The ballistic missile program of Iran is the largest in the Middle East and plays a key role in Iran's military and defense strategy, pursuit of regional power projection, and other geopolitical goals. Analysts assess that the Islamic Republic of Iran's varied arsenal of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles are intended to function as "deterrence through retaliation", as an immediate response option to attacks by foreign adversaries. The missile program is also seen as a tool for enhancing the capabilities of the Islamic Republic's non-state allies in the West Asia and overall bolstering national defense capabilities.

The program aims to offset its adversaries' conventional military superiority, particularly given that international sanctions against Iran since the 1979 revolution have hampered its ability to maintain and upgrade its air force. The Iranian government has adopted a "deterrence by punishment" approach to counter threats by enemies and rivals such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. Concerns about the ballistic program's potential connection to Iran's nuclear ambitions, especially as a means for delivery of nuclear warheads, have led to international scrutiny and sanctions.

The program is primarily led by two state entities: the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which oversee several subordinate missile entities and front companies that procure needed ingredients, components, and equipment from foreign suppliers. The Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO) is tasked with advancing the country's ballistic missile capabilities.

In February 2026, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran deliberately limits the range of its missiles to 2,000 km. On 20 March, Iran launched two missiles toward the British base on Diego Garcia, around 4,000 km from Iran, according to U.S. officials. Iranian officials denied this.

History Iran's missile program originated during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War as a means to deter Iraqi Scud attacks during the War of the Cities phase of the conflict and to compensate for its lack of modern air power amid U.S. sanctions. In 1984, Iran obtained its first contingent of ballistic missiles (20 Soviet "Scud-B" SRBMs) from Libya and subsequently procured Scud derivatives and launchers from North Korea and China. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, regarded as the father of Iran's missile program, sought expertise and blueprint designs from North Korea. He designed missiles with an operational range of up to 2000 km to target Israel.

By the 1990s, Iran had reverse-engineered the Scud-B to produce the Shahab-1 (a range of 330 km) and Shahab-2 (a range of 500km) missiles, as well as Zelzal and Fateh short-range rockets. In the 2000s, Iran introduced longer-range systems (e.g. the liquid-fueled Shahab-3 MRBM, based on the Scud-C) and began testing two-stage solid-fueled designs (e.g. the Sejjil-2 MRBM). Key milestones include the public debut of Shahab-3 in 1998 (a range of ∼1,300 km) and the solid-fuel Sajjil in 2008. By 2010, Iran was unveiling newer variants (e.g. Qiam-1 in 2010, Zolfaghar in 2016) and integrating missile tests with its growing space launch program. Throughout this period the program's drivers included deterrence of Israel and Arab states of the Persian Gulf, asymmetrical warfare doctrine, and prestige, as summed up by experts: "Iran's ballistic missile programme… is an important element of military doctrine, a means of deterrence, and a tool of statecraft".

The 2010s were marked by prioritization of improved accuracy and development of precision-guidance technology over increased range.https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program The Fateh-110 in this period underwent many modifications to improve its accuracy and range, resulting in a number of derivatives – Zolfaghar, Fateh-313, Kheibar Shekan, etc.https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program

In February 2025, Iran appeared to be rearming its missile program. A ship carrying 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a chemical crucial for solid propellant production in missiles, arrived at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. This shipment could facilitate the production of propellant for about 260 Kheibar Shekan missiles or around 200 Martyr Hajj Qassem Soleimani ballistic missiles. The shipment highlights Iran's continuing dependence on international sources for critical materials.

In June 2025, during the Twelve-Day War, The Economist reported that 6% of 500 missiles fired by Iran towards Israel hit built-up areas.

Iran intensified efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program following the losses it sustained during the 2025 Twelve-Day War, and after the war, production of ballistic missiles quickly resumed. Iran was reported to have replenished its stockpile of approximately 2,000 missiles, while it was said to have made significant developments in the capabilities of its missiles. Iran's reported rearmament occurred despite the reinstating of United Nations sanctions restricting arms transfers and ballistic missile activity through the JCPOA "snapback" mechanism in late September 2025. The sanctions were intended to prevent Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including delivery of materials which could contribute to such activity.

European intelligence sources and a CNN investigation report that since the reimposition of sanctions, Iran received multiple large shipments of sodium perchlorate from China, totaling approximately 2,000 tons, delivered to the port of Bandar Abbas. This was in addition to an earlier shipment of 1000 tons delivered to Iran from China in February 2025. Sodium perchlorate, while not explicitly banned by the sanctions, falls under the broader prohibition of providing "items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology" which could contribute to Iran's missile program, and is a precursor in the production of ammonium perchlorate, the primary oxidizer in solid-fueled rocket motors used in Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles, whose provision to Iran is prohibited explicitly.

Reports that the shipments were facilitated through a network of Chinese suppliers, front companies, and cargo vessels, some of which were already under U.S. sanctions, were corroborated by ship-tracking data and satellite imagery. The reports included evidence of repeated voyages between Chinese ports and Iran and, in some cases, deliberate efforts to obscure vessel movements. Analysts assess that the quantities delivered could allow the production of five hundred missiles, which would demonstrate a determined attempt by Iran to replenish depleted stockpiles.

On 22 December 2025, Iran reportedly conducted ballistic missile tests over Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, Khorramabad and Mahabad. Initially, IRGC aligned media notified the public about the tests, while citing various videos of missile deployment surfacing from many locations, however state-run IRIB News Agency denied the launches had ever taken place, stating that the white trail was "an aircraft contrail at high altitude" and that the images were "inaccurate".

During the 2026 Iran War, ballistic missiles were used to target U.S. bases in the Middle East as well as targets in neighboring Arab states, as well as Israel. The IDF and the US began a campaign of airstrikes targeting the ballistic missile launchers to limit the ability of Iran to launch missiles. As a result the number of daily ballistic missile launches was reduced by 86% after the first week of the war. There have also been four instances of Iranian ballistic missiles entering Turkish airspace during the war, all of which were downed by NATO air defenses. Iran has denied targeting Turkey with ballistic missiles, with Turkish officials suggesting that the missiles may have intended to target Cyprus but veered off course.

Iran reportedly fired missiles towards the UK-US base on Diego Garcia, part of the Chagos Islands, which is around 4,000km (2,500 miles) from Iran, overnight between 19 and 20 March. However, an Iranian official later denied the claim. The Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran Esmail Baghaei called it a false flag operation and accused Israel of launching the missiles at the base.

Types Iran's ballistic missile arsenal is estimated to include somewhere between 3000 and 4000 missiles prior to the 2026 Iran war. This large inventory comprises a diverse array of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), with a range of 300–1000 km, and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with a range of 1000–3000 km. According to a statement made by Iranian Parliament member of the Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy, Amir Hayat Moghadam, all of Europe, and in particular Britain, France and Germany are in range of Iranian MRBMs, while major US cities such as Washington and New York, beyond range at approximately 10,000 km away, may be targeted by missiles launched from the sea.

In addition, Iran has outfitted various types of its missiles with cluster munition capabilities to disperse small bomblets from the head of the missile. The munitions are capable of carrying up to 5 kg (11 lb) of explosive material and released at high altitudes, which are released during the missile's flight at a high altitude and disperse over a radius of several miles. According to analysts, most of Iranian missiles equipped with cluster munitions are able to accommodate up to 24 bomblets, though the more advanced Khorramshahr missile can carry up to 80 such munitions. Iran has deployed such outfitted missiles extensively during both the 2025 and 2026 wars against Israel, in what observers consider an effort to evade the latter's multi-layered air defense system and exhaust the supply of interceptors. Iran's use of this tactic to target adversaries has been described as "indiscriminate" by human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, given that the cluster munitions do not aim for precise targets and randomly disperse. In the past two wars with Israel, both organizations issued reports criticized Iran for launching cluster bombs into densely-populated civilian areas, calling them violations of international humanitarian law and possible war crimes.

Table

Short-range ballistic missiles 300–1,000 km range

Source: Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 – Liquid-fueled missiles with ranges of 350 km and 750 km, respectively. Qiam-1 – A liquid-fueled SRBM with a range of 750 km and a smart targeting system. Fateh-110 family – A series of solid-fueled missiles, including: Fateh-110 (300 km range) Fateh-313 (500 km range) Zolfaghar (750 km range) Hormuz series – Anti-ship SRBMs with ranges of about 300 km.

Medium-range ballistic missiles 1,000–3,000 km range

Source: Shahab-3 variants – Liquid-fueled MRBMs with ranges between 1,200 km and 2,100 km. Qasem Basir – An improved Haj Qasem variant, with better precision and evasion mechanisms and a range of 1,200 kilometers. Haj Qasem – A solid-fueled MRBM with an estimated range of 1,400 km. Kheybar shekan – A precision-strike ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 km. Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 – Hypersonic missiles reportedly capable of Mach 13 speeds, with ranges of 1,400 km and 1,500 km, respectively. Etemad, meaning "trust" in Persian, capable of traveling 1,700 kilometers. Ghadr-110 – A liquid-fueled MRBM with a range of 2,000–3,000 km. Sejjil – A two-stage, solid-fueled MRBM with a range of 2,000 km. Khorramshahr – A liquid-fueled MRBM that can carry multiple warheads, with a range of 2,000 km. Emad – An improved Shahab-3 variant with better precision and a range of 2,000 km.

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (disputed) 3,000–5,500 km range

Unknown Type