement reached among an impressive gathering of prominent leaders on 31 July 1966. Abdul Hapidz, a former key member of the banned (PRB), led the party, which was established in the wake of the PRB's failed December 1962 uprising. BAKER aimed to strengthen Brunei's political institutions and pressed for swift independence, urging British High Commissioner Fernley Webber to implement the April 1965 accords.
Pengiran Muhammad Ali, the driving force behind BAKER's formation, was elected chairman, while Abdul Hapidz assumed the role of president. Other notable figures involved included Othman Sunggoh, Ghazali Umar, Arshad Marsal, Pengiran Yussof Limbang, Zainal Abidin Puteh, and Abdul Wahab Safar.
"The formation of the new party here is a good sign," remarked Webber during BAKER's launch. Although he typically refrained from involvement in local politics, he acknowledged that the aftermath of the rebellion had created a political void that needed to be filled for the benefit of Brunei and its people. Seizing the moment, BAKER immediately called for independence, believing the timing was ideal.
The easing of regional tensions, particularly in Brunei, following improved relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, further bolstered BAKER's momentum. Former PRB organisers brought their extensive experience in political mobilisation, allowing BAKER to rapidly expand its branch organisations into Seria, Kuala Belait, and Muara. At the same time, members of the Legislative Council (LegCo) openly advocated for the early implementation of the constitutional reforms outlined in White Paper 4/65, amplifying the party's influence both within and outside the LegCo. As the party's presence and demands for reform grew, a confrontation with the government seemed inevitable. Following the LegCo elections on 25 March 1965, BAKER demanded the implementation of the constitutional amendments from White Paper 4/65. Although the paper suggested a ministerial system of governance, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien III did not fully adopt it.
Rise to popularity BAKER's rise in 1966 closely mirrored the ascent of the PRB a decade earlier, solidifying its status as the most prominent political party of its time. Its formation was, in part, facilitated by covert support from Brunei's British administration, which recognised the need for a structured political entity to negotiate a power transition and ensure the success of meaningful constitutional reforms. Reflecting this, Webber expressed his hope that BAKER would "demonstrate [that] there is a repository of experienced and enlightened political leadership in Brunei in which responsibility for an increased range of public affairs could be invested." This echoed the earlier tacit support that the PRB had received from British officials, first from British Resident John Orman Gilbert and later from Dennis White.
There was minimal opposition to BAKER's application to register as a political party, and it was accepted two days after it was submitted. The party's first priority was to seek an audience with Omar Ali Saifuddien to pay traditional respects, similar to the A. M. Azahari-led PRB delegation's visit in 1962 following their electoral victory. In the second week of October 1966, Omar Ali Saifuddien met with BAKER leaders, Abdul Hapidz and Pengiran Ali, where the conversation was polite but informal, with no formal matters discussed. Omar Ali Saifuddien engaged in lighthearted chat, even asking about the date of an upcoming tug-of-war against his team, to which Ghazali, the head of the Tutong District for BAKER, humorously responded that he dared not play again after losing to the Omar Ali Saifuddien's team in a previous match. Despite the informal nature of the meeting, the party pressed on with its objectives.
In response to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's declaration regarding Brunei in the House of Commons in November 1966, BAKER drafted a memorandum urging Omar Ali Saifuddien to expedite Brunei's independence. The party argued that, due to the requirement for Executive Council members to follow the British high commissioner's instructions, Brunei remained under British colonial influence. The memorandum called for immediate independence and the implementation of the constitutional amendments outlined in White Paper 4/65. On 21 November 1966, the document was presented to State Secretary Pengiran Muhammad Yusuf, and by 26 November, after receiving it, British High Commissioner F.D. Webber agreed to forward it to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Arthur Bottomley, for further response. Webber expressed the British government's eagerness to see positive constitutional progress in Brunei and showed sympathy for the country’s desire for independence.
British–Brunei negotiations While documents related to the British–Brunei negotiations after 1964 remain restricted, it appears that the British only acknowledged Omar Ali Saifuddien's rights to negotiate changes to the 1959 Brunei Agreement as part of Brunei's path to full independence. These negotiations were not attended by representatives from Brunei's political parties. The British government pressured Omar Ali Saifuddien to expedite the May 1965 constitutional reforms by using the agreement as leverage, which he saw as separate from the promises he expected from the British.
Webber, assigned to manage the situation, ultimately disregarded the pressure tactics from political parties. BAKER's President, Abdul Hapidz, held the British government accountable for implementing the proposals in White Paper 4/65. In early February 1967, the British government responded to BAKER's memorandum, expressing support for Brunei's desire for independence. However, the Bruneian government ignored this message and refused to engage with any political party delegations regarding constitutional reforms, leaving BAKER's leaders feeling rejected. By February 1967, London had shown some interest in Brunei's political future, but the Bruneian government remained hesitant. By May, it became clear that the white paper outlining political reforms was merely a statement of intent rather than a concrete plan for change.
Concerned about jeopardising the security agreements established in 1959, Omar Ali Saifuddien traveled to London to prevent full independence. In June 1967, Brunei chose to align its currency with Singapore rather than Malaysia, maintaining economic stability through a currency board. BAKER formally appealed to the British administration, criticising Britain for failing to grant Brunei sovereignty and urging an acceleration of the independence process. The British government responded, stating its readiness to grant independence but placing the responsibility for the delay on Omar Ali Saifuddien. In March 1967, BAKER sent a delegation to meet the sultan, demanding an explanation for his stance. However, he refused to meet them, directing them instead to Arthur Adair. Frustrated by Britain's refusal to act, Omar Ali Saifuddien traveled to London, and on 4 October 1967, he abdicated in favour of his son, Hassanal Bolkiah.
In late April 1967, while Omar Ali Saifuddien embarked on a global tour, visiting Australia, the US, and Europe, with plans to visit the United Kingdom in June for talks at the Commonwealth Relations Office, the BAKER party sought to push for the implementation of constitutional proposals in the White Paper. However, their efforts were rebuffed by the sultan, who remained silent on the matter. During his absence, the Brunei government clarified through the Daily Star that the White Paper was only a statement of intent, with its implementation to occur at a pace deemed suitable by the government, marking a significant setback for both the BAKER party and the Commonwealth Office's hopes for democratic reform in Brunei.
In response to BAKER's May 1967 memorandum, the Bruneian government reiterated that the White Paper 4/65 was merely a declaration of the Omar Ali Saifuddien's intentions and that its implementation would be carried out at a pace appropriate for the welfare of the people. This response dealt a major blow to the BAKER party. In contrast, Webber extended an invitation to a BAKER delegation to discuss their plans in the third week of May 1967, expressing sympathy for the party's demands, particularly their desire to be included in discussions regarding the proposed constitutional reforms.
Calls for democratic reform Following Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah's proclamation on 5 October 1967, BAKER's operations sharply declined, and its influence gradually waned amid the ensuing political turmoil. He was under pressure at this point because he was hesitant to adopt a democratic form of governance for fear that it would reduce his absolute power and replace it with a constitutional monarchy. He maintained that his citizens preferred the guided monarchy, which had provided stability and peace to Brunei, and that they were not prepared for such a shift. He was also concerned that Brunei may become more likely to join Malaysia if it adopted a democratic system, particularly since some BAKER party members were drawn to Malaysia's political structure. Abdul Hapidz, had openly expressed his desire for Brunei to eventually merge with Malaysia, stating to Utusan Melayu on 20 October 1967, "We want independence first, after that it will be up to the people. If they want to come into Malaysia, we have no objection."
The BAKER party, alongside the British and Malaysian governments, called on Hassanal Bolkiah to implement a democratic system of government in Brunei. The party urged him to hold a general election in 1968, two years earlier than initially planned. In October 1967, Abdul Latif Hamid, the secretary-general of BAKER, stated that the people of Brunei desired an early election to establish a representative government. In response to the BAKER party's call for an early general election, Omar Ali Saifuddien immediately rejected the claim, stating in an interview with Utusan Melayu that Brunei would not hold a general election for at least ten years. He also reassured Malaysia that British forces would remain in Brunei, despite Britain's plans to withdraw its forces from Singapore and Malaysia. Omar Ali Saifuddien emphasised that the British government would continue to assist Brunei in the event of an attack or external instigation, and he confirmed that the Emergency Regulations in the state would remain in effect.