The government of the People's Republic of China has imposed financial and trade restrictions against individuals, entities, and jurisdictions whose actions it has determined to be contrary to certain national interests. China maintains three unilateral sanctions programs in addition to implementing the multilateral sanction decisions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.
China's three unilateral sanctions programs are separately administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and the Taiwan Affairs Office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains a sanctions list that imposes travel, trade, and financial restrictions against targeted individuals and entities accused of interfering with China's domestic affairs or endangering China's interests. The Ministry of Commerce maintains the Unreliable Entity List, which heavily restricts allowable business and investment activity in China by listed entities. The Taiwan Affairs Office implements sanctions against Taiwan and targets entities and individuals accused of promoting Taiwanese independence.
Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common instrument in China's foreign policy, particularly as the country's economic power has grown in recent years. Compared to Western sanctions—typically led by the United States and the European Union—China's use of economic sanctions exhibits several notable differences. Influenced by international norms, domestic political and economic structures, and concerns over its international reputation, China tends to employ sanctions in a more restrained and low-profile manner. Although the frequency of Chinese sanctions has risen significantly in recent years, it remains relatively rare for China to impose sanctions as proactively or publicly as Western powers. Several key characteristics distinguish Chinese economic sanctions:
Ambiguous and informal announcements
Unlike in Western countries, Chinese sanctions are not typically imposed through clear legal or administrative orders. Instead, they are often announced via statements by relevant government agencies, serving to create a sense of threat or coercion. For this reason, scholars frequently describe Chinese sanctions as "informal sanctions". A notable example is the dispute between China and South Korea over the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in 2016. In response, Chinese authorities ordered the suspension of 74 Lotte supermarkets for fire safety violations and informally blacklisted several South Korean companies, effectively halting commercial interactions. These measures lacked formal legal basis but had tangible punitive effects.
This ambiguity allows the Chinese government greater policy flexibility. However, the pattern began to shift following the U.S.–China trade war, as China introduced a series of legal instruments—such as the Unreliable Entity List and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law—to formalize and legitimize its use of sanctions. Despite these developments, many sanctions continue to be issued through diplomatic statements without formal legal codification.
In September 2020, the Ministry of Commerce issued new rules allowing for the creation of the Unreliable Entity List, and the National People's Congress followed up soon after in June 2021 by promulgating the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, which established a legal framework for maintaining previous sanctions. The law also allowed Chinese ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Taiwan Affairs Office, to implement new blocking sanctions against foreign individuals and entities. The Taiwan Affairs Office announced a sanction under the new law in November 2021, and the Ministry of Commerce announced its first Unreliable Entity List designation in February 2023.
Focus on specific issues
Chinese sanctions are often closely tied to issues of diplomacy and national sovereignty; for example, the rare earth export ban on Japan amid the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute and agriculture import ban on Taiwan during Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. In practice, Chinese economic sanctions tend to be more symbolic than substantive—frequently described as "more bark than bite." They are often short in duration but intense in impact, aiming to compel the target to yield quickly under pressure.
Focus on individuals, corporations, and public mobilization
Chinese sanctions are primarily directed at foreign individuals and companies, rather than foreign governments—a notable contrast to the approaches of the United States or the European Union, which sometimes target entire governments. In addition, China often encourages its domestic population to reduce consumption of goods from the targeted country, thereby enhancing the impact of sanctions through patriotic appeals. This strategy blends state action with public participation to amplify pressure on the target.
As of August 2024, over 100 individuals and entities have been sanctioned by China.
Scholars have created Chinese Economic Sanctions database from 1949 to 2020, including 135 cases in which China is the sender and 88 cases in which China is the target, and the dataset can be downloaded on GitHub.
Sanctions announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs + Date Country/Region Individual/entity Position when sanctioned Restrictions Travel restriction Prohibit contact Asset freeze 2 December 2019 National Endowment for Democracy National Democratic Institute for International Affairs International Republican Institute Human Rights Watch Freedom House 13 July 2020 Congressional-Executive Commission on China Sam Brownback United States Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom 13 July 202010 August 2020 Marco Rubio United States Senator 13 July 202010 August 2020 Ted Cruz 13 July 202010 August 2020 Chris Smith Member of the U.S. House of Representatives 14 July 2020 / 26 October 2020 / 21 February 2022 / 16 February 2023Lockheed Martin CorporationU.S. defense company 10 August 2020 Josh Hawley United States Senator Tom Cotton Pat Toomey Carl Gershman President of the National Endowment for Democracy Derek J. Mitchell President of the Institute for Democracy in International Affairs Daniel Twining President of the International Republican Institute Kenneth Roth Executive director of the Human Rights Watch Michael Abramowitz President of Freedom House26 October 2020Boeing Defense, Space & SecurityU.S. defense company26 October 2020 / 21 February 2022 / 16 February 2023Raytheon Corporation26 October 2020 30 November 2020 John Knaus Senior Director of the Asia Affairs of the National Endowment for Democracy Manpreet Singh Anand Asia Project Leader of the Institute for Democracy in International Affair Crystal Rosario Hong Kong Branch Director of the Institute for Democracy in International Affairs Kelvin Sit Tak-O Hong Kong Project Director of the Institute for Democracy in International Affairs 21 January 2021 Mike Pompeo Former U.S. Secretary of State Peter Navarro Former Director of Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Robert C. O'Brien Former U.S. National Security Advisor David R. Stilwell Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Matt Pottinger Former Deputy National Security Advisor Alex Azar Former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Keith J. Krach Former Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Kelly Craft Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton Former U.S. National Security Advisor Steve Bannon Former Senior Counselor to the President 22 March 2021 Reinhard Bütikofer Member of the European Parliament Michael Gahler Raphaël Glucksmann Ilhan Kyuchyuk Miriam Lexmann Sjoerd Sjoerdsma Member of the House of Representatives Samuel Cogolati Member of the Chamber of Representatives Dovilė Šakalienė Member of the Seimas Adrian Zenz Researcher Björn Fredrik Jerdén Political and Security Committee European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights Mercator Institute for China Studies Alliance of Democracies Foundation 26 March 2021 Tom Tugendhat Member of ParliamentChairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee Ian Duncan Smith Member of Parliament Neil O'Brien Member of Parliament David Alton Member of the House of Lords Tim Loughton Member of Parliament Nus Ghani Member of Parliament Helena Kennedy Member of the House of Lords Geoffrey Nice Lawyer Joanne Smith-Finley Activist on Uyghur issues China Research Group Conservative Party Human Rights Commission Uyghur Tribunal Essex Court Chambers 27 March 2021 Gayle Conelly Manchin Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Tony Perkins Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Michael Chong Member of Parliament Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development 17 April 2021 Jónas Haraldsson Lawyer 26 May 2021 Johnnie Moore Jr. Member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021 Wilbur Ross Former U.S. Secretary of Commerce 23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021 Carolyn Bartholomew Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021 Jonathan N. Stivers Former Director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021 Doyun Kim National Democratic Institute 23 July 2021 / 30 December 2021 Adam J. King International Republican Institute Authorized Representative in Hong Kong 23 July 2021 Sophie Richardson Human Rights Watch China Director Hong Kong Democracy Council 21 December 2021 Nadine Maenza Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Nury Turkel Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom Anurima Bhargava Member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom James W. Carr 5 August 2022 Nancy Pelosi Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 12 August 2022 Agnė Vaiciukevičiūtė Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications 16 September 2022 Gregory J. Hayes Chairman of Raytheon Technologies Ted Colbert President and CEO of Boeing Defense, Space & Security 23 December 2022 Miles Yu Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute